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Introduction 
Since the seminal paper of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation between 
ownership and control of modern corporations and followed by the work by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) on the agency costs related to such separation, the academic research pays 
special attention on the effect of ownership structure on corporate finance and governance. 
Boyd and Solarina (2016) conduct a 30-year (1980-2013) review of management and finance 
studies that focus on corporate ownership structure and document that institutional ownership 
is the most frequently studies type of ownership. Resent research on the corporate ownership 
structure focuses on institutional investors due to their dominate role in the financial markets 
and their effective role as external corporate mechanism (Gillan and Starks, 2003).  
Moreover, institutional ownership has been increasing in many countries around the 
world for the past six decades. For instance, recent evidence shows that the total financial assets 
held by institutional investors increased from 79% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 413% 
between 1960 and 2016 (OECD, 2017). Nowadays institutional investors have become 
particularly important shareholders in Anglo-American countries (Blume and Keim, 2017; 
Mallin, 2018). Institutional investors are not only large but also sophisticated shareholders who 
have the power to determine the strategy of the firm (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Gillan and 
Starks, 2003; Tihanyi et al., 2003) and therefore the firm’s outcome [for a recent review, see 
Goranova and Ryan (2014)].  
Institutional investors are ‘very heterogeneous and have different governance structures 
and regulatory requirements’ (Boyd and Solarina, 2016, p.1284); thus, they have different 
abilities and incentives to monitor and emergent with their investee firms. A common 
distinction between institutional investors that recent research focuses on is the investment 
horizon of these investors. A recent survey of institutional investors by McCahery, Sautner and 
Starks (2016) highlights that institutional investors with a longer investment horizon tend to 
monitor the management of their investee firms using the several tools at their disposal more 
than their short-term counterparts. Prior studies argue that these investors as rational 
shareholders have the bigger incentive to effectively monitor their investee firms on an ongoing 
basis to maximize long-run value [see for example, Bushee (2001), Chen, Harford and Li 
(2007), Froot, Perold and Stein (1992), Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) and Harford, Kecskés 
and Mansi (2018)]. Consequently, this thesis focuses on the role of institutional investors with 
long-term investment horizon on corporate finance and corporate governance using a 
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comprehensive dataset of all public firms traded on the London Stock Exchange over the period 
from 2000 to 2016.  
The UK provides an interesting country context for studying institutional investors 
because the level of institutional ownership in the UK is one of the highest in the world 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Also, while the US and UK share many similarities in governance 
systems (i.e., a common law system and high protection of minority rights), important 
differences include the role and rights of institutional investors and the nature of corporate 
governance reforms. The UK corporate governance system is often described as being 
shareholder-led. Contrary to the US’s regulator-led approach, it gives shareholders the 
independence of deciding which monitoring strategy to employ to protect their interests. In the 
UK, regulators and policymakers tend to empower shareholders to engage with their investee 
firms, which can be clearly seen through shareholder rights granted by corporate law (Davies, 
Mulley and Bardell, 2019). The Companies Act 2006, Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance, and Stewardship Code are some examples of the encouraging legal environment 
towards shareholder activism. Indeed, Davies, Mulley and Bardell (2019) argue that the UK’s 
legal and regulatory framework of shareholder rights is the most empowering for shareholder 
activism when comparing to other European country frameworks. Institutional investors in the 
UK have been reported to engage more with the firm management and regularly meet with the 
board and top management to discuss strategies, governance issues, and financial performance 
(Williams and Conley, 2005; Aguilera et al., 2006). The mainstream UK institutions have 
senior managers responsible for corporate governance activities and dedicated teams of 
corporate governance experts, who often meet with the managers or boards of their portfolio 
companies (Hendry et al., 2007). 
Thus, the UK setting is particularly suited for testing theories of monitoring, 
engagement and trading aimed to study the role of institutional ownership on corporate finance 
and corporate governance as the UK setting has several characteristics that are necessary to 
increase monitoring, engagement and trading. On the one hand, institutional investors in the 
UK have been encouraged through the various corporate governance codes and guidance 
(including the Stewardship codes) to be a potent force for helping ensure good governance in 
their investee companies. On the other hand, UK equity markets have a high degree of 
efficiency and the listing rules favour independent shareholders.   
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This thesis provides empirical evidence on the important role of institutional ownership 
on corporate finance and corporate governance in the context of the UK. In particular, the first 
two essays of the thesis focus on the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon on 
corporate cash policies. The third/last essay investigates the effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on shareholder proposals as effective tool/channel of corporate changes. 
Research on corporate cash holdings has been one of the central topics in corporate 
finance literature during the last few decades, especially in the last twenty years since the 
publication of influential articles by Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) and Opler et al. (1999). 
Amess, Banerji and Lampousis (2015) argue that the increase in interest for this topic can be 
attributed to that companies all over the world have been consistently increasing the amounts 
of cash they hold over time. For example, in the UK,  while corporate cash holdings represented 
9.9% of firms’ total assets during the 1990s (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004), it has represented 13.7% 
during the last two decades (Farinha, Mateus and Soares, 2018). Similar trends have been 
documented on other developed and emerging markets. Indeed, the increase of firms’ cash 
holdings worldwide increased both the interest of scholars and practitioners on this topic, with 
the main aims to identify the motives, the drivers and the consequences for holding cash [for a 
recent review, see Weidemann (2018)]. 
The first essay of the thesis aims not only to investigate the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on cash holdings but also considers the role of the firms’ contexts. Prior 
studies show that cash is a valuable strategic asset (George, 2005; Kim and Bettis, 2014) that 
creates shareholder value, especially when used for adaptation in the face of uncertainties (Deb, 
David and O’Brien, 2017). Building on economic perspectives, the behavioural theory and the 
value-creation versus value-appropriation literatures, I argue that the effect of long-term 
institutional investors on cash holdings depends on the magnitude of the agency costs and is 
driven by the implications of cash for firm performance that are context specific. My analysis 
shows that there is a negative relationship between long-term institutional ownership and 
corporate cash holdings, and this relationship is larger for firms with high agency costs. 
Moreover, I focus on different contexts (firm diversification, industry R&D intensity and 
industry growth) of the implications of cash for firm performance, and I find that the negative 
relationship between long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings is also significantly 
moderated by the firms’ contexts.  
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The first essay provides several contributions. First, this essay contributes to the 
empirical literature on cash holdings. Despite the interesting institutional setting in the UK, 
empirical studies on the role of institutional investors in monitoring a firm’s cash holdings have 
focused mainly on US firms though documented mixed results. Additional evidence from the 
UK is therefore useful in developing a broader view on the role of institutional investors in 
monitoring a firm’s cash holdings. Second, this essay also makes theoretical contributions.  On 
the one hand, I argue and find that the magnitude of agency costs could aggravate or alleviate 
the negative relationship between long-term institutional ownership and firm cash holdings. 
On the other hand, I further show that this relationship not only depends on the agency costs 
but is also moderated by the implications of cash for firm performance that are context specific. 
The second essay of the thesis aims to the effect of long-term institutional ownership 
on cash holdings considering the cash deviation from the optimal level of cash. Prior studies 
find that the cash deviation from the optimal level of cash has a significant negative effect on 
firm’s operating performance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van 
der Waal, 2013; Chen and Shane, 2014; Oler and Picconi, 2014) and value (Harford, Mansi 
and Maxwell, 2008; Martínez-Sola, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2013; Lin and Chiu, 
2017). Building on the agency theory and the precautionary needs for cash holdings, I argue 
that the effect of long-term institutional investors on cash holdings depends on the cash 
deviation from the optimal level of cash. My analysis shows that while long-term institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with cash holdings only for firms with excess cash, firms 
with a high presence of long-term institutional investors increase cash when they hold cash 
below the optimal level. Moreover, I find that long-term institutional ownership is associated 
with higher value of cash holdings and is positively moderating the negative relationship 
between excess cash and operating performance.  
The second essay makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the cash holding 
literature by focusing on the deviation of cash holdings. Previous literature has extensively 
studied the determinants of cash level. Focusing of the cash deviation has two distinctive merits. 
One the one hand, it enables us to empirically examine the discretionary component of cash 
that is not explained by the firm’s fundamental needs for cash and is documented by recent 
literature to have negative effect on firm’s value. On the second hand, the cash deviation is a 
suitable variable for capturing both agency concerns (i.e. cash above optimum) and 
precautionary motives (i.e. cash below optimum) of corporate cash, and such multi-view 
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approached is urged by corporate governance scholars. Second, the second essay provides 
additional evidence on the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon on corporate 
cash policy. Studying the investment horizon of institutional investors and cash deviation 
together enables us to test the heterogonous effect of institutional ownership on cash. Therefore, 
my results can help explain the contradictory findings in the literature on the effect of 
institutional investment horizon on cash policy. Finally, this essay provides a comprehensive 
investigation on the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon on corporate cash 
policy within a single recent context. Prior studies while document consistent increases in the 
level and value of corporate cash holdings since the 1980s, they attribute these trends to several 
market and corporate factors depending on the period of time (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; 
Bates, Chang and Chi, 2018). Thus, using one context for a recent period to comprehensively 
study the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash level, the value of cash and the 
use of excess cash, can help extend the existing literature with comprehensive and consistent 
results. 
The last essay of the thesis aims to study the role of institutional investors’ investment 
horizon on shareholder proposals. Particularly, it investigate the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the probability of shareholder proposals targeting, market reaction 
to shareholder proposals, and voting outcome of these proposals. The shareholder proposal is 
a powerful governance tool available to shareholders in the UK to implement corporate changes 
in their investee firms, and is even more powerful than in the US (Buchanan et al., 2012). 
Building on the agency view and the monitoring function of institutional investors, I argue that 
the presence of institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon is associated with a 
lower probability of shareholder proposals targeting and a better outcome of shareholder 
proposals. My analysis shows that firms with high proportions of long-term institutional 
ownership is less likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. Moreover, I find that while 
long-term institutional ownership is positively associated with cumulative abnormal return 
(CARs) around the general meeting dates, it is negatively (positively) associated with dissent 
(in favour) voting on shareholder proposals.   
The last essay makes several contributions. First, this essay contributes to the literature 
on the role of investor horizon on firm decision-making. On the one hand, while empirical 
studies mainly focus on the correlation relationship between investor horizon and several firms’ 
corporate decisions and governance practices, little is known about how that correlation occurs. 
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This essay not only confirms the previously reported important role of investor horizon on 
influencing a firm’s policies, governance and strategies, but also provides evidence on how 
such impact has occurred. Second, this essay argues that it is important to differentiate between 
institutional investors based on their investment horizon when studying shareholder activism. 
In particular, while the literature on shareholder proposals mainly documents that institutional 
ownership and shareholder proposals targeting are positively correlated, such results are 
contradictory to the common expectation of the effective monitoring function of institutional 
shareholders (Goranova et al., 2017). The results documented in this essay conversely show 
that institutional ownership of long-term shareholders decreases the likelihood of shareholder 
proposals targeting. Finally, this essay aims to broaden the empirical literature of shareholder 
proposals by not only providing additional evidence from the UK, but also by conducting a 
comprehensive analysis of shareholder proposals using a long and recent sample of shareholder 
proposals. Recent and comprehensive evidence on the determinants and outcomes of 
shareholder proposals is important, as recent literature documents the evolution over time of 
the use of shareholder proposals by activist shareholders, positive market reaction around 
proposal submission, and positive votes cast by voting shareholders. 
Overall, this thesis aims to investigate the role of institutional ownership, particularly 
long-term institutional investors, on corporate finance and corporate governance. The findings 
in this thesis support the proposed arguments/predictions and provide evidence on the effective 
monitoring role of long-term institutional ownership. Several estimations strategic/techniques 
are employed to check the robustness of these findings. The documented empirical findings 
suggests new directions and potential avenues for future research. This thesis makes several 
empirical and theoretical contributions.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Essay 1 investigates the effect of long-
term institutional ownership on cash holdings and the moderating role of the firms’ contexts, 
Essay 2 studies the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the level and value of cash 
holdings considering the cash deviation from the optimal level of cash, Essay 3 investigates 
the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the probability of shareholder proposals 
targeting, market reaction around shareholder proposal meetings, and voting outcome of 
shareholder proposals, Finally,  the conclusion summaries the findings and the suggested 
potential avenues for future research of these essays.  
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Essay 1. Long-term institutional investors’ ownership and cash 





This study provides novel empirical evidence on the impact of long-term institutional investors’ 
ownership on firms’ cash holdings using a large sample of UK listed firms for the period 2000–
2016. I build on economic perspectives, the behavioural theory and the value-creation versus 
value-appropriation literatures. My analysis shows that long-term institutional investors’ 
ownership is associated with lower firm cash holdings and that this negative relationship is 
significantly more pronounced for firms with high agency costs. I further show that the link 
between long-term institutional investors’ ownership and cash holdings is context specific. 
Firms with a high proportion of long-term institutional investors hold more cash if they are 
more diversified and face lower agency costs. However, firms with a high proportion of long-
term institutional investors are pressured to further reduce their cash holding when agency costs 
are high, even if they operate in industries with high growth opportunities or in industries with 
high R&D intensity. Overall, my findings are robust to several estimation strategies. 
 
Keywords: Institutional investors, investment horizon, cash holdings, firm diversification, 




*This paper has been peer-reviewed and accepted at the British Academy of Management Conference – BAM 
2020 where it has been presented on September 2020 and awarded the Best Full paper in the Corporate 
Governance Track, the 6th Annual International Corporate Governance Society Conference – ICGS 2020 where it 
has been presented on November 2020, and the European Academy of Management Conference – EURAM 2020 
where it has been presented on December 2020. 
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1. Introduction 
Companies all over the world have been consistently increasing the amounts of cash 
they hold over time. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) show that corporate cash has been doubled 
between 1980 and 2003 to reach 23.2% of the total assets of US firms. Similar trends were 
documented in other developed countries [see Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) for evidence 
from Japan; García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2008) for evidence from Spain; and Schauten, 
van Dijk and der Waal (2013) for evidence from large companies all over Europe]. Emerging 
markets also picked up the trend: Chen et al. (2012) report that the percentage of cash to total 
assets is 20% in China and a recent article in The Economist1 states that South Korean firms 
hold $440 billion in cash, which represents approximately 34% of the country’s GDP. More 
recently, uncertainty associated with Brexit has triggered UK companies to significantly 
increase their cash holdings (The Deloitte CFO Survey, Q1 2019). In particular, UK companies 
held a record £747 billion in cash at the end of 2018, equivalent to 35% of GDP and almost 
one-third higher than in early 2016. 
The increase of firms’ cash holdings worldwide increased both the interest of scholars 
and practitioners on this topic, with the main aims to identify the motives, the drivers and the 
consequences for holding cash [for a recent review see, Weidemann (2018)]. Overall, prior 
studies show that cash is a valuable strategic asset (George, 2005; Kim and Bettis, 2014) that 
creates shareholder value, especially when used for adaptation in the face of uncertainties (Deb, 
David and O’Brien, 2017). While holding large amounts of cash could be beneficial for 
shareholders in the face of uncertainties, it could also be detrimental for shareholders if these 
high levels of cash are not used to create shareholder value. A main concern for shareholders 
is that large cash holdings accumulated by firms could be easily misused by opportunistic 
managers (i.e. agency cost, see Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Jensen, 1986). Given this 
concern, recent literature using several perspectives (such as agency theory, behavioural theory, 
resource dependence theory, critical mass theory and so on) has been focusing on the drivers 
of cash holding and mechanisms that maximize/reduce the benefits of holding cash. For 
example, studies have been focused on firms’ characteristics (Kim and Bettis, 2014; Aktas, 
Louca and Petmezas, 2019), their governance quality (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford, 
Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017), industry context (Chen, 2008; Deb, 
 
1 ‘A $2.5 trillion problem’, The Economist, September 27th, 2014. 
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David and O’Brien, 2017), and CEO characteristics (Aktas, Louca and Petmezas, 2019). 
Despite the large number of studies, the findings of these studies are still mixed and 
inconclusive [see for example, Weidemann, (2018)]. In this paper, I aim to contribute to this 
literature by examining how long-term institutional investors’ ownership affects firms’ cash 
holdings, focusing on the moderating role of contexts, while accounting for the magnitude of 
agency costs. 
My focus on the role of institutional investors’ ownership is motivated by their 
dominant position among corporate owners. Institutional ownership has been increasing in 
many countries around the world for the past six decades. Nowadays institutional investors 
have become particularly important shareholders in Anglo-American countries (Blume and 
Keim, 2017; Mallin, 2018; OECD, 2017). Institutional investors are not only large but also 
sophisticated shareholders who have the power to determine the strategy of the firm (Thomsen 
and Pedersen, 2000; Gillan and Starks, 2003; Tihanyi et al., 2003) and therefore the firm’s 
outcome [for a recent review, see Goranova and Ryan (2014)]. They are characterized by low 
risk to prioritize shareholder value and liquidity (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Gillan, 
Kensinger and Martin, 2000). Further, a recent survey of institutional investors by McCahery, 
Sautner and Starks (2016) highlights that institutional investors with a longer investment 
horizon tend to monitor the management of their investee firms using the several tools at their 
disposal more than their short-term counterparts. Consequently, I focus on institutional 
investors’ ownership with a long-term investment horizon. Prior studies argue that these 
investors as rational shareholders have the bigger incentive to effectively monitor their investee 
firms on an ongoing basis [see for example Chen, Harford and Li (2007) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997)]. This is likely to reduce agency costs, which in turn would alleviate 
overinvestment problems arising from holding large amounts of cash. I therefore posit that 
higher long-term institutional ownership would be associated with a firm’s lower cash holdings. 
In this study, I use a comprehensive dataset of all public firms traded on the London 
Stock Exchange over the period from 2000 to 2016. The UK provides an interesting country 
context for studying institutional investors because the level of institutional ownership in the 
UK is one of the highest in the world (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Also, while the US and UK 
share many similarities in governance systems (i.e., a common law system and high protection 
of minority rights), important differences include the role and rights of institutional investors 
and the nature of corporate governance reforms. The UK corporate governance system is often 
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described as being shareholder-led. Contrary to the US regulator-led approach, it gives 
shareholders the independence of deciding which monitoring strategy to employ to protect their 
interests. Institutional investors in the UK have been reported to engage more with the firm 
management and regularly meet with the board and top management to discuss strategies, 
governance issues, and financial performance (Williams and Conley, 2005; Aguilera et al., 
2006). The mainstream UK institutions have senior managers responsible for corporate 
governance activities and dedicated teams of corporate governance experts, who often meet 
with the managers or boards of their portfolio companies (Hendry et al., 2007). Despite the 
interesting institutional setting in the UK, empirical studies have focused mainly on US firms.2 
Additional evidence from the UK is therefore useful in developing a broader view on the role 
of institutional investors in monitoring a firm’s cash holdings. This study makes several 
important contributions. First, this study contributes to the empirical literature on cash holdings. 
In particular, I provide novel evidence that long-term institutional investors’ ownership is 
negatively related to the amount of cash holdings. For instance, in a fifteen-year period, cash 
holdings in firms with long-term institutional ownership decreased. Second, this study makes 
several theoretical contributions. I build on economic perspectives, the behavioural theory and 
the value-creation versus value-appropriation literatures.  
On the one hand, I argue that the magnitude of agency costs could aggravate or alleviate 
the negative relationship between long-term institutional ownership and firm cash holdings. 
On the other hand, I argue that the decision of long-term institutional investors to monitor 
opportunistic managers depends on the magnitude of the agency costs and is driven by the 
implications of cash for firm performance that are context specific (Deb, David and O’Brien, 
2017). Specifically, I look at the degree of firm diversification, industry R&D intensity and 
industry growth opportunities 3 . I show that the negative relationship between long-term 
 
2 Even in the US context the issue is far from settled – studies report mixed results. While Cleary and Wang (2017) find that 
long-term institutional investors’ ownership decreases cash holdings, Harford, Kecskés and Mansi (2012, 2018) find that firms 
with higher institutional ownership hold more cash but the negative effect of long-term institutional ownership is not 
statistically significant. Moreover, Huang and Petkevich (2016) find that both short-term and long-term institutional investors 
have positive effects on cash holdings. But, firms with more short-term institutional investors hold more cash than firms with 
more long-term institutional investors. They argue that long-term institutional investors seek value-enhancing information, 
while short-term investors focus on collecting value-neutral information.  
3 Deb et al. (2017) discuss six contexts that are splitted into two groups. The first group which they called ‘value creation contexts’ and include 
industry competition, industry R&D intensity and industry growth, and the second group which they called ‘value appropriation contexts’ and 
includes corporate governance,  diversification and corporate opacity. The ideal situation is to analysis all six contexts; however, I faced a 
data availability challenge with two of the value appropriation contexts; corporate governance and firm opacity. My sample consistent of all 
UK firms listed in London Stock Exchange which include FTSE All-Share index and FTSE AIM All-Share index. The available proxy I could 
use for corporate governance is Corporate Governance Score that is available through Asset4 database; however, Asset4 does not cover all 
UK firms, it only covers 412 firms which I believe belong to FTSE 350. So, when I used this variable, my sample reduced from 11,245 to 
2,578 firm-year observations. Similarly, the index that proxy for firm opacity consists of four variables, trading volume, bid-ask spread, 
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institutional ownership and corporate cash holdings is significantly higher in firms with high 
agency costs, and I demonstrate that more diversified firms hold more cash than less diversified 
firms under long-term institutional investors’ monitoring. This positive effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on cash holdings however is only significant for firms with low agency 
costs. As high levels of diversification complemented by large cash holdings could be 
detrimental for firm performance (Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017), long-term institutional 
owners ensure that firms do not hold extra cash when agency costs are high but allow for extra 
cash when agency costs are low. Conversely, long-term institutional ownership is associated 
with lower cash holdings if firms operate in industries characterized by high R&D intensity or 
by high growth opportunities. I find that firms operating in industries with high R&D intensity 
tend to hold less cash as long-term institutional ownership increases. The effect however is 
driven by firms with high agency costs. Similarly, the cash holdings of firms in industries with 
high growth opportunities with long-term institutional ownership is lower compared to firms 
in industries with low growth opportunities. The negative relationship is only significant for 
firms with high agency costs but not significant for firms with low agency costs. Overall, my 
results suggest that the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings depends 
both on the magnitude of the agency costs and of the firm’s contexts (i.e. firm diversification, 
industry R&D intensity and industry growth). The study provides some evidence on “how 
governance could limit the potential for bad or self-serving managerial decisions, while 
encouraging strategies that create long-term shareholder value” (Goranova et al., 2017, p. 2294)     
A potential concern is the extent to which my results can be interpreted causally. To 
address this concern, I employ a variety of estimation strategies and my findings are robust to 
these measures.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
background and hypotheses development, Sections 3 and 4 explain the econometric 
 
number of analyst following the firm and analyst forecast error, and the two variables related to analyst forecasting are available through 
I/B/E/S database and such variables are not available for all firms as analysts usually focus on large and liquid firms. So, when I used these 
variables to construct the index for firm opacity, my sample reduced from 11,245 to 5,669 firm-year observations. Thus, I have decided to 
conduct my study using the large sample of all UK firms and adopt one proxy for value appropriation contexts (i.e., firm diversification) which 
is available for all firms in my sample. Given the challenge of the data for value appropriate contexts, I have also decided to choose two 
proxies from the value creation contexts used by Deb et al. (2017) (i.e., industry R&D intensity and industry growth). It is worth noting that 
using the other three contexts that I have not use in my study provides consistent results with my arguments and results (empirical results for 
these contexts are available in Appendix A). 
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specification and the data respectively, Section 5 reports the results of the study, and Section 6 
provides a conclusion. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Economic perspectives like agency theory argue that holding large amounts of cash 
could aggravate conflicts of interests among a firm’s shareholders and their managers (Jensen, 
1986). Naturally, managers would have more influence over cash spending decisions, which 
gives rise to agency conflicts in the firm. Institutional investors could be effective monitors. 
There are however differences between short-term and long-term institutional investors. 
Specifically, long-term institutional owners could have much more skin in the game. 
Previous studies support this view. In particular, they show that long-term and short-
term institutional investors exhibit heterogeneous trading behaviour and monitoring 
effectiveness, and tend to implement heterogeneous financing and investment policies in their 
investee firms. Several empirical studies emphasize that both monitoring by institutional 
investors and their degree of public and private engagements depend on their investment 
horizons [for a recent review of empirical studies on shareholder activism, see Goranova and 
Ryan (2014)]. For example, in the context of payout policies, Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2013) 
find that short-term institutional investors support share repurchases over dividends. In addition, 
long-term institutional investors are shown to be less likely to change their holding positions 
in response to good or bad news than short-term institutional investors (Hotchkiss and 
Strickland, 2003). They are argued to benefit from their long-term position by utilizing private 
information they have about the firm to enhance firm performance (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007; 
Borochin and Yang, 2017), including corporate social performance (Neubaum and Zahra, 
2006). Regarding financing decisions, firms with larger long-term institutional ownership have 
been shown to use more external debt (Huang and Petkevich, 2016; Cleary and Wang, 2017), 
and more internal funding (Huang and Petkevich, 2016), but less external equity (Huang and 
Petkevich, 2016; Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2018) and seasoned equity (Hao, 2014). Using 
several measures for firm performance, Yin, Ward and Tsolacos (2018) find that long-term 
institutional ownership has positive ‘long-lasting’ effect on firm performance. Moreover, a 
recent study by Cremers, Pareek and Sautner (2020) finds that firms that experience a large 
increase in short-term institutional ownership reduce long-term investments (i.e., R&D) which 
decreases firm’s long-term value. 
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In the context of cash holdings, economic perspectives such as agency theory (Jensen, 
1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) provide rationale for long-term investors to engage with a 
firm when the benefits of monitoring exceed the agency costs associated with free cash flow. 
Within a cost-benefit framework (i.e. a cost-benefit analysis of monitoring versus trading), 
Chen, Harford and Li (2007) argue that long-term institutional investors are effective monitors 
of firms because their monitoring costs decrease and monitoring benefits increase with the 
length of time they invest in the firm. Moreover, in a recent survey of large institutional 
investors, McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016) find that long-term institutional investors are 
more likely to actively engage with the management of their investee firms to monitor firms’ 
policies.  I develop a coherent argument that demonstrates how, using the several private and 
public tools at their disposal to engage with their investee firms, they have stronger incentives 
to monitor the management’s actions in such firms effectively.  
In the context of cash holding policies, there is evidence that institutional investors 
closely monitor managers’ actions to ensure efficient use of cash resulting in a higher value of 
cash holdings (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Moreover, a few recent studies show that 
institutional investors’ horizons affect cash holdings. On the one hand, it has been found that 
long-term investors are more likely than short-term investors to decrease firms’ cash (Huang 
and Petkevich, 2016). On the other hand, a negative relationship has been shown between the 
higher presence of long-term investors and cash holdings (Cleary and Wang, 2017). 
In this vein, I expect that long-term institutional investors are more likely to decrease 
the cash holdings of their investee firms, as investors that would get high net benefits from 
engaging with their companies are more likely to devote more resources to this process. As 
these benefits are likely to be higher for long-term institutional investors (Chen, Harford and 
Li, 2007; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016, Yin, Ward and 
Tsolacos, 2018), I posit that long-term institutional investors will act as effective monitors and 
therefore their higher presence would be associated with lower cash holdings.  
Building on agency theory (Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), I also argue that 
the negative effect of long-term institutional investors on corporate cash holdings is dependent 
on the magnitude of the agency costs. In doing so, I extend the work of previous studies that 
have focused on the moderating role of the agency costs [see for example Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009)].  I expect that long-term institutional investors would engage in order to decrease cash 
holdings more in firms with high agency costs than in firms with low agency costs, as the 
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expected net benefits of engagement (if successful) would be higher in firms with high agency 
costs. Succinctly, I posit that the negative effect of institutional investors with long-term 
investment horizons on cash holdings will be more pronounced in firms with high agency costs. 
Therefore, I hypothesize:  
H1a: The proportion of long-term institutional ownership is negatively associated with a firm’s 
cash holdings. 
H1b: Agency costs will moderate positively the relationship between long-term institutional 
ownership and cash holdings.  
Recent studies building on economic perspectives, behavioural theory and the value-
creation versus value-appropriation literatures argue that “cash is surprisingly valuable as a 
strategic asset” (Kim and Bettis, 2014, p. 2053) and that “the implications of cash for firm 
performance are context specific” (Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017, p. 436). For example, Deb, 
David and O’Brien (2017) find that holding cash in value creation contexts (i.e., highly 
competitive, research-intensive or growth-focused industries) is beneficial for firm 
performance because in such contexts it is used for adaptation to complex environments. 
Conversely, holding cash in value appropriation contexts (i.e., poorly governed, diversified or 
opaque firms) could be harmful for firm performance, because in such contexts it is used for 
value appropriation by stakeholders. Given that the performance benefits of cash depend on 
the context, I speculate that the monitoring intensity of opportunistic managers by long-term 
institutional investors could also be context specific. I pay special attention to firms that are 
diversified, operate in research-intensive industries and industries with high growth 
opportunities.  
Industry R&D Intensity 
The lack of cash is often linked to the lack of R&D investment by firms (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Un, 2010). Firms operating in industries with high R&D intensity are likely to 
have a focus on innovation. R&D driven innovation is difficult to finance using external funds 
due to its intangible nature, uncertain outcome, and potentially severe information problems 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). R&D is mainly financed by internal cash flow and stock issues 
(Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009). To avoid paying a premium to secure external capital 
(Levitas and McFadyen, 2009), firms in R&D intensive industries tend to rely more on 
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precautionary cash to smooth R&D (Brown and Petersen, 2011). In addition, industries with 
high R&D intensity are often characterized by a rapid pace of technological change and by a 
high level of uncertainty in demand and risk, which may motivate firms to either use cash as a 
strategic weapon (Lyandres and Palazzo, 2012) or hold cash as a precaution to ensure survival. 
From the shareholder perspective, transparency of R&D investment is generally lower 
and there is more room for expropriation by managers. R&D investment decisions are often 
risky and, if successful, are likely to generate returns only in the longer term and therefore may 
require the support of long-term shareholders, especially long-term institutional investors. The 
impact of institutional investors on R&D investment and/or innovation has mainly been studied 
in the US context and the results are mixed. Bushee (1998) and Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
Zingales (2013) find that institutional ownership has a positive effect on R&D investment and 
innovation, while Harford, Kecskés and Mansi (2018) report a negative effect on R&D 
spending and a positive effect on innovation efficiency. Brav et al. (2014) show that firms 
reduce their R&D spending when targeted by activists but increase their innovation output. 
Lastly, Huang and Petkevich (2016) find no significant relationship between R&D investment 
and long-term institutional ownership. 
If cash is beneficial for performance in firms operating in high R&D intensity industries, 
as it can foster adaptation and is also a source of innovation (Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017; 
Levitas and McFadyen, 2009), I posit that industry R&D intensity negatively moderates the 
relationship between the long-term institutional investors’ investment horizon and corporate 
cash holdings. In other words, I expect that firms with a high proportion of long-term 
institutional investors’ ownership will have more cash, as long-term institutional investors will 
be more likely to support the management to hold cash and then monitor the management, with 
the aim to force the management to invest such cash to increase firm performance.  
In addition, the effect of industry R&D intensity and industry growth as moderators of 
such a relationship will be stronger in firms with high agency costs than in firms with low 
agency costs. In other words, I expect that long-term institutional investors would prefer that 
firms operating in high R&D intensity industries with high agency costs invest cash instead of 
sitting on a pile of cash, as these investments will be necessary to increase firm performance 
(Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017). For firms with low agency cost, I expect that long-term 
institutional investors will leave the decision to management regarding the lack of resources 
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and their importance for such firms (Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2010). Therefore, I hypothesize 
that: 
H2: The negative relationship between the proportion of long-term institutional ownership and 
a firm’s cash holdings is stronger in firms operating in high R&D intensity industries, 
especially in firms with high agency costs. 
Industry Growth  
If cash is beneficial for performance in firms operating in industries with high growth 
opportunities, for which investment opportunities are widely available as they can facilitate 
adaptation (Deb, David and O'Brien, 2017), then I posit that industry growth negatively 
moderates the relationship between long-term institutional investors’ investment horizon and 
corporate cash holdings.  
The numerous attractive investment opportunities, strategic investments (including 
entering into strategic alliances), investment in technologies, joint ventures and the 
uncertainties about the time they arise, are just some of the reasons for which large amounts of 
cash with high potential return are good for firm performance in such firms (Boyle and Guthrie, 
2003; Chen et al., 2000; Grant, 2013; Park, Chen and Gallagher, 2002). These reasons help to 
explain why I expect that industry growth negatively moderates the relationship between long-
term institutional investors’ investment horizon and corporate cash holdings. Similarly to R&D 
intensity, I expect that long-term institutional investors will be more likely to support the 
management to hold cash in firms operating in industries with high growth opportunities and 
then monitor (engage with) the management with the aim to force the management to invest 
such cash in investment opportunities with high potential return in search of good performance 
(Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017; Grant, 2013).   
In addition, the effect of industry growth as moderator of such a relationship will be 
stronger in firms with high agency costs than in firms with low agency costs. Similarly to R&D 
intensity, I expect that long-term institutional investors want firms operating in industries with 
high growth opportunities with high agency costs to invest instead of sitting on cash, as these 
investments will be necessary to increase firm performance (Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017; 
Grant, 2013). For firms with low agency cost, I expect that long-term institutional investors 
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will leave the decision to management regarding the lack of resources and their importance for 
such firms (Grant, 2013; Myers, 1977).  
My prediction is based on the assumption that in firms operating in industries with high 
growth opportunities the decision of the management to invest cash also depends on the owners 
of the firms. In particular, the management needs and is looking for the support of long-term 
shareholders, especially long-term institutional investors, to invest cash, as for example in 
strategic alliances or in investments in technology.  This is because firms with high growth 
opportunities are more likely to experience failure and incur high costs (including bankruptcy 
costs) and/or are more likely to generate returns only in the long term  (Opler et al., 1999; 
Myers, 1977, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H3: The negative relationship between the proportion of long-term institutional ownership and 
a firm’s cash holdings is stronger in firms operating in industries with high growth 
opportunities, especially in firms with high agency costs. 
Diversification  
The detrimental effect of cash on the performance of firms that are diversified could 
motivate long-term institutional investors to closely monitor their investee firms and to engage 
more with their management to decrease the level of cash under managers’ purview. This 
strategy could help to avoid the decrease in shareholder value as a consequence of value 
appropriation actions by opportunistic managers or other stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). At the same time, monitoring of diversified firms could be complex and costly, 
especially the ones with high agency costs. Several studies highlight potential explanations for 
why this is often the case. First, value appropriation by management is easier and more likely 
to occur in diversified firms as they encourage rent-seeking actions both by corporate and 
divisional managers (Ndofor, Wesley and Priem, 2015). Second, diversified firms are 
characterized by higher conflicts between competing divisional managers and by misallocation 
of cash resources to less efficient individual divisional units (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 
2000). Third, monitoring of opportunistic managers by shareholders (including long-term 
institutional investors) and other stakeholders (including media) in diversified firms is more 
complex and costly due to accentuated information asymmetry between management and 
stakeholders (Goranova et al., 2007). For example, the publication of consolidated accounts 
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facilitates the obfuscation of data on the efficiency of individual divisional units (Hill and Jones, 
1992). Fourth, information asymmetry increases between the corporate centre and the 
divisional managers when the number of divisional units is increased (Hitt et al., 2017). Finally, 
several conflicts can also arise between different institutional investors (e.g., short-term versus 
long-term institutional investors) and/or between institutional investors and other stakeholders 
(such as creditors and employees), which can increase agency costs (Coffee, 2017).  
Given the complexity and the high costs of monitoring of diversified firms, long-term 
institutional investors are less likely to be effective monitors in these firms. I therefore expect 
that firm diversification positively moderates the relationship between long-term institutional 
investors and firm cash holdings. This effect would be less pronounced in firms with high 
agency costs than in firms with low agency costs because the effectiveness of monitoring is 
likely to be dependent on the magnitude of the agency costs. In addition, the cost and 
complexity of monitoring of diversified firms could also encourage long-term institutional 
investors to become lax on cash holdings in firms with low agency costs. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
H4: Firm diversification positively moderates the relationship between the proportion of long-
term institutional ownership and a firm’s cash holdings, especially in firms with low agency 
costs. 
3. Econometric Specification 
My main interest is in the relationship between firm cash holdings and long-term 
institutional ownership. I estimate the following specification: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where Cash/TA denotes the cash holdings of firm i at time t. LTIO is the long-term institutional 
ownership. I also control for a set of firm-specific characteristics [i.e. X, see the next section 
for a full list and description of these variables]. 𝜑 and 𝜏 are complete sets of three-digit SIC 
codes and time fixed effects. 𝜖 is an iid error term. 
Different types of long-term institutional investors. In separate regressions I also 
differentiate between different types of long-term institutional investors. Specifically, I look at 
the long-term investors that invested in a firm as part of their investment in a particular stock 
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market index or long-term investors with a high turnover portfolio. These investors are 
expected to be much more passive investors and are likely widely diversified (Bushee, 1998; 
Derrien, Kecskés and Thesmar, 2013; Wang, 2014) meaning that they would not care too much 
about any particular firm in their large portfolio. At the same time, non-indexer and long-term 
investors with a low turnover portfolio would be much more interested in firm policies. I expect 
that cash holdings would be lower in firms with long-term institutional investors that are 
actively involved in firm affairs (i.e. Long-term IO non-indexer and Long-term IO with low 
portfolio turnover).  
Reverse causality and omitted variables. I also address omitted variables concerns, 
by using firm fixed effects that control for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, I address reverse causality and omitted variables concerns using instrumental 
variable (IV) methods that isolate plausible exogenous variation in institutional ownership. A 
potential concern is that long-term institutional investors could invest in firms with certain 
characteristics. To address these concerns, I use an instrumental variable strategy. Several 
recent papers (such as Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) among others) show that 
investors in index firms affects a variety of market prices and corporate policies. Following 
Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), I use the initial institutional ownership by long-
term investors and index firms (i.e. FTSE 100) as instrument variables of my variable of interest, 
LTIO.  
4. Data and Variables 
4.1 Sample and data sources 
To empirically document the relationship between an investment horizon of 
institutional investors and corporate cash holdings, I focus on the UK firms that traded on the 
London Stock Exchange over the period from 2000 to 2016. Data derives from different 
sources. I start by collecting ownership data from Thomson Reuters Eikon Ownership & 
Profiles module. The module provides detailed information about the name of each shareholder, 
the number and type of shares held, and the first date of holding. I further match firms with full 
ownership information available to the Thomson Reuters Datastream database to obtain their 
financial and accounting information (e.g, size, profitability, industry sector, etc.). Then, I 
collect data about the main corporate governance characteristics (e.g., CEO duality, 
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Independent NED on Board (%), Board Size) from BoardEx and the Thomson Reuters Asset4 
module.  
Following the literature, I exclude firms operating in financial industries (SIC codes 
6000–6999) and utility industries (SIC codes 4900–4999) because these industries are subject 
to several capital requirements and strong regulatory monitoring (Kim and Bettis, 2014). All 
continuous variables are truncated to remove the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to 
limit the impact of large outliers on my results. After excluding observations for which firm-




I focus on cash as my main dependent variable. Cash is defined as a ratio of cash and 
cash equivalents to total assets (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Opler et al., 1999). Use of cash stock is appropriate from the agency theory perspective as 
Jensen (1986) focused on the cumulative cash balance rather than the yearly free cash flow 
when characterizing managerial misbehaviour. It is also appropriate to use it from the 
behavioural theory angle: slack resource arguments. 
Explanatory variables 
The main explanatory variable of interest is long-term institutional ownership (Long-
term IO), which measures the voting rights of the long-term institutional owners. Institutional 
owners include mutual investment funds, pension funds, hedge funds, banks and trusts, 
insurance companies, endowments and foundations, private equity, venture capital and 
investment advisors. Following recent empirical literature, I use the actual investment duration 
at the firm level by a specific institutional investor as a proxy for investment horizon (Elyasiani 
and Jia, 2010; Attig et al., 2012; Wang, 2014; Yin, Ward and Tsolacos, 2018). Long-term IO 
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is therefore defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors with investment duration at firm level of at least eight quarters (two years).4  
In my analysis, I further differentiate between long-term institutional investors that 
index (Long-term IO indexer) and long-term institutional investors that do not index (Long-
term IO non-indexer). Indexers replicate the market index and do not choose the firms in which 
they invest; they are also more likely to be more passive investors. Instead, non-indexers 
carefully choose firms for their portfolio and are more likely to actively participate in firm 
decision making. 
Another important distinction between long-term institutional investors is whether they 
hold low or high turnover portfolio. Institutional investors with low levels of portfolio turnover 
(Long-term IO low portfolio turnover) tend to be more dedicated to firms and have a 
“relationship” approach to investing. Due to their stable ownership positions, these institutions 
tend to have better access to private information about their portfolio firms and would be more 
efficient monitors (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998). At the same time, institutional investors with 
high levels of portfolio turnover (Long-term IO high portfolio turnover) would be much less 
preoccupied with the monitoring of firms in their portfolio. In addition, I also control for 
blockholder ownership (at 5%) in all specifications to separate investor horizons from investor 
concentration.  
Given my focus on public firms, which are generally large and prone to agency 
problems, it is important to account for the extent of conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. While in theory the severity of this conflict is affected by the efficiency of the 
managerial labour market and the extent of product market discipline (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
these concepts are hard to measure empirically. Nonetheless, Ang et al. (2000) followed by 
Singh and Davidson (2003), Fleming et al. (2005) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) use the 
inverse asset turnover ratio to proxy for agency costs. This ratio is interpreted as an asset 
utilization ratio that shows how effectively management deploys the firm’s assets. A high 
inverse asset turnover ratio indicates poor investment decisions, insufficient effort, and 
consumption of perquisites, and hence suggests that agency costs arising from the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders are high. In further analysis, agency costs are classified as 
 
4 Using different durations such as twelve quarters for long-term institutional investors does not change my results. 
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high (low) agency costs if firm-specific agency costs are above (below) the median value of 
the inverse asset turnover variable.  
Firm Diversification is measured by the number of industries a firm operates in (which 
spans from 1 to 8). R&D intensity is the mean value of R&D intensity of all firms at the 
industry-year level (similar to Gentry and Shen, 2013; Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017), where 
R&D intensity is R&D expenses divided by sales. Missing R&D values are replaced by zeros 
and (the upper limit for R&D intensity is) capped at 1 (Kim and Bettis, 2014; Deb, David and 
O’Brien, 2017). Similarly, Industry Growth Opportunities (Industry GO) are defined as the 
mean value of market-to-book ratio at the industry-year level.  
Control variables 
In my analysis, I use a set of the most common firm-specific variables that have been 
used to explain cash holdings by firms in previous studies (e.g. Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; 
Caprio, Del Giudice and Signori, 2020; Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2018; Opler et al., 1999; 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). These variables include Firm Size, Leverage, Market-to-book, Cash 
Flow, Industry Sigma, Net Working Capital (NWC), R&D, Capital Expenditure, Acquisition, 
and Dividend (dummy).  For detailed definitions of all variables, see Table A1 in Appendix A. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables used in my analysis. Long-
term institutional investors control on average 23% of a firm compared to 31% controlled by 
all institutional investors. 3.4% of the ownership is held by these long-term institutional 
investors who are indexers and 20.4% is held by non-indexers. Moreover, long-term 
institutional investors holding a low turnover portfolio own on average 16.1% of a firm, while 
long-term institutional investors holding a high turnover portfolio hold only 1.6%. About 21% 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
The table provides summary statistics for main ownership and firm-level variables used in the econometric analysis. 
Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. The sample contains all UK public firms and 
covers the period from 2000 to 2016. 
        Distribution 
  N Mean St dev 5th 50th 95th 
Ownership variables       
Long-term IO 11.254 0.233 0.212 0.000 0.174 0.642 
Long-term IO (indexer) 7.431 0.034 0.038 0.000 0.025 0.110 
Long-term IO (non-indexer) 11.218 0.204 0.186 0.000 0.156 0.559 
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover) 11.137 0.161 0.161 0.000 0.116 0.483 
Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover) 8.851 0.016 0.031 0.000 0.001 0.083 
Institutional Ownership 11254 0.313 0.227 0.014 0.270 0.726 
Blockholding (5%) 11254 0.212 0.153 0.000 0.190 0.497 
Firm-level variables       
Cash 11.254 0.135 0.154 0.003 0.079 0.468 
Size 11.254 11.950 2.223 8.658 11.735 15.899 
Leverage 11.254 0.169 0.167 0.000 0.136 0.489 
Market-to-Book 11.254 1.791 1.309 0.688 1.393 4.279 
Cash Flow 11.254 0.008 0.195 -0.357 0.055 0.177 
Industry Sigma 11.254 0.464 0.445 0.048 0.322 1.270 
NWC 11.254 0.019 0.196 -0.277 0.010 0.353 
R&D 11.254 0.029 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.158 
Capital Expenditure 11.254 0.044 0.052 0.002 0.027 0.152 
Acquisition 11.254 0.025 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.148 
Dividend 11.254 0.601 0.490 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Overall, on average, firms in my sample hold about 13.5% of their total assets in cash. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of long-term institutional ownership by main industries. For 
ease of presentation, I aggregate the three-digit SIC codes into broad industry-level categories.5  
I find that construction industries generally have the highest long-term institutional ownership 
(30%), followed by retail trade and wholesale trade (27%), transportation and communications, 
and manufacturing (26%). The lowest holdings of 12.9% by long-term institutional investors 
are observed in agriculture, forestry, and fishing industries. 
In untabulated analysis, I check for the potential multi-collinearity in all my estimation 
models. I follow prior ownership and cash holdings literature (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Callen and 
Fang, 2013; Kim et. al, 2016; Miranda-Lopez et. al, 2019; Neubaum and Zahra; 2006; Tihanyi 
 
5 Industries are classified following SIC codes classification at the alphabetical level, A–J. 
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et. al, 2003) and adopt Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis to test for multi-collinearity. I 
find that all VIFs of the independent variables through all my estimated regression models are 
below the conventional rule-of-thumb value of 10 (Neter et al, 1983). An exception is that there 
are some independent variables are highly correlated with their products that are included in 
the same regression model which leads to high VIFs that exceed the value of 10. However, as 
these high values are caused by the inclusion of products of other variables, these nigh VIFs 
‘is not a problem and can be safely ignored’ (Allison, 2012). 
Table 2. Distribution of long-term institutional ownership by industries 
The table presents the distribution of long-term institutional investors holdings by industries. Industries are classified 
following SIC codes classification (alphabetical level, A–J). 
        Distribution 
  N Mean St dev 5th 50th 95th 
       
Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing 108 0.129 0.115 0.000 0.101 0.366 
Construction 342 0.300 0.222 0.000 0.307 0.656 
Manufacturing 3965 0.263 0.218 0.000 0.210 0.656 
Mining 1118 0.142 0.152 0.000 0.094 0.479 
Retail Trade 1005 0.277 0.210 0.000 0.246 0.646 
Services 3569 0.202 0.204 0.000 0.140 0.631 
Transportation and Communications 738 0.264 0.211 0.000 0.230 0.637 
Wholesale Trade 418 0.277 0.238 0.000 0.240 0.689 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1 Long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings 
I start exploring the relationship between cash holdings and long-term institutional 
ownership by estimating basic regressions. Table 3 displays the regression estimation results. 
I find a clear negative relationship suggesting that the presence of long-term institutional 
investors is associated with lower cash holdings by firms.  
In Columns (2) – (4) I differentiate among long-term institutional investors on the basis 
of their investing style. Columns (2) and (3) differentiate between indexers and non-indexers. 
I see that the coefficient for the indexers is positive, close to zero and not significant. By 
contrast, the coefficient for the non-indexers is negative, significant and similar to the 
coefficient I obtained in my basic model. The differentiation between long-term institutional 
investors with low and high portfolio turnover generates similar results (Columns 4 and 5). The 
coefficient estimate for investors with low portfolio turnover is negative and significant, albeit 
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slightly lower than the effect obtained in the basic model, while the effect for investors with 
high portfolio turnover is positive and not significant. The absence of the effect for indexers 
and long-term institutional investors with high portfolio turnover is broadly consistent with the 
notion of passive investors that are not actively involved in firms’ day-to-day operations. 
My results are robust to several estimation strategies. First, I address omitted variables 
concerns using firm fixed effects that control for time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. 
Column (6) contains the estimation. Second, I further address the endogeneity concern by re-
estimating my main specification using an instrumental variable strategy. I use the initial 
ownership of long-term institutional investors and index firms. Columns (7) and (8) contain 
the estimation results.  
Overall, the negative effect of long-term institutional investors on firm cash holdings is 
consistent with my main estimation and corroborate Hypothesis H1. In terms of economic 
significance, results from Column (1) suggest that a 1-standard-devaition increase in long-term 
institutional ownership (21.1%) is associated with a decrease in cash holdings by 2.37%.   
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Table 3. Long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings 
The table presents the results of OLS and 2SLS regressions examining the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firms’ cash holdings for the sample of the UK public firms during 
the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional investors, with investment duration of at least eight quarters 
(two years). Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation 
through clustering by firms and years. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable = Cash/Total Assets 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE First stage 
Second 
stage, IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Long-term IO -0.112***     -0.099***  -0.280*** 
 (0.016)     (0.018)  (0.083) 
Long-term IO (indexer)  0.020       
  (0.071)       
Long-term IO (non-indexer)   -0.095***      
   (0.018)      
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)    -0.077***     
    (0.014)     
Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover)     0.041    
     (0.064)    
Instrument         
Initial long-term IO       0.192***  
       (0.012)  
FTSE100       0.025***  
       (0.006)  
Controls         
Institutional Ownership 0.090*** -0.010 0.054*** 0.035** -0.001 0.092*** 0.725*** 0.220*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.065) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.001 0.002 0.020 0.013 0.023 0.003 -0.045*** -0.010 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) 
Size -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.022*** 0.004*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.268*** -0.219*** -0.270*** -0.267*** -0.251*** -0.217*** 0.012 -0.267*** 
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 (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.008) (0.017) 
Market-to-Book 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.012*** -0.004*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Cash Flow -0.011 -0.019 -0.012 -0.013 -0.018 0.008 -0.011** -0.013 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.005) (0.014) 
Industry Sigma 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
NWC -0.151*** -0.171*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.163*** -0.192*** -0.008 -0.152*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) 
R&D 0.172*** 0.140** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.125** 0.055 0.018* 0.177*** 
 (0.035) (0.049) (0.036) (0.037) (0.044) (0.034) (0.011) (0.036) 
Capital Expenditure -0.176*** -0.190*** -0.173*** -0.178*** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.060*** -0.189*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.038) (0.023) (0.039) 
Acquisition -0.200*** -0.172*** -0.202*** -0.195*** -0.192*** -0.157*** -0.085*** -0.218*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) 
Dividend -0.013** -0.022*** -0.013** -0.014** -0.020*** -0.003 0.018*** -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
         
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects      Yes   
First stage F       141.3***  
Hansen J statistic        0.845 
R2 0.385 0.413 0.387 0.386 0.384 0.646 0.873 0.199 
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5.2 Moderating effects 
5.2.1 Long-term institutional ownership and agency costs 
Large cash holdings by firms are often connected to the potential agency problems that 
firms might face. I therefore investigate if the negative effect of long-term institutional 
investors is moderated by agency costs. Agency cost is defined as an inverse turnover variable. 
Estimation results are reported in Table 4. As expected, firms with higher agency costs 
tend to hold more cash. For the long-term institutional investors, results are consistent with my 
main estimations – higher long-term institutional ownership is associated with lower cash 
holdings. However, the impact of long-term institutional investors on firm cash holdings 
increases together with the increase in agency costs. The coefficient estimates for the 
interaction term of long-term institutional investors with agency costs are -0.030 (with a 
standard error of 0.013) in the regressions on the full sample, -0.042 (with a standard error of 
0.015) for non-indexers, and -0.037 (with a standard error of 0.016) for long-term institutional 
investors with low portfolio turnover. The interaction coefficients are also negative but not 
significant for indexers and long-term institutional investors with high portfolio turnover. 
These results support Hypothesis H1. In terms of economic significance, results from Column 
(1) suggest that a 1-standard-devaition decrease (increase) in asset turnover (inverse asset 
turnover) is associated with a further decrease in cash holdings by 0.52% when long-term 
institutional ownership at its mean (23.3%).  
5.2.2 Long-term institutional ownership and industry R&D intensity  
I next examine whether industry R&D intensity moderates the relationship between 
corporate cash holdings and long-term institutional ownership.  
Columns (1), (4), and (7) of Table 5 present results on the full sample for all long-term 
institutional investors, non-indexers and long-term institutional investors with low portfolio 
turnover respectively. My initial finding that higher shareholding by long-term institutional 
investors is associated with even lower cash holdings in high R&D intensity industries seems 
to contradict my prior results. Further differentiation between firms with low agency costs 
(Columns 2, 5, and 8) and high agency costs (Columns 3, 6, and 9) however shows that the 
effect is much larger and statistically significant only for firms with high agency costs.  
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Table 4. Cash holdings and agency cost 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings is 
moderated by the severity of agency costs. The analysis is performed on the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 
2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional investors, with investment duration of 
at least eight quarters (two years). Agency cost is an inverse asset turnover variable. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in 
Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through 
clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions.  *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable = Cash/Total Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Long-term IO -0.137***     
 (0.022)     
Long-term IO (indexer)  -0.068    
  (0.095)    
Long-term IO (non-indexer)   -0.136***   
   (0.026)   
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)    -0.115***  
    (0.021)  
Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover)     0.009 
     (0.064) 
Agency Cost (Inverse asset turnover) 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Agency Cost x Long-term IO -0.030**     
 (0.013)     
Agency Cost x Long-term IO (indexer)  -0.085    
  (0.082)    
Agency Cost x Long-term IO (non-indexer)   -0.042**   
   (0.015)   
Agency Cost x Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)    -0.037**  
    (0.016)  
Agency Cost x Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover)     -0.037 
     (0.054) 
Institutional Ownership 0.085*** -0.009 0.053*** 0.037** 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.001 0.002 0.019 0.013 0.023 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)       
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.390 0.419 0.391 0.391 0.388 
N 11163 7374 11127 11048 8776 
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Table 5. Cash holdings and R&D intensity 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings is moderated by industry R&D intensity and severity of agency costs. 
The analysis is performed on the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional investors, 
with investment duration of at least eight quarters (two years). Agency cost is defined as high (low) if firm-specific agency cost is above (below) median value of the inverse asset turnover variable. Industry 
R&D intensity is mean value of R&D at the industry-year level. Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 







High   


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Long-term IO -0.095*** -0.061*** -0.121***       
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.027)       
Long-term IO (non-indexer)    -0.069*** -0.029 -0.109***    
    (0.018) (0.023) (0.028)    
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)       -0.053*** -0.022 -0.086*** 
       (0.014) (0.017) (0.026) 
Long-term IO x Industry R&D intensity -0.627** -0.239 -0.726**       
 (0.226) (0.301) (0.291)       
Long-term IO (non-indexer) x Industry 
R&D intensity    -0.850*** -0.379 -0.962**    
    (0.247) (0.357) (0.334)    
Long-term IO (low) x Industry R&D 
intensity       -0.803*** -0.333 -0.861* 
       (0.236) (0.293) (0.421) 
Industry R&D intensity 0.085 -0.020 0.084 0.109 -0.001 0.117 0.079 -0.014 0.072 
 (0.088) (0.124) (0.117) (0.082) (0.120) (0.103) (0.082) (0.114) (0.115) 
Institutional Ownership 0.088*** 0.060*** 0.105*** 0.051*** 0.028 0.067** 0.033** 0.020 0.042* 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.002 -0.016 0.030 0.021 -0.008 0.059* 0.014 -0.009 0.045 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.018) (0.019) (0.030)           
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.387 0.420 0.413 0.389 0.421 0.416 0.388 0.421 0.415 
N 11239 6708 4421 11202 6692 4403 11121 6654 4362 
  
31 | P a g e  
This is consistent with the idea that long-term institutional investors closely monitor the 
firms they invest in and apply the pressure only in cases when the likelihood of expropriation 
by managers is high. These results support Hypothesis H2. 
5.2.3 Long-term institutional ownership and industry growth opportunities 
The estimation results are reported in Table 6. Interestingly, once industry growth 
opportunities are accounted for, the negative coefficient between long-term institutional 
ownership and firm cash holdings loses its significance. Overall, higher industry growth 
opportunities are associated with higher cash holdings by firms; however, this is mainly true 
for firms with low agency costs. At the same time, firms that operate in industries with higher 
growth opportunities and have long-term institutional ownership hold lower amounts of cash 
than firms that do not have long-term institutional investors. The effect is stronger for firms 
with high agency costs (coefficient estimate is -0.056 vs -0.038). These results support 
Hypothesis H3. 
5.2.4 Long-term institutional ownership and firm diversification 
I use the number of industries that a firm operates in to measure the degree of firm 
diversification. The number of industries ranges from 1 to 8 in my sample. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 7. Consistent with previously reported 
results, higher long-term institutional ownership is associated with lower cash holdings by 
firms. This effect is more pronounced in firms with high agency costs, supporting the 
monitoring conjecture. At the same time, more diversified firms tend to hold less cash, though 
the coefficient is significant for firms with low agency costs only. I observe a moderating effect 
of firm diversification on firm cash holding in the presence of long-term institutional investors 
– the estimated coefficient is positive and significant (0.016 with a standard error of 0.005). 
This finding is consistent with more diversified firms facing lower risk and being more difficult 
to monitor. Further differentiation between firms with low and high agency costs shows that 
this positive effect is significant only for firms with low agency costs. The results hold for non-








Table 6. Cash holdings and industry growth opportunities 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings is moderated by industry growth opportunities and severity of agency costs. 
The analysis is performed on the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional investors, 
with investment duration of at least eight quarters (two years). Agency cost is defined as high (low) if firm-specific agency cost is above (below) median value of the inverse asset turnover variable. Industry 
Growth Opportunities (GO) is mean value of market-to-book ratio at the industry-year level.  Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust 
to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years.  Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable = Cash/Total Assets 
 












  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Long-term IO -0.006 0.009 -0.036       
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.055)       
Long-term IO (non-indexer)    0.017 0.037 -0.030    
    (0.036) (0.040) (0.066)    
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)       0.057 0.053 0.038 
       (0.033) (0.035) (0.064) 
Industry Growth Opportunities 0.023*** 0.019** 0.018 0.023*** 0.018** 0.017 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.019* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) 
Long-term IO x Industry GO -0.053*** -0.038** -0.056**       
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.025)       
Long-term IO (non-indexer) x Industry GO    -0.057*** -0.039** -0.060*    
    (0.015) (0.017) (0.032)    
Long-term IO (low) x Industry GO       -0.070*** -0.044** -0.081** 
       (0.015) (0.016) (0.034) 
Institutional Ownership 0.085*** 0.057*** 0.105*** 0.052*** 0.027 0.072*** 0.035** 0.020 0.046** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.001 -0.015 0.025 0.019 -0.007 0.052 0.013 -0.008 0.041 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.020) (0.031) (0.018) (0.019) (0.031)           
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.387 0.421 0.413 0.388 0.421 0.415 0.388 0.422 0.415 
N 11239 6708 4421 11202 6692 4403 11121 6654 4362 
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Table 7. Cash holdings and firm diversification 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings is moderated by industry growth opportunities and severity of agency 
costs. The analysis is performed on the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors, with investment duration of at least eight quarters (two years). Agency cost is defined as high (low) if firm-specific agency cost is above (below) median value of the inverse asset turnover 
variable. Diversification is the number of industries a firm operates in (spans from 1 to 8). Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust 
to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable = Cash/Total Assets 
 













  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Long-term IO -0.163*** -0.133*** -0.181***       
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.036)       
Long-term IO (non-indexer)    -0.143*** -0.096** -0.181***    
    (0.028) (0.035) (0.048)    
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)       -0.135*** -0.095*** -0.151*** 
       (0.027) (0.033) (0.044) 
Diversification -0.004 -0.006** -0.004 -0.003 -0.005* -0.003 -0.003 -0.005* -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Long-term IO x Diversification 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.012       
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)       
Long-term IO (non-indexer) x Diversification    0.015** 0.016** 0.011    
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)    
Long-term IO (low) x Diversification       0.017** 0.017** 0.011 
       (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
Institutional Ownership 0.086*** 0.054** 0.104*** 0.051*** 0.024 0.070** 0.034** 0.019 0.043* 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.004 -0.012 0.028 0.021 -0.006 0.054* 0.015 -0.007 0.043 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.020) (0.031) (0.018) (0.019) (0.030)           
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.386 0.422 0.412 0.387 0.421 0.414 0.387 0.422 0.414 
N 11239 6708 4421 11202 6692 4403 11121 6654 4362 
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5.3 Additional robustness 
Given that internal corporate governance mechanisms can exacerbate or mitigate 
agency costs, I control for the role of board structure (size and independence) and CEO power. 
In particular, I control for Independent Non-Executive Directors (NED) on the Board (% 
Independent NED), Board Size, Board Size2 and CEO duality that might affect cash holdings. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 8. Overall, my results are robust after controlling 
for these main corporate governance characteristics in the main models. In additional models, 
I controlled also for additional CEO characteristics and my results are still robust.  
Table 8. Corporate governance controls (robustness) 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings for 
the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares 
held by all long-term institutional investors, with investment duration of at least eight quarters (two years). Detailed definitions of all 
variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for 
serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable = Cash/Total Assets 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Long-term IO -0.107***     
 (0.019)     
Long-term IO (indexer)  0.044    
  (0.070)    
Long-term IO (non-indexer)   -0.105***   
   (0.019)   
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)    -0.072***  
    (0.018)  
Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover)     -0.015 
     (0.050) 
CEO Duality -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent NED in Board (%) 0.038** 0.022 0.041** 0.039* 0.028 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Board Size 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.000 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
Board Size2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Ownership 0.088*** -0.002 0.059*** 0.034** -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.003 -0.004 0.025 0.015 0.024 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
      
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.385 0.413 0.387 0.386 0.384 
N 7296 5010 7288 7245 5921 
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6. Conclusion 
This study extends the existing literature on cash holdings by providing novel empirical 
evidence in relation to the effect of the proportion of long-term institutional ownership on cash 
holdings in the UK over time. I build on economic perspectives, the behavioural theory and the 
value-creation versus value-appropriation literatures and explore the moderating role of 
contexts, while accounting for the magnitude of agency costs. My findings show that long-term 
institutional investors’ ownership is associated with lower firms’ cash holdings and that this 
negative relationship is significantly more pronounced for firms with high agency costs. I 
further show that the decision of long-term institutional investors to monitor opportunistic 
managers depends on the magnitude of the agency costs and is driven by the implications of 
cash for firm performance that are context specific (i.e. the degree of firm diversification, 
industry R&D intensity and industry growth opportunities). Overall, my findings support my 
predictions and provide novel evidence on the monitoring role of long-term institutional 
investors’ ownership through the cash holding channel in different contexts. 
 Beyond the scope of this study, the documented empirical evidence suggests new 
directions and potential avenues for future research. First, as this paper finds the magnitude of 
the agency costs could aggravate or alleviate the negative relationship between long-term 
institutional ownership and firms’ cash holdings and that large cash holdings are often 
connected to potential problems (Jensen, 1986), an interesting research question might be as 
follows: does the impact of long-term institutional ownership on cash depend on the level of 
cash that firm holds?  
Second, this study suggests that the monitoring role of long-term institutional investors 
is driven by the implications of cash for firm performance. Thus, what is the relationship 
between the presence of long-term institutional investors and the value of firms’ cash holdings? 
 Third, the interplay between different theories and perspectives enables this study to 
enrich our understanding of how the firms’ contexts and characteristics determine the relevance 
of theory being adopted to explain corporate cash holdings. Adopting a multi-view approach 
could contribute to the literature of cash holdings. For example, prior studies find that firms 
with high information asymmetry hold more cash as external capital might be costly for such 
firms. However, from investors’ view, the risk of value-appropriation increases with 
information asymmetry as with agency concerns. Thus, do institutional investors pay more 
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attention in monitoring corporate policies of firms with higher information asymmetry and 
agency concerns?   
Fourth, the findings of this study support recent research on the importance of 
considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors when studying their monitoring role and 

















37 | P a g e  
7. References 
Acharya, V. V., Almeida, H. and Campello, M. (2007). ‘Is cash negative debt? A 
hedging perspective on corporate financial policies’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
16(4), pp. 515–554. 
Aghion, P., Van Reenen, J. and Zingales, L. (2013). ‘Innovation and Institutional 
Ownership’,  American Economic Review, 103(1), pp. 277–304. 
Aguilera, R. V., Williams, C. A., Conley, J. M. and Rupp, D. E. (2006). ‘Corporate 
Governance and Social Responsibility: a comparative analysis of the UK and the US’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(3), pp. 147–158. 
Aktas, N., Louca, C. and Petmezas, D. (2019). ‘CEO overconfidence and the value of 
corporate cash   holdings’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 54, pp. 85–106. 
Allison, P., 2012. When can you safely ignore multicollinearity. Statistical horizons, 
5(1), pp.1-2. 
Ang, J. S., Cole, R. A.  and Lin, J. W. (2000). ‘Agency costs and ownership structure’, 
The Journal of Finance, 55(1), pp. 81–106.  
Attig, N., Cleary, S. , El Ghoul, S.  and Guedhami, O. (2012). ‘Institutional investment 
horizon and investment-cash flow sensitivity’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(4), pp. 1164–
1180. 
Bates, T. W., Kahle, K. M.  and Stulz, R. M. (2009). ‘Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So 
Much More Cash than They Used To?’, The Journal of Finance, 64(5), pp. 1985–2021. 
Blume, M. E. and Keim, D. B. (2017). ‘The Changing Nature of Institutional Stock 
Investing’, Critical Finance Review, 6, pp. 1–41. 
Borochin, P. and Yang, J. (2017). ‘The effects of institutional investor objectives on 
firm valuation and governance’, Journal of Financial Economics, 126(1), pp. 171–199. 
Boyle, G. W. and Guthrie, G. A. (2003). ‘Investment, uncertainty, and liquidity’, The 
Journal of Finance, 58(5), pp. 2143–2166. 
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Ma, S. and Tian, X. (2018). ‘How does hedge fund activism 
reshape corporate innovation?’, Journal of Financial Economics, 130(2), pp. 237–264. 
Brown, J. R., Fazzari, S. M. and Petersen, B. C.  (2009). ‘Financing innovation and 
growth: Cash flow, external equity, and the 1990s R&D boom’, The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 
pp. 151–185. 
Brown, J. R. and Petersen, B. C. (2011). ‘Cash holdings and R&D smoothing’, Journal 
of Corporate Finance, 17(3), pp. 694–709. 
Bushee, B. J. (1998). ‘The Influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D 
investment behavior’, Accounting Review, 73(3), pp. 305–333. 
Callen, J.L. and Fang, X., 2013. Institutional investor stability and crash risk: 
  
38 | P a g e  
Monitoring versus short-termism?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(8), pp.3047-3063. 
Caprio, L., Del Giudice, A.  and Signori, A.  (2020). ‘Cash holdings in family firms: 
CEO identity and implications for firm value’, European Financial Management, 26(2), pp. 
386–415.  
Chen, Q., Chen, X., Schipper, K., Xu, Y. and Xue, J. (2012). ‘The sensitivity of 
corporate cash holdings to corporate governance’, The Review of Financial Studies, 25(12), pp. 
3610–3644. 
Chen, S.S., Ho, K. W., Lee, C.F. and Yeo, G. H.H.  (2000). ‘Investment opportunities, 
free cash flow and market reaction to international joint ventures’, Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 24(11), pp. 1747–1765. 
Chen, X., Harford, J. and Li, K. (2007). ‘Monitoring: Which institutions matter?’, 
Jouranl of Financial Economics, 86(2), pp. 279–305. 
Chen, Y. R. (2008). ‘Corporate governance and cash holdings: Listed new economy 
versus old economy firms’, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 16(5), pp. 430–
442. 
 Cleary, W. S. and Wang, J.  (2017). ‘Institutional investors, monitoring and corporate 
finance policies’, International Journal of Managerial Finance, 13(2), pp. 186–212. 
Coffee, J. C. (2017). The Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted 
Majorities, and the Public Morality. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). Law 
Working Paper no. 373.  
Cermers, M., Pareek, A. and Sautner, Z. (2020). ‘Short-term investors, long-term 
investments, and firm value: Evidence from russell 2000 index inclusions’, Management 
Science, 66(10), pp. 4535–4551. 
Cuervo‐Cazurra, A. and Un, C. A.  (2010). ‘Why some firms never invest in formal 
R&D’, Strategic Management Journal, 31(7), pp. 759–779. 
Deb, P., David, P. and O’Brien, J. (2017). ‘When is cash good or bad for firm 
performance?’, Strategic Management Journal, 38(2), pp. 436–454. 
Deloitte LLP (2019). The Deloitte CFO Survey (Q1 201). Available at: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/finance/articles/deloitte-cfo-survey.html (Accessed: 
14 November 2019).   
Derrien, F., A. Kecskés, A. and Thesmar, D. (2013). ‘Investor horizons and corporate 
policies’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48(6), pp. 1755–1780 
Dittmar, A. and Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007). ‘Corporate governance and the value of cash 
holdings’, Journal of Financial Economics, 83(3), pp. 599–634. 
Elyasiani, E. and Jia, J. (2010). ‘Distribution of institutional ownership and corporate 
firm performance’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(3), pp. 606–620. 
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983). ‘Agency problems and residual claims’, The 
  
39 | P a g e  
Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp. 327–349. 
Farinha, J., Mateus, C. and Soares, N. (2018). ‘Cash holdings and earning quality: 
evidence from the Main and Alternative UK markets’, International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 56, pp. 238–252. 
Ferreira, M. A. and Matos, P. (2008). ‘The colors of investors’ money: The role of 
institutional investors around the world’, Journal of Financial Economics, 88(3), pp. 499–533. 
Ferreira, M.A. and Vilela, A. S. (2004). ‘Why do firms hold cash? Evidence from EMU 
countries’, European Financial Management, 10(2), pp. 295–319. 
Fleming, G., Heaney, R. and McCosker, R. (2005). ‘Agency costs and ownership 
structure in Australia’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(1), pp. 29–52. 
Florackis, C. and Ozkan, A. (2009). ‘The impact of managerial entrenchment on agency 
costs: An empirical investigation using UK panel data’, European Financial Management, 
15(3), pp. 497–528. 
García‐Teruel, P. J. and Martínez‐Solano, P.  (2008). ‘On the determinants of SME cash 
holdings: Evidence from Spain’, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35(1-2), pp. 127–
149. 
Gaspar, J. M., Massa, M. and Matos, P. (2005). ‘Shareholder investment horizons and 
the market for corporate control’, Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), pp. 135–165. 
George, G. (2005). ‘Slack resources and the performance of privately held firms’, 
Academy of Management Journal, 48(4), pp. 661–676 
Gillan, S. L., Kensinger, J. W. and Martin, J. D. (2000). ‘Value creation and corporate 
diversification: the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co.’, Journal of Financial Economics, 55(1), pp. 
103–137. 
Gillan, S. and Starks, L. T. (2003). ‘Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and 
the role of institutional investors: A global perspective’, Journal of Applied Finance, 13(2), pp.  
4–22. 
Goranova, M. L., Alessandri, T. M., Brandes, P. and Dharwadkar, R. (2007). 
‘Managerial Ownership and Corporate Diversification: a longitudinal view’, Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(3), pp. 211-225. 
Goranova, M., Priem, R. L., Ndofor, H. A., and Trahms, C. A. (2017). ‘Is there a "Dark 
Side" to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance 
Estremeness’, Strategic Management Journal, 38(11), pp. 211-225. 
Goranova, M. and Ryan, L. V. (2014). ‘Shareholder activism: a multidisciplinary 
review’, Journal of Management, 40(5), pp. 1230–1268. 
Grant, R. M. (2013). Contemporary Strategy Analysis: Text and cases edition. West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Hao, Q. (2014). ‘Institutional shareholder investment horizons and seasoned equity 
  
40 | P a g e  
offerings’, Financial Management, 43(1), pp. 87–111. 
Harford, J., Kecskés, A. and Mansi, S. (2012). ‘Investor horizons and corporate cash 
holdings’, SSRN Electronic Journal. [Online] Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000226 
(Accessed: 14 January 2019).  
Harford, J., Kecskés, A. and Mansi, S. (2018). ‘Do long-term investors improve 
corporate decision making?’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 50, pp. 424–452. 
Harford, J., Mansi, S. A. and Maxwell, W. F. (2008). ‘Corporate governance and firm 
cash holdings in the US’, Journal of Financial Economics, 87(3), pp. 535–555. 
Hendry, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R. and Roberts, J. (2007). ‘Responsible ownership, 
shareholder value and the new shareholder activism’, Competition & Change, 11(3), pp. 223–
240. 
Hill, C. W. and Jones, T. M. (1992). ‘Stakeholder-agency theory’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 29(2), pp. 131–154. 
Hitt, M. A.,  Jackson, S. E., Carmona, S., Bierman, L., Shalley, C. E.  and Wright, M. 
(2017). The Oxford Handbook of Strategy Implementation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hotchkiss, E. S. and Strickland, D. (2003). ‘Does shareholder composition matter? 
Evidence from the market reaction to corporate earnings announcements’, The Journal of 
Finance, 58(4), pp. 1469–1498. 
Huang, K. and Petkevich, A. (2016). ‘Investment Horizons and Information’, Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting, 43(7-8), pp. 1017–1056. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). ‘Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers’, 
The American Economic Review, 76(2), pp. 323–329. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp. 305–360. 
Kim, C. and Bettis, R. A. (2014). ‘Cash is surprisingly valuable as a strategic asset’, 
Strategic Management Journal, 35(13), pp. 2053–2063. 
Kim, I., Miller, S., Wan, H. and Wang, B., 2016. Drivers behind the monitoring 
effectiveness of global institutional investors: Evidence from earnings management. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 40, pp.24-46. 
Levitas, E. and McFadyen, M. A. (2009). ‘Managing liquidity in research-intensive 
firms: signaling and cash flow effects of patents and alliance activities’, Strategic Management 
Journal, 30(6), pp. 659–678. 
Lyandres, E. and Palazzo, B. (2016). ‘Cash holdings, competition, and innovation’, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 51(6), pp. 1823–1861. 
Mallin, C. (2018). Corporate Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z. and Starks, L. T. (2016). ‘Behind the Scenes: The 
  
41 | P a g e  
corporate governance preferences of institutional investors’, The Journal of Finance, 71(6), pp. 
2905–2932. 
Miranda-Lopez, J., Orlova, S. and Sun, L., 2019. CEO network centrality and corporate 
cash holdings. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 53(4), pp.967-1003. 
Myers, S. C. (1977). ‘Determinants of corporate borrowing’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5(2), pp. 147–175. 
Myers, S. C. and Majluf, N. S. (1984). ‘Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have’, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 
pp. 187–221. 
Ndofor, H. A., Wesley, C. and Priem, R. L. (2015). ‘Providing CEOs with opportunities 
to cheat the effects of complexity-based information asymmetries on financial reporting fraud’, 
Journal of Management, 41(6), pp. 1774–1797. 
Neter J, Wasserman W, Kutner MH (1983) Applied linear statistical models. Irwin, 
Homewood 
 Neubaum, D. and Zahra, S. (2006) ‘Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social 
Performance: The Moderating Effects of Investment Horizon, Activism, and Coordination’, 
Journal of Management, 32(1), pp. 108–131. 
OECD (2017). Institutional investors’ indicators (Edition 2017), OECD Institutional 
Investors Statistics (database). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/00e2532c-en (Accessed: 
14 January 2019). 
Oler, D. K. and Picconi, M. P. (2014). ‘Implications of insufficient and excess cash for 
future performance’, Contemporary Accounting Research, 31(1), pp. 253–283. 
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. and Williamson, R. (1999). ‘The determinants and 
implications of corporate cash holdings’, Journal of Financial Economics, 52(1), pp. 3–46. 
Ozkan, A. and Ozkan, N. (2004). ‘Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation 
of UK companies’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 28(9), pp. 2103–2134. 
Park, S. H., Chen, R. and Gallagher, S. (2002). ‘Firm resources as moderators of the 
relationship between market growth and strategic alliances in semiconductor start-ups’, 
Academy of Management Journal, 45(3), pp. 527–545. 
Pinkowitz, L. and Williamson, R. (2001). ‘Bank power and cash holdings: Evidence 
from Japan’, The Review of Financial Studies, 14(4), pp. 1059–1082. 
Rajan, R., Servaes, H. and Zingales, L. (2000). ‘The cost of diversity: the diversification 
discount and inefficient investment’, The Journal of Finance, 55(1), pp. 35–80. 
Schauten, M. B. J., van Dijk, D. and  van der Waal, J.P. (2013). ‘Corporate governance 
and the value of excess cash holdings of large European firms’, European Financial 
Management, 19(5), pp. 991–1016. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1992). ‘Liquidation values and debt capacity: A market 
  
42 | P a g e  
equilibrium approach’, The Journal of Finance, 47(4), pp. 1343–1366. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997). ‘A survey of corporate governance’, The Journal 
of Finance, 52(2), pp. 737–783. 
Singh, M. and Davidson III, W. N. (2003). ‘Agency costs, ownership structure and 
corporate governance mechanisms’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(5), pp. 793–816. 
Thomsen, S. and Pedersen, T. (2000). ‘Ownership structure and economic performance 
in the largest European companies’, Strategic Management Journal, 21(6), pp. 689–705. 
Tihanyi, L., Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E. and Hitt, M. A. (2003). ‘Institutional 
ownership differences and international diversification: the effects of boards of directors and 
technological opportunity’, Academy of Management Journal, 46(2), pp. 195–211 
Wang, M. (2014). ‘Which types of institutional investors constrain abnormal accruals?’, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(1), pp. 43–67. 
Weidemann, J. F. (2018). ‘A state-of-the-art review of corporate cash holding research’, 
Journal of Business Economics, 88(6), pp. 765–797. 
Williams, C.A. and Conley, J. M. (2005). ‘An emerging third way? The erosion of the 
Anglo-American shareholder value construct’, Cornell International Law Journal, 38, pp. 
493–551. 
 Yin, C., Ward, C. and Tsolacos, S. (2018) ‘Motived monitoring: The importance of the 
institutional investment horizon’, International Review of Financial Analysis, 60, pp. 197-212 
  
43 | P a g e  
Essay 2. Institutional investors’ investment horizon and cash 




Using all UK listed firms in the London Stock Exchange for the period 2000–2016, this study 
investigates the effects of institutional investors’ investment horizon on the cash deviation from 
the optimal level of cash. Incorporating agency concerns and the precautionary needs for cash 
holdings, I argue that the effect of long-term institutional investors on cash holdings depends 
on the cash deviation from the optimal level of cash. On the one hand, I find that long-term 
institutional ownership is negatively associated with cash holdings only for firms with excess 
cash; on the other hand, firms with a high presence of long-term institutional investors increase 
cash when they hold cash below the optimal level. I further show that long-term institutional 
ownership is associated with a higher value of cash holdings. This study also shows that long-
term institutional ownership has a positive moderating effect on the negative relationship 
between excess cash and a firm’s operating performance. Overall, my findings support my 
predictions on the positive monitoring role of long-term institutional investors on how much 
cash firms hold, how firms use cash, and how much cash contributes to firm value. I provide 
several robustness tests for my findings.  
 
Keywords: Cash deviation, institutional ownership, investment horizon, optimal level of cash, 





*This paper has been peer-reviewed and accepted at the 6th Annual International Corporate Governance Society 
Conference – ICGS 2020 where it has been presented on November 2020. 
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1. Introduction 
Research on corporate cash holdings has been one of the central topics in corporate 
finance literature during the last few decades, especially in the last twenty years since the 
publication of influential articles by Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) and Opler et al. (1999). 
Amess, Banerji and Lampousis (2015) argue that the increase in interest for this topic can be 
attributed to the boost in corporate cash holdings around the world. For example, Graham and 
Leary (2018) show that corporate cash holdings have been increasing in the US since the 1970s, 
and have reached 22.6% of total corporate assets during the last two decades. Similarly, in the 
UK, while, on average, cash holdings represented 9.9% of firms’ total assets during the 1990s 
(Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004), it has represented 13.7% during the last two decades (Farinha, 
Mateus and Soares, 2018). Similar trends have been documented in other developed countries 
(Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; Karpuz, Kim and Ozkan, 2020). Emerging 
markets show consistent evidence: For example, Chen et al. (2012) report that the percentage 
of cash to total assets is 20% in China. Private firms also show high figures, such as 9.39% in 
the US (Gao, Harford and Li, 2013) and about 10% in Italy (Bigelli and Sánchez-Vidal, 2012).  
Despite several studies designed to identify cash holdings motives based on the costs 
and benefits of holding cash, the data are still inconclusive and scholars have called for 
additional studies on this topic (Lin and Chiu, 2017; Weidemann, 2018; Bates, Chang and Chi, 
2018). In particular, while there are several motives, such as precautionary and transaction 
motives (Keynes, 1936), that are driving firms to increase cash holdings, firms pay attention to 
the costs that are associated with holding cash [i.e. the cost of carry and spending hypothesis 
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. Balancing between the costs and benefits of 
holding cash, Opler et al. (1999) suggest that firms can reach an optimal level of cash holdings 
by trading off between such costs and benefits. Since Opler et al.’s (1999) study, a considerable 
amount of empirical evidence has supported the existence of the optimal level of corporate 
cash to which firms intentionally adjust their cash holdings towards (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 
Dittmar and Duchin, 2010; Gao, Harford and Li, 2013; Lozano and Durán, 2017; Bates, Chang 
and Chi, 2018). Hence, according to these studies, firms actively decrease or increase their cash 
holdings to reach the optimal cash level—but why? 
Indeed, recent studies have shown that cash deviation from its optimal level decreases 
a firm’s value (Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Martínez-Sola, García-Teruel and 
Martínez-Solano, 2013; Lin and Chiu, 2017) and a firm’s future performance (Dittmar and 
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Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; Chen and Shane, 2014; Oler 
and Picconi, 2014). Distinguishing between positive and negative deviations,6 both positive 
and negative cash deviations decrease the next year’s return on net operating assets (RNOA), 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) (Oler and Picconi, 2014), and a firm’s future earnings 
(Chen and Shane, 2014). This negative effect of cash deviation on a firm’s performance might 
be explained by two views. 
The first standpoint is the agency view, which is more suitable to explain positive cash 
deviation, when firms hold excess cash. Based on this view, excess cash increases agency costs 
(Jensen, 1986). In addition, Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) find that firms with excess 
cash will have lower profitability and valuations if the governance structures of these firms are 
weak (i.e. spending hypothesis). Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Schauten, van Dijk and 
van der Waal (2013) find that firms with weak governance structures diminish future operation 
performance by spending their excess cash holdings inappropriately. 
The second idea is the precautionary motive view, which is more suitable to explain 
negative cash deviation, when firms hold insufficient cash. Based on this view, the negative 
effect of negative cash deviation may be attributed to the fact that firms with insufficient cash 
may lose the opportunity to undertake unforeseen profitable investments (Keynes, 1936). 
Indeed, Harford, Klasa and Maxwell (2014) show that holding a low level of cash exposes 
firms to higher refinancing risk. Hence, the aforementioned papers suggest that holding either 
excess or insufficient amounts of corporate cash decreases a firm’s overall future value.  
Previous corporate cash holding studies heavily use both precautionary and agency 
views as the underlying arguments when studying corporate cash policies, but by examining 
these motives separately (Amess, Banerji and Lampousis, 2015). This study aims to incorporate 
both agency and precautionary views to gain a better understanding of corporate cash policies. 
In particular, I argue that institutional investors, especially long-term investors, perceive both 
agency and precautionary motives simultaneously when interacting in order to influence a 
firm’s cash policy. On the one hand, the agency motive pushes long-term institutional investors 
 
6  Positive (negative) cash deviation means when cash is above (below) the optimal level and equivalent to an excess 
(insufficient) cash level, as used by Dittmar and Duchin (2010) and others. 
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to decrease cash holding when firms hold excess cash. On the other hand, the precautionary 
motive pressures them to increase the cash level when firms hold insufficient cash. 
 Over the last six decades, the level of shares owned by institutional investors has 
increased in many countries around the world, especially in Anglo-American countries. Recent 
evidence shows that the total financial assets held by institutional investors increased from 79% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) to 413% between 1960 and 2016 (OECD, 2017). 
Consequently, these major increases in both corporate cash and institutional ownership have 
motivated several scholars to study the effect of institutional ownership on firms’ cash policies. 
 On the one hand, previous studies building on agency motive argue that institutional 
investors with longer investment horizons are effective monitors (Bushee, 1998; Chen, Harford 
and Li, 2007; Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2018, Yin, Ward and Tsolacos, 2018). Specifically, 
they can mitigate agency problems and eventually enhance corporate cash policies by 
decreasing cash holdings. On the other hand, other studies building on the precautionary view 
argue that, as long-term institutional investors’ main aim is maximizing the long-term value of 
the firm (Bushee, 1998; Derrien, Kecskés and Thesmar, 2013; Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 
2018), such investors will encourage the firms to increase cash holdings to hedge against the 
risks that are associated with having insufficient cash. Over time, these views have generated 
extensive debate, but the results of previous studies are mixed and have failed to support the 
main assumptions of these views (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). 
In this paper, I aim to contribute to this debate by combining both views. I argue that 
the effect of an institutional investor’s investment horizon on corporate cash policy depends on 
the level of cash deviation from the optimal level. I build on the agency and precautionary 
views to posit that long-term institutional investors will decrease the firm’s overall cash 
deviation by either decreasing excess cash holdings to reach a firm’s optimal cash level (i.e. 
agency view) or increasing insufficient cash holdings to reach a firm’s optimal cash level (i.e. 
precautionary view). My results support the agency view when a firm has positive deviation 
(i.e. excess cash) and the precautionary view when a firm has negative deviation (i.e. 
insufficient cash).  
As cash deviation has a negative effect on a firm’s value and operating performance, 
and I argue that long-term institutional ownership decreases the cash deviation, I then expect 
that the negative relationship between cash deviation and a firm’s value is positively moderated 
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by long-term institutional ownership. To this end, I start to investigate the effect of long-term 
institutional investors on the marginal value of each additional dollar raised by a firm. Firms 
with good corporate governance use their cash more efficiently (Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 
2008), which translates to a higher value of cash than poorly governed firms (Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013). Moreover, firms incorporated 
in countries with strong governance have a higher value of cash than firms in countries with 
poor governance (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006). Thus, I hypothesize that the higher 
presence of long-term institutional investors is associated with a higher marginal value of cash 
holdings by firms.  
In addition, I further focus on the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the use 
and value of excess cash rather than total cash holdings. Using excess cash ensures that I only 
account for the change in cash that is not related to the determinants of the optimal level 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; Chen and Shane, 
2014). As excess cash holdings are a potential agency concern, one may expect that well-
governed firms with excess cash will decrease their cash holdings to the optimal level more 
aggressively than poorly governed firms. However, the rapid dissipating of excess cash is 
associated with value-decreasing investments (Harford, 1999; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 
2008) and lower future operating performance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Therefore, I 
posit that firms with excess cash and a high proportion of long-term institutional ownership 
will adjust their cash holding to the optimal level through less accumulation of more cash and 
efficient dissipation of the current excess cash on value-creating investments.  
Using panel data for all UK firms listed in the London Stock Exchange during the period 
2000–2016, I use a two-step regression to test my hypothesis on the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the cash deviation. This method has been used in recent accounting 
and finance studies to mainly observe the effect of the variable of interest on the discretionary 
component of the dependent variable (Chen, Hribar and Melessa, 2018). I first estimate the 
optimal level of cash for each firm using Opler et al.’s (1999) model. I then investigate the 
factors pushing firms to move cash towards its optimal level. My main variable of interest is 
the institutional investors’ investment horizon. Following recent studies, I use the length of an 
investor’s holding period for specific stock as a proxy for the investor’s investment horizon 
(Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Attig et al., 2012; Wang, 2014). I further employ the excess return 
model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) and the market-to-book model of Fama and French 
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(1998) to study the moderating role of long-term institutional investors on the value of cash 
holdings and the value of excess cash. Finally, I follow Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and 
Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal (2013) in studying the moderating effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the use of excess cash and firms’ operating performance. 
My findings support hypotheses on the positive monitoring role of long-term 
institutional investors on corporate cash policies. First, I find that long-term institutional 
ownership is associated with smaller cash deviation from the optimal cash level. This suggests 
that long-term institutional investors constantly consider a firm’s optimal level and urge them 
to move cash towards its optimal level. I further test the sensitivity of this effect by 
differentiating between excess cash and cash deficit. My results show that long-term 
institutional ownership has a highly significant negative coefficient on cash holdings when 
firms have an excess of cash; conversely, long-term institutional ownership significantly 
increases the change in cash when firms have a cash deficit. 
Second, I find that the relationship between the change in cash and firm value is 
positively moderated by long-term institutional ownership. Moreover, I find that firms with a 
high proportion of long-term institutional investors and excess cash efficiently dissipate their 
excess cash on value-creating investments. Overall, my findings are consistent with the existing 
literature that suggests long-term institutional investors are effectively and/or actively 
monitoring firms’ decisions (Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2018).  
This study makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the cash holding literature 
by focusing on the deviation of cash holdings. Previous literature has extensively studied the 
determinants of cash level. In contrast, this study investigates what causes a firm to deviate 
from its optimal level. In particular, the use of the cash deviation has two distinctive merits. 
The first merit is that cash deviation enables us to test the discretionary or the unexplained 
component of cash that is not explained by the firm’s fundamental needs for cash. Since Opler 
et al.’s (1999) study on the main determinants of corporate cash, most studies in the cash 
literature have emphasized the validity of these determinants to explain a firm’s cash policies 
in different contexts and periods. Importantly, recent studies find that the unexplained 
component of cash by these determinants has a significant negative effect on a firm’s value.  
The second merit is that cash deviation is a suitable variable for capturing both the 
agency view and precautionary view of corporate cash. I build on the agency view to explain 
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cash policy when firms have cash above the optimal level (i.e. excess cash), and then I build 
on the precautionary view to explain cash policy when firms have an insufficient amount of 
cash holdings.  
Second, I provide additional evidence on the effect of institutional investors’ investment 
horizon on corporate cash policy. Studying the investment horizon of institutional investors 
and cash deviation together enables us to test the heterogonous effect of institutional ownership 
on cash. Therefore, my results can help explain the contradictory findings in the literature on 
the effect of institutional investment horizon on cash policy. While Harford, Kecskés and 
Mansi (2012) and Huang and Petkevich (2016) find the higher presence of long-term 
institutional investors is associated with higher level of cash, Cleary and Wang (2017) and 
Harford, Kecskés and Mansi (2018) find that long-term institutional ownership decreases cash 
holdings, although the latter study shows a negative, but not a statistically significant, 
coefficient estimate. Conversely, I find that the effect of long-term institutional ownership on 
cash depends on how a firm’s cash holdings deviate from its optimal level. While this study 
shows consistent and robust results on the positive moderating effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on the value of cash holdings, the existing literature has failed to provide significant, 
but also consistent results (Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2012; Im et al., 2018; Ward, Yin and 
Zeng, 2018)  
Lastly, this study provides a comprehensive investigation on the effect of institutional 
investors’ investment horizon on corporate cash policy within a single recent context. Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009) show a consistent increase in corporate cash holdings since the 1980s, 
and this increase can be explained by the changes in firm characteristics over time. Bates, 
Chang and Chi (2018) further show that the value of each $1 of cash increased from $0.61 in 
the 1980s to $1.12 in the 2000s and the speed of adjustment in cash holdings towards the 
optimal level decreased during the same period; the authors attribute these trends to several 
market and corporate factors depending on the period of time. Thus, using one context for a 
recent period to comprehensively study the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash 
level, the value of cash and the use of excess cash, can help extend the existing literature with 
comprehensive and consistent results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background and hypotheses development, Section 3 presents the econometric specifications, 
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Section 4 outlines the data sources and variable measurement, Section 5 reports the estimation 
results and some robustness tests, and Section 6 provides a conclusion.  
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Previous studies have shown that long- and short-term investors are heterogeneous in 
trading behaviour, monitoring effectiveness, firms’ funding policies, and firms’ investment 
policies. Unlike long-term institutional investors, short-term institutional investors frequently 
change their holding positions in response to good or bad news (Hotchkiss and Strickland, 2003) 
and during periods when the CBOE Volatility Index is increased (Cella, Ellul and Giannetti, 
2013). Chen, Harford and Li (2007) document that long-term institutional investors benefit 
from their long position in the firm, as they use the information they have about the firm to 
enhance firm performance. Borochin and Yang (2017) find confirming evidence that long-term 
institutional investors have information advantage, are associated with less future 
misevaluation and better future corporate governance. Prior studies also suggest that long-term 
institutional investors effectively monitor a firm’s policies (Bushee, 1998; Harford, Kecskés 
and Mansi, 2018) and actively engage with a firm’s management and board (McCahery, 
Sautner and Starks, 2016). 
 Turning to a firm’s financing decisions, prior empirical evidence confirms the 
heterogeneous effects of short- and long-term institutional investors on the financing policies 
of the firm. Firms with higher long-term institutional ownership use more external debt (Huang 
and Petkevich, 2016; Cleary and Wang, 2017) and more internal funding (i.e. retained earnings) 
(Huang and Petkevich, 2016), but less external equity (Huang and Petkevich, 2016; Harford, 
Kecskés and Mansi, 2018) and less seasoned equity (Hao, 2014). The institutional investors’ 
investment horizon also influences firms’ investment decisions. Firms with a high proportion 
of long-term institutional ownership invest more in investments that maximize the long-run 
value of the firm such as R&D (Bushee, 1998) and innovations (Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 
2018) while firms that experience a large exogenous increase in short-term institutional 
ownership reduce R&D investments (Cremers, Pareek and Sautner, 2020). Indeed, Yin, Ward 
and Tsolacos (2018) find that a higher presence of long-term institutional investors is 
associated with not only a positive, but also a long-lasting, effect on firm performance, and 
Neubaum and Zahra (2006) find that long-term institutional ownership is positivity associated 
with corporate social performance. 
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Regarding the effect of the institutional investors’ investment horizon on a firm’s cash 
policies, contradictory results have been documented in the literature. On the one hand, Cleary 
and Wang (2017) argue that, because of the positive monitoring role of long-term institutional 
investors in reducing agency and information asymmetry problems, long-term institutional 
ownership is associated with lower cash holdings. Harford, Kecskés and Mansi (2018) also 
document a negative, but not significant, coefficient on the effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on cash holdings. On the other hand, Harford, Kecskés and Mansi (2012) find that 
firms with a high presence of long-term institutional investors hold more cash holdings as 
opportunistic managers are less likely to misuse cash in such firms. Moreover, Huang and 
Petkevich (2016) show that both short-term and long-term institutional ownership have 
positive significant effect on cash holdings, although the effect is larger in firms with higher 
short-term institutional ownership. They attribute this difference to the fact that investors with 
different investment horizons seek different types of information. They argue that long-term 
institutional investors seek value-enhancing information, while short-term investors focus on 
collecting value-neutral information. Thus, the existing empirical studies provide contradictory 
results on the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon on corporate cash holdings, 
and they explain their findings with different theoretical arguments. 
Indeed, I argue that focusing not only on the cash level, but also on the cash deviation 
can help to explain such mixed findings in the literature. I argue that using cash deviation will 
provide a deeper understanding of the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon on 
cash holdings. In terms of cash deviation, I can distinguish between positive deviation (i.e. 
excess cash) and negative deviation (i.e. cash deficit). On the one hand, I expect that long-term 
institutional investors will decrease excess cash level to minimize the agency cost of having a 
high amount of cash in the hands of a manager (i.e. agency view). On the other hand, as long-
term institutional investors are more linked to a firm’s financial health and long-run value (i.e. 
precautionary view), they will encourage managers to increase the cash holdings when the cash 
level is insufficient. Combining both expectations, I argue that long-term institutional investors 
monitor a firm to hold the level of cash that is needed to meet its fundamental investments and 
operations (i.e. the optimal cash level).  
Agency motive suggests that firms with a higher amount of cash holdings are exposed 
to higher agency costs (Jensen, 1986). The ownership of institutions can reduce such costs via 
effective monitoring and active engagement. For example, previous studies have shown that 
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institutional investors closely monitor managers’ actions to ensure efficient use of cash 
(Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008), which ultimately leads to a higher value of cash holdings 
(Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). Recent literature emphasizes that both the quality of 
monitoring and the efficiency of engagement of institutional investors are varied based on their 
investment horizons (McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016). In the context of cash holding 
policies, Cleary and Wang (2017) argue the effect of institutional ownership in decreasing a 
firm’s cash holdings is attributed to long-term investors rather than short-term investors. In 
addition to the potential agency costs that are often connected to large cash holdings, other 
costs of cash holdings include a low rate of return and possible tax disadvantages (Opler et al., 
1999; Foley et al., 2007). Moreover, recent literature documents that excess cash holdings are 
associated with a lower value of cash and operating performance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; Chen and Shane, 2014; Oler and Picconi, 
2014), and then ultimately lower firm value (Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Martínez-
Sola, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2013). Therefore, my first sub-hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Sub-Ha: The presence of long-term institutional investors decreases the excess cash; in other 
words, long-term institutional ownership decreases positive deviation of cash from its optimal 
level. 
However, prior research finds that firms with less cash holdings are more sensitive to 
their cash flows (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004) and more likely to fail to undertake 
value-creating investment opportunities (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). Moreover, firms are 
exposed to more refinancing risk when they hold a lower amount of cash holdings (Harford, 
Klasa and Maxwell, 2014). Considering that the risk-taking behaviours of large investors might 
influence a firm’s cash policies (Boubaker, Nguyen and Rouatbi, 2016), and that different types 
of owners have different risk-taking behaviours towards cash policies (Anderson and Hamadi, 
2016), I expect that long-term institutional investors will be more risk averse than other 
investors towards cash policies and encourage a firm to hold more cash. In terms of a firm’s 
performance, the effect of holding insufficient cash is even more harmful than holding excess 
cash on the firm’s future performance (Chen and Shane, 2014; Oler and Picconi, 2014). As 
long-term institutional investors are more concerned about the long-run value and health of 
their investee firms, my second sub-hypothesis is as follows:  
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Sub-Hb: The presence of long-term institutional investors decreases cash deficit; in other 
words, long-term institutional ownership decreases negative deviation of cash from its optimal 
level. 
Recent studies examine the effect of the cash deviation from the optimal cash level on 
firm value. These studies find consistent results that suggest the importance for firms to 
maintain the optimal cash level. For example, Oler and Picconi (2014) examine the effect of 
cash deviation on future firm performance using a sample of US public firms over the period 
1989–2008. They find that the cash deviation has a significant negative effect on both RNOA 
and CAR.  
Chen and Shane (2014) distinguish between two types of changes in corporate cash 
holdings, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ changes. The normal changes are the changes in cash 
towards the optimal level of cash. By contrast, the abnormal changes are the changes in cash 
that are not derived from a firm’s fundamental investing and operating needs. Chen and Shane 
(2014) document that only the abnormal changes in cash have a negative and significant effect 
on a firm’s future performance. Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, both Harford, Mansi 
and Maxwell (2008) and Martínez-Sola, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2013) find 
consistent evidence that cash deviation reduces firm value. In the context of institutional 
investors’ investment horizon, Bushee (2001) finds that while short-term institutional investors 
seek short-run earnings, long-term institutional investors focus on the long-run health and value 
of the firm. A recent survey by McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016) confirms that long-term 
institutional investors actively engage in a firm’s policies, and one of the triggers of the 
engagement is low payments to shareholders despite the firm having high cash holdings. I 
therefore hypothesize: 
H1: The presence of long-term institutional investors decreases both excess and insufficient 
cash level from its optimal level; in other words, long-term institutional ownership decreases 
cash deviation from its optimal cash level.  
If the presence of long-term institutional investors is associated with lower cash 
deviation, and the cash deviation has a negative effect on firm value, I then posit that firms 
with a higher proportion of long-term institutional ownership will have a higher value of cash 
holdings. The existing literature provides consistent results that the relationship between the 
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change in cash holdings and firm value is positively moderated by the quality of governance at 
country level (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 
2013; Thakur and Kannadhasan, 2019) and firm level (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; 
Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; Deb, David and O’Brien, 2017). However, while 
institutional ownership is often used as a measure of corporate governance in the cash holdings 
literature (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Harford, 
Kecskés and Mansi, 2012; Bates, Chang and Chi, 2018a; Im et al., 2018; Ward, Yin and Zeng, 
2018), prior studies report inconsistent results on the effect of institutional ownership on the 
value of cash holdings.  
In particular, while Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that institutional blockholding 
is associated with a higher value of cash, Bates, Chang and Chi (2018) also find that this 
relationship existed during the 1990s, but that institutional blockholding had a negative, but 
not statistically significant, effect on the value of cash during the 2000s. 
Recent studies further differentiate between institutional investors based on their 
investment horizon, but still report mixed results. For example, Harford, Kecskés and Mansi 
(2012) study the effect of long-term institutional investors (i.e. investors with low portfolio 
turnover) on the value of cash, and they find a positive significant effect for only long-term 
indexers and not all long-term institutional investors. Adopting Bushee’s (1998) classification, 
while Im et al. (2018) and Ward, Yin and Zeng (2018) interestingly find that short-term 
institutional investors (i.e. transient investors) have a positive effect on the value of cash, they 
report both a negative and positive, but not significant, effect of long-term institutional 
investors (i.e. dedicated investors). Despite these studies’ focus on US firms and their use of 
alternative measures for institutional investors’ investment horizon, they failed to provide 
consistent results. This study aims to provide additional evidence; however, I use another 
interesting institutional context (i.e. the UK) and adopting a new measure of investors’ 
investment horizon based on investee firm level rather than investors’ overall portfolio turnover. 
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
 H2: The presence of long-term institutional investors positively moderates the relationship 
between the change in cash and a firm’s value; in other words, long-term institutional 
ownership increases the value of cash holdings. 
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Building on the potential agency costs that are associated with large cash holdings 
(Jensen, 1986), the recent literature on corporate governance and cash holdings focuses on the 
use of excess cash. Studies find that the value of excess cash is higher in countries with a strong 
governance environment (i.e. with developed markets, low corruption and better information 
asymmetry) compared with countries with a weak governance environment (Drobetz, 
Grüninger and Hirschvogl, 2010; Kusnadi, 2019). Frésarda and Salva (2010) find that investors 
value excess cash at a premium for well-governed firms as it is expected to be used efficiently.  
Consistent with the spending hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), Harford, Mansi 
and Maxwell (2008) find that poorly governed firms with excess cash are associated with 
higher spending in capital expenditure and acquisitions, but with lower profitability and firm 
value. While Harford (1999) finds that firms with excess cash dissipate their cash in value-
decreasing acquisitions, Gao and Mohamed (2018) confirm these findings—but only if the 
acquirer firm is poorly governed. Moreover, Gao, Harford and Li (2013) compare public and 
private firms to find that well-governed public firms spend their excess cash in value-creating 
long-run investments (i.e. R&D). Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Schauten, van Dijk and 
van der Waal (2013) find that the negative effect of excess cash on future operating 
performance is positively moderated with the quality of a firm’s governance through the 
efficient use of the excess cash. Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H3: The presence of long-term institutional investors positively moderates the relationship 
between excess cash and a firm’s operating performance; in other words, long-term 
institutional ownership increases the value of excess cash through value-creating investments. 
3. Econometric Specifications 
3.1 Cash deviation 
As this study intends to particularly explain the unexplained portion of cash holdings, I 
follow a large body of the accounting and finance literature and employ a two-step regression 
procedure to study the cash deviation [for a recent empirical review of studies that have used 
this procedure, see Chen, Hribar and Melessa (2018)]. Under this procedure, the dependent 
variable can be divided into two parts: explained and unexplained parts. The explained part 
refers to the part predicted by a first-step regression, which regresses the dependent variable 
on some primary explanatory variables; and the unexplained part refers to the difference 
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between the actual values of the dependent variable and the predicted values by first-step 
regression. In other words, the fitted values that are predicted by the first-step regression 
represent the explained part, and the residuals from this regression represent the unexplained 
part. Then, the second-step regression regresses these residuals on new independent variables 
of interest. Equation (1) is the first-step model to estimate the optimal cash level. 
 𝐶𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑗 +  𝜏𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where 𝐶 denotes the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets of firm 
i at time t. 𝜖 is the residual (or the fitted deviation), that is, the difference between the actual 
cash level and the predicated optimal level C*. 𝑋 is a set of main determinants of corporate 
cash level (Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; Bates, Chang and Chi, 2018): firm 
size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, cash flow, industry cash flow volatility, net working 
capital (NWC), capital expenditure, R&D, acquisitions, and dividend. 𝜑 and 𝜏 are industry and 
year fixed effects, respectively. Thus, Equations (2) and (3) show the numerical version of the 
cash deviation variable and the absolute cash deviation, respectively.  
 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡  =  𝐶𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗  =  𝜖𝑖?̂?. (2) 
 |𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡|  =  |𝐶𝑖𝑡 −  𝐶𝑖𝑡
∗ |  =  |𝜖𝑖?̂?|. (3) 
While Equation (1) represents the first-step regression, I use the second-step regression to test 
my first hypothesis H1, and the model specification is as follows: 
 |𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡| =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝜑𝑗 +  𝜏𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (4) 
where 𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂 denotes the long-term institutional ownership. 𝑋 is a set of cash determinants used 
to estimate the optimal cash level in Equation (1). 𝜑 and 𝜏 are industry and year fixed effects, 
respectively. 𝜖 is the error term. I include the explanatory variables from the first-stage model 
into the second-stage model to eliminate the potential bias associated with a two-step procedure 
(Chen, Hribar and Melessa, 2018).7 
 
7 Chen, Hribar and Melessa (2018) review 61 studies that apply a two-step regression procedure and find that this procedure 
might lead to biased coefficients. They suggest three possible approaches to eliminate the biases, one of which is to include 
the first-step regression’s explanatory variables as control variables in the second-step regression. Though their study was 
focusing on using the residuals from the first-step model without any transformation or partition, they advise caution even if 
transformed or partitioned residuals have been used as dependent variables. 
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3.2 Value of cash holdings 
To test my hypothesis H2 on the relationship between long-term institutional ownership 
and the value of cash holdings, I employ the excess return model of Faulkender and Wang 
(2006), which has been widely used in corporate governance and cash value literature (Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; Bates, Chang and Chi, 
2018; Ward, Yin and Zeng, 2018). Thus, I estimate the following specification: 
 
𝒓𝒊𝒕 − 𝑹𝒊𝒕
𝑩 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑻𝑰𝑶𝒊𝒕  ×  
∆𝑪𝒊𝒕
𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕−𝒕
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 +  𝝐𝒊𝒕, 
(5) 
where ∆𝑋 denotes a change in 𝑋 from time 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡. 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is stock return over one year 𝑡 − 1 to 
𝑡. 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐵  is Fama and French’s (1993) 25-size and book-to-market matched portfolio return over 
one year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡. 𝑀𝐸 is market value of equity. 𝐶 is cash and cash equivalents. 𝐸 is earnings 
before extraordinary items. 𝑁𝐴 is net assets (total asset – cash and cash equivalents). 𝑅𝐷 is 
research and development expenses. 𝐼 represents interest expenses. 𝐷 is common dividends. 𝐿 
is total debt (short and long debt). 𝑀𝑉 is market value of equity plus total debt. 𝑁𝐹 is net new 
equity issues plus net new debt issues. 𝝐 is the error term.  
 I am interested in the coefficient 𝛽1, which represents the moderating effect of long-
term institutional ownership on the relationship between the change in cash holdings and stock 
excess return. To gain a more intuitive interpretation for this coefficient, I follow Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) and use a binary dummy variable to distinguish between firms with a high 
proportion of long-term institutional ownership versus firms with a low proportion. I use the 
top and bottom quartiles of long-term institutional ownership to construct such a binary 
variable. In separate regressions, I also use the ratio of long-term institutional ownership 
instead of the dummy variable. In further analysis, I also re-estimate Equation (5) excluding 
𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂, but instead estimating the model for two subsamples of high (top quartile) and low 
(bottom quartile) long-term institutional ownership. 
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3.3 Use of excess cash and operating performance 
To test hypothesis H3 on the moderating effect of long-term institutional ownership on 
the relationship between excess cash and a firm’s operating performance, I adopt the approach 
of Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and estimate the following specification: 
 𝑹𝑶𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝑻𝑰𝑶𝒊𝒕−𝟏  ×
𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏




𝜷𝟓𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟔
𝑷𝑷&𝑬𝒊𝒕
𝑵𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝝋𝒋 + 𝝉𝒕 + 𝝐𝒊𝒕, 
(6) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 denotes the ratio of operating income to the book value of net assets. 𝐷𝑒𝑣 is the 
cash deviation from its optimal level, using the residuals predicted by Equation (1). 𝑁𝐴 is the 
natural log of the book value of net assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐸 is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment 
to the book value of net assets. 𝜑 and 𝜏 are industry and year fixed effects, respectively. 𝜖 is 
the error term. I lagged the long-term institutional ownership and include lagged operating 
performance.  
I estimate Equation (6) using only a subsample of firms with excess cash, as the aim 
here is to study the use of excess cash. My main interest is in the moderating effect of long-
term institutional ownership on the effect of the use of excess cash on operating performance. 
The coefficient 𝛽1 of the interaction between 𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 and 
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 captures such an effect. I 
further re-estimate Equation (6) using industry adjusted operating performance 
(𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑]) and controlling for firm and year fixed effects.  
4. Data and Variables 
4.1 Sample and data sources 
My sample consists of the UK firms that traded in the London Stock Exchange during 
the period of 2000–2016. The data are from three sources: Ownership data is obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon Ownership & Profiles module. Eikon provides detailed information 
of the firm’s shareholders, such as name, number of shares held, investment style, and the first 
date of holding the shares. I further use the Thomson Reuters Datastream database to obtain 
financial and accounting data for firms with full ownership information available. Finally, I 
collect corporate governance data from BoardEx and Thomson Reuters Asset4 module.  
Following the literature, firms operating in financial industries (Standard Industrial 
Classification [SIC] codes 6000–6999) and utility industries (SIC codes 4900–4999) have been 
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excluded from the sample, as such industries are entitled to meet some capital requirements 
and regulatory supervision (Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 
2009; Farinha, Mateus and Soares, 2018). The final dataset consists of 11,830 firm-year 
observations. To avoid the problem of large outliers, all continuous variables have been 
truncated at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
4.2 Variables 
Cash deviation  
The primary dependent variable to test hypothesis H1 is the cash deviation from the 
estimated optimal level of cash holdings (/𝐷𝑒𝑣/). In other words, the cash deviation of firm 𝑖 
in year 𝑡 is the residual from the regression model that predicts the optimal cash level for firm 
𝑖 in year 𝑡, in Equation (1). The optimal cash level (𝐶 ∗) can be defined as the cash that is 
needed to fund firms’ fundamental investments and operations (Oler and Picconi, 2014; Lozano 
and Durán, 2017). 𝐶 ∗  is a function of firm-level characteristics that influences firm cash 
holdings. Following the literature ( e.g., Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; 
Farinha, Mateus and Soares, 2018), I use the cash and cash equivalents to total assets ratio as 
a primary measure of corporate cash holdings. 
Excess return 
I employ the stock excess return model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) to study the 
relationship between long-term institutional ownership and the value of cash holdings, for 
hypothesis H2. The dependent variable in this model is the difference between a firm’s stock 
return and a benchmarking return, namely, excess return. For benchmarking, I use the Fama 
and French (1993) 25-size and book-to-market value-weighted portfolios (Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; 
Bates, Chang and Chi, 2018). Thus, my dependent variable in Equation (5) (𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐵) is the 
firm’s stock return over one year from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 minus the benchmarking return of size and 
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Operating performance 
To test my prediction in hypothesis H3 on the moderating effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the relationship between excess cash and operating performance, I 
use the ratio of operating income to the book value of net assets (𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴) to proxy for a firm’s 
operating performance. I further use an industry adjusted ratio normalized by industry-year 
average ( 𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑] ), following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and 
Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal (2013).  
Investment horizon 
Recent papers (e.g., Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Attig et al., 2012; Wang, 2014; Yin, Ward 
and Tsolacos, 2018) on investment horizon literature use the duration of those investors which 
remain investing in a firm as a proxy for investment horizon. Wang (2014) argues that, while 
portfolio turnover8 measures an investor’s investment horizon at the fund level, investment 
duration can capture the investor’s horizon at a specific firm level. Indeed, an investor might 
be a long-term investor at the fund level, but choose to not be so in some firms in their portfolio. 
Using investment duration at firm level overcomes such a flaw and ensures that only investors 
who intentionally choose to hold a firm’s shares for a long period are classified as long 
investors (Yin, Ward and Tsolacos, 2018). I also believe that using the investment duration of 
investors at a firm level is more relevant when studying a firm’s cash policy. In order for an 
investor to monitor a firm’s cash policy and actively engage with the firm’s management, the 
investor should be investing in the firm for a long enough time, or at least planning to stay in 
the firm for a while, including the cost of the monitoring and intervention. Thus, in this study, 
following Wang (2014) and McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016), I classify institutional 
investors based on their investment duration in a specific firm as long-term institutional 
investors if such investors hold their shares for at least eight quarters (two years).9  
 
8 Several proxies of the institutional investors’ investment horizon have been used in previous literature. One strand of the 
literature adopts Bushee’s (1998) measure to classify investors based on investment horizon (e.g. Wahal and McConnell, 2000; 
Bushee, 2001; Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole, 2009). Bushee (1998) uses past trading behaviour to distinguish between short-term 
(‘transient’) and long-term (‘dedicated’) investors, where he classifies investors with a low-turnover and concentrated portfolio 
as long-term investors. While Bushee (1998) uses the absolute value of the change in investor positions over one quarter, other 
researchers use the Churn ratio to measure an investor’s turnover portfolio. For instance, Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) 
calculate the Churn ratio by summing the aggregates of the purchase and sale of an investor’s overall portfolio. On the other 
hand, Yan and Zhang (2009) argue that using the minimum between the aggregate purchase or sale is superior, as it reduces 
the effect of an investor’s cash flow on portfolio turnover. 
9 Using different durations such as twelve quarters for long-term institutional investors does not change my results. 
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Firm-level controls 
The firm-specific control variables used in this study are motivated by most studies in 
cash holdings literature (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009; Oler and 
Picconi, 2014; Farinha, Mateus and Soares, 2018). These variables include firm Size, Leverage, 
Market-to-book, Cash Flow, Industry Sigma, NWC, R&D, Capital Expenditure, Acquisition, 
and Dividend. 
Firm Size is defined as the natural log of the book value of total assets. Accessibility to 
capital market can be captured by firm size (Oler and Picconi, 2014); thus, small firms are 
expected to hold more cash as they may have limited access to external funds at a higher cost 
compared with larger firms. Moreover, large firms can benefit from the economies of scale in 
holding cash (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009), and they hold a lower cash ratio to their total 
assets compared with small firms. Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) also suggest that firm 
size is a proxy for takeover deterrent. This means small firms are more likely to hold high cash 
amounts to resist takeover attacks. Overall, I expect that cash holdings decrease with the 
increase of firm size. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt (short and long debt) to the book value of total assets. 
According to the hedge theory of Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007), there is a positive 
relationship between a firm’s cash holding and leverage (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). 
However, most of the literature shows a negative coefficient of leverage on cash holding [see, 
for example, the literature review of Weidemann (2018)]. Indeed, the negative relationship is 
supported by the idea that firms spend cash in serving their outstanding debt, and the interest 
payment will naturally increase with leverage (Jensen, 1986). Thus, I expect to find similar 
results to the literature on the relationship between leverage and cash holdings.  
Market-to-book is the ratio of the market value to the book value of total assets. The 
market-to-book ratio is used in cash holdings literature to proxy for a firm’s investment 
opportunities. According to the precautionary motive of holding cash, firms with higher 
investment opportunities may hoard more cash to enhance their ability to undertake future 
investment opportunities. Thus, I expect a positive relationship between market-to-book ratio 
and cash holdings.  
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Cash Flow is measured as earnings after interest, taxes and dividends, but before 
depreciation to the book value of total assets. On the one hand, firms with a high cash inflow 
can accumulate more cash. Moreover, high cash inflows can mean that firms encounter better 
investment opportunities (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009) which encourage firms to hoard more 
cash as aforementioned. On the other hand, and consistent with the precautionary motive, firms 
with high cash inflows are less likely to need to hoard high cash holdings. Opler et al. (1999) 
suggest that the relationship between cash flow and cash holdings depends on the measures of 
cash being used and the period of the study. Thus, I expect to find a negative coefficient, which 
is consistent with the findings of Farinha, Mateus and Soares (2018), whose study context and 
measures of cash are similar to mine.  
Industry Sigma is the average standard deviation of cash flows of all firms in the same 
industry and year over the past 10 years. Because of precautionary reasons, I expect that firms 
operating in industries with high volatile cash flow will hold more cash. 
NWC is measured as the net working capital minus cash to the book value of total assets. 
As NWC and cash holdings represent the liquidities of firms, they are in some cases considered 
to be substitutes for each other (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). Accordingly, I expect that a 
firm decreases its cash holding as NWC increases.  
R&D is the ratio of research and development expenses to a firm’s total sales. Because 
of frequent missing data in research and development expenses, I follow most literature and 
substitute missing data of research and development expenses with zero when missing. As 
R&D expenses consume cash reserves, one may expect that R&D and cash holding will have 
a negative relationship. However, as firms which operate in an environment with high R&D 
spending are enjoying better investment opportunities, but exposing themselves to greater 
financial constrains (Opler et al., 1999; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009), I expect that firms in 
such an environment will hoard more cash.  
Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total assets. 
In theory, capital expenditure can have a positive or negative relationship with cash holding. 
Similar to R&D, firms with high capital expenditure are more likely to have greater growth 
opportunities and higher financial constraints. Based on this argument, one may expect a 
positive relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings. On the other hand, if 
capital expenditure is expended to increases a firm’s assets that can be used as collateral, the 
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firm will have greater borrowing capacity, and then less need for high cash holdings. Also, 
capital expenditure consumes cash reserves. Thus, I expect a statistically significant 
relationship between capital expenditure and cash holdings with a sign dependent on the 
context.  
Acquisition is measured as the ratio of net cash flows towards acquisitions to the book 
value of total assets. The aforementioned arguments of the relationship between capital 
expenditure and cash will hold true with acquisitions. Thus, I expect to find a statistically 
significant coefficient with a similar sign to capital expenditure.  
Dividend is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm paid dividends in a particular 
year, and zero otherwise. I expect firms that pay a dividend will have lower cash holdings. 
Firms consume their cash reserves as they pay dividends. At the same time, Bates, Kahle and 
Stulz (2009) argue that paying-dividend firms are less likely to be risky and have better access 
to the capital market, and, therefore, have less need to hold high cash reserves. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all independent and dependent variables used 
in my study. All variables are defined in Appendix B Table B1. Panel A of Table 1 presents 
my main explanatory variables. The average ownership of institutional investors is 31.3% in 
UK firms. Long-term institutional ownership represents approximately two-thirds of 
institutional ownership, which is around 23.3% of total ownership. Once I divide the long-term 
institutional investors into index versus non-index investors, I see most of the long-term 
institutional investors in my sample are non-index investors who, on average, hold 20% of a 
firm’s shares compared with 3.4% held by index investors. It is also interesting to distinguish 
between long-term investors based on their overall portfolio turnover. I find that, in my sample, 
most of the long-term institutional investors—around 75%—have a low-turnover portfolio. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table provides summary statistics. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for ownership variables. Panel B shows the descriptive 
statistics for cash and cash deviation dependent variables. Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the main firm-level control variables. 
Panel D shows the descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables based on the excess return model of Faulkender and Wang 
(2006). Panel E shows the descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables used for operating performance analysis. Panel F 
shows the descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables used for the market-to-book model of Fama and French (1998). All 
variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. 
                            N Mean  Median    SD   25th    75th 
Panel A: ownership variables             
Long-term IO           11254   0.233   0.174   0.212   0.050   0.385 
Long-term IO (non-indexer)   11218   0.204   0.156   0.186   0.035   0.339 
Long-term IO (indexer)    7431   0.034   0.025   0.038   0.000   0.056 
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)     11137   0.161   0.116   0.161   0.020   0.257 
Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover)     8851   0.016   0.001   0.031   0.000   0.016 
Institutional Ownership       11254   0.313   0.270   0.227   0.120   0.482 
Blockholding (5%)            11254   0.212   0.190   0.153   0.096   0.312 
Panel B: cash dependent variables             
Cash                          11254   0.135   0.079   0.154   0.030   0.180 
|Dev|                         11254   0.091   0.067   0.091   0.032   0.117 
Excess cash    4667   0.111   0.068   0.121   0.029   0.150 
Cash deficit    6587  -0.077  -0.067   0.058  -0.106  -0.034 
Panel C: firm-level variables             
Size                          11254  11.950  11.735   2.223  10.299  13.462 
Leverage                      11254   0.169   0.136   0.167   0.013   0.268 
Market-to-book                11254   1.791   1.393   1.309   1.023   2.057 
Cash Flow                     11254   0.008   0.055   0.195  -0.003   0.095 
Industry Sigma                11254   0.464   0.322   0.445   0.124   0.604 
NWC                           11254   0.019   0.010   0.196  -0.090   0.128 
R&D                           11254   0.029   0.000   0.095   0.000   0.010 
Capital Expenditure      11254   0.044   0.027   0.052   0.011   0.057 
Acquisition                   11254   0.025   0.000   0.056   0.000   0.020 
Dividend      11254   0.601   1.000   0.490   0.000   1.000 
Panel D: Excess return model             
Excess return                  7719   0.011  -0.075   0.801  -0.317   0.186 
ΔCash/ME                      7719   0.010   0.001   0.173  -0.037   0.048 
ΔEarnings/ME                  7719   0.013   0.008   0.319  -0.036   0.052 
ΔNet Assets/ME                7719   0.085   0.048   0.526  -0.047   0.203 
ΔR&D/ME                       7719   0.001   0.000   0.012   0.000   0.000 
ΔInterest/ME                  7719   0.000   0.000   0.017  -0.002   0.003 
ΔDividends/ME                 7719   0.000   0.000   0.017   0.000   0.004 
Cash/ME                        7719   0.196   0.106   0.279   0.040   0.240 
Debt/MV                        7719   0.183   0.118   0.204   0.003   0.296 
New Finance/ME                 7719   0.071   0.002   0.253  -0.009   0.087 
Panel E: operating performance analysis           
RONA                           4330  -0.110   0.072   0.711  -0.044   0.136 
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RONA (Industry adjusted)              4330  -0.145   0.012   0.704  -0.069   0.095 
Net Assets                     4330  11.610  11.464   2.529   9.719  13.539 
PP&E                           4330   0.278   0.203   0.251   0.069   0.427 
Panel F: Market-to-book model             
Market Value/NA                5497   2.408   1.534   3.283   1.085   2.394 
ΔCash/NA                    5497   0.017   0.002   0.318  -0.029   0.045 
XCash/NA                    4319   0.027  -0.022   0.337  -0.088   0.060 
ΔF2 Market Value/NA            5497   0.598   0.141   4.352  -0.390   0.810 
ΔL2 Net Assets/NA              5497   0.096   0.161   0.621  -0.067   0.385 
ΔF2 Net Assets/NA              5497   0.351   0.115   1.227  -0.102   0.428 
Earnings/NA                    5497  -0.024   0.066   0.384  -0.028   0.121 
ΔL2 Earnings/NA                5497   0.008   0.016   0.382  -0.054   0.069 
ΔF2 Earnings/NA                5497   0.034   0.020   0.405  -0.049   0.095 
R&D/NA                         5497   0.035   0.000   0.127   0.000   0.008 
ΔL2 R&D/NA                     5497   0.007   0.000   0.057   0.000   0.000 
ΔF2 R&D/NA                     5497   0.006   0.000   0.068   0.000   0.000 
Dividends/NA                   5497   0.022   0.014   0.031   0.000   0.031 
ΔL2 Dividends/NA               5497   0.002   0.000   0.022   0.000   0.007 
ΔF2 Dividends/NA               5497   0.005   0.000   0.027   0.000   0.009 
Interest/NA                    5497   0.015   0.011   0.017   0.003   0.021 
ΔL2 Interest/NA                5497   0.000   0.000   0.017  -0.003   0.006 
ΔF2 Interest/NA                5497   0.003   0.000   0.022  -0.004   0.005 
Panel G: Corporate Governance             
CEO Duality                    7318   0.199   0.000   0.400   0.000   0.000 
CEO Tenure                     7318   4.678   3.400   4.283   1.400   6.700 
Independent NED in Board (%)    7318   0.400   0.429   0.219   0.273   0.571 
Board Size                     7318   6.927   7.000   2.256   5.000   8.000 
Board Size2                    7318  53.073  49.000 36.108  25.000  64.000 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the results of my main cash dependent variables. While UK 
firms hold, on average, 13.5% of their total assets in the form of cash and cash equivalents, UK 
firms deviate from their optimal cash levels by 9.1%. Accordingly, the optimal cash level of 
an average UK firm will be around 4.4% if such a firm holds excess cash and 22.6% if the firm 
holds insufficient cash.10 Firms with cash deficits represent around 59% of the sample and hold, 
on average, 8% less cash than their optimal cash levels. On the other hand, firms with excess 
 
10 If the average firm holds 14.1% of its assets in cash (Cit= 13.5%) and this average firm, on average, deviates by 9.1% above 
or below its optimal level (|Devit|= 9.1%), then the average firm might have an optimal level of cash that equals to 4.4% (Cit*= 
13.5% - 9.1%) or 22.6% (Cit*= 13.5% + 9.1%). 
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cash reserves hold, on average, 11.1% of their total assets in excess cash from their optimal 
cash levels. 
Panel C of Table 1 shows the summary results of the firm-level control variables. These 
variables are the main determinants of cash holdings used to estimate the optimal cash level in 
Equation (1), and then used as control variables in further analyses. Overall, the statistics in 
Panel C are similar to those in the previous literature. It is worth noting that the average cash 
flow in my study is smaller than the cash flow presented in cash literature using a similar 
context (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Farinha, Mateus and Soares, 2018). While those earlier 
studies use earnings after interest and taxes, but before depreciation, I use earnings after interest, 
taxes, and common dividends, but before depreciation, following Opler et al. (1999) and Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009). I argue that my measure of cash flow is more appropriate for my study, 
as I aim to predicate the optimal cash level and my dividend variable is a binary dummy rather 
than the actual amount paid as dividends. 
Panels D, E, and F of Table 1 present summary statistics for variables used in the value 
of cash analysis and operating performance analysis. Panel D shows that the average (median) 
stock excess return in my sample is 1.1% (-7.8%). Panel E show that the average return on net 
assets is -11% though the median is 7.2%. Moreover, PP&E interestingly represents only 27.8% 
of net assets.11 In Panel F, I present summary statistics for variables used in the market-to-book 
model presented in the additional robustness section. Finally, Panel G reports summary 
statistics for corporate governance characteristics used in the robustness analyses section.  
In untabulated analysis, I check for the potential multi-collinearity in all my estimation 
models. I follow prior ownership and cash holdings literature (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Callen and 
Fang, 2013; Kim et. al, 2016; Miranda-Lopez et. al, 2019; Neubaum and Zahra; 2006; Tihanyi 
et. al, 2003) and adopt Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis to test for multi-collinearity. I 
find that all VIFs of the independent variables through all my estimated regression models are 
below the conventional rule-of-thumb value of 10 (Neter et al, 1983). 
 
 
11 As shown in Panel B, cash represents 13.5% of total assets, and, in the untabulated statistics, cash represents 35.5% of net 
assets.  
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I argue in this paper that the long-term institutional ownership affects corporate cash 
holdings. I divide my sample firms into five quintiles based on the long-term institutional 
ownership, where the bottom (top) quintile contains firms with the least (most) long-term 
institutional ownership. Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for cash variables for 
both quintiles. Panel A reveals that, on average, firms in the top quintile clearly hold a lower 
amount of cash and have smaller cash deviations compared with firms in the bottom quintile. 
Using a t-test to compare the equality of means, Panel B of Table 2 confirms that the differences 
in means of cash variables between the top and bottom quintiles is statistically significant. 
Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 1, firms in the top quintiles not only have a lower cash 
amount and cash deviation, but they also have consistent cash ratios across years. Finally, 
Figure 2 visualizes the cash deviation around the optimal cash level. While firms in both 
quintiles are more likely to have positive cash deviation, with excess cash—than having 
negative deviation, with cash deficit—firms in the top quintile have less dispersed cash 
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Table 2: Difference in cash by quartiles of long-term institutional ownership 
This tables shows a comparison of cash level and cash deviations between the top and bottom quartiles of long-term ownership.  Panel 
A presents the means and medians for these quintiles. Panel B presents a T-test statistics of comparing the means. Detailed definitions 
of variables are in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
                            
Bottom Quartile Top Quartile 
   Obs.    Mean  Median    Obs.    Mean  Median 
Cash                        3451 0.228 0.138    4218   0.100   0.063 
|Dev|                       2138 0.138 0.103    3931   0.065   0.049 
Dev                         2138 0.015 -0.025    3931   0.001  -0.012 
Large Positive Dev          845 0.193 0.142    1285   0.097   0.067 
Large Negative Dev          852 -0.141 -0.124     854  -0.099  -0.090 
Panel B: T-test comparing means 
  Diff.       
Cash                          0.130*** (34.16) 
|Dev|                        0.0733*** (30.01) 
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5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Main analyses 
I start by exploring the relationship between long-term institutional ownership and a 
firm’s cash level and how this relationship differs when a firm has either an excess or 
insufficient cash level. Then, to test my first main hypothesis, I analyse the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the cash deviation from the optimal level and the change in cash 
when a firm does deviate from its optimal cash level. Second, I study the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the value of cash holdings. Third, I show the results of the 
moderating role of long-term institutional ownership on the use of excess cash and a firm’s 
operating performance. Lastly, I provide several robustness tests. 
5.1.1 Institutional investors’ investment horizon and cash deviation 
Table 3 presents the regression results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership 
on cash holdings. Column (1) suggests that long-term institutional ownership decreases a firm’s 
cash holdings. In Columns (2)–(5), I differentiate between firms with excess cash and firms 
with cash deficit. The coefficients of long-term institutional ownership are negative and only 
statistically significant for a subsample of firms with excess cash. The regression estimation 
results are consistent with the agency view as long-term institutional investors tend to decrease 
the amount of cash held by a firm to minimize the potential agency costs. By contrast, and 
consistent with the precautionary view, the presence of large investors is associated with higher 
cash holdings, but only in firms with cash deficit. Overall, Table 3 suggests that long-term 
institutional ownership decreases cash holdings especially when firms hold excess cash. The 
overall results of the control variables are consistent with the literature.  In terms of economic 
significance, results from Table 3 suggest that a 1-standard-devaition increase in long-term 
institutional ownership (21.1%) is associated with a decrease in cash holdings by 2.52%, 1.63% 







70 | P a g e  
Table 3. Long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings 
Table 3 reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on corporate cash holdings (Cash). Column (1) shows the results 
of the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) show the results of subsamples of firms with excess cash and firms with cash deficit, respectively. 
Columns (4) and (5) present the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings of subsamples of firms in the top and the 
bottom tertiles of cash deviations (Dev), respectively. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for 
serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are 
truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
                          Dependent Variable = Cash    
                                   (1)    (2)          (3)             (4)             (5)    
                          





Long-term IO -0.119*** -0.077*** -0.006 -0.062** -0.010 
                          (0.017) (0.021) (0.009) (0.022) (0.008) 
Institutional Ownership   0.090*** 0.060** 0.015* 0.047* 0.011 
                          (0.016) (0.021) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) 
Blockholding (5%)       0.011 -0.010 0.011* -0.009 0.009 
                          (0.016) (0.018) (0.005) (0.019) (0.006) 
Size                      -0.009*** -0.020*** -0.003*** -0.020*** -0.003*** 
                          (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Leverage                  -0.259*** -0.353*** -0.165*** -0.349*** -0.159*** 
                          (0.017) (0.016) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) 
Market-to-Book            0.025*** 0.028*** 0.014*** 0.026*** 0.014*** 
                          (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash Flow                 -0.022 -0.058*** 0.011* -0.053*** 0.005 
                          (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) 
Industry Sigma            0.007 0.014* 0.008*** 0.017** 0.007** 
                          (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) 
NWC                       -0.119*** -0.176*** -0.067*** -0.183*** -0.067*** 
                          (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) 
R&D                       0.189*** 0.250*** 0.107*** 0.246*** 0.099*** 
                          (0.038) (0.027) (0.015) (0.027) (0.013) 
Capital Expenditure             -0.183*** -0.318*** -0.054*** -0.315*** -0.069*** 
                          (0.036) (0.039) (0.017) (0.041) (0.023) 
Acquisition               -0.203*** -0.355*** -0.060*** -0.372*** -0.098*** 
                          (0.023) (0.027) (0.012) (0.026) (0.016) 
Dividend         -0.018*** -0.042*** -0.011*** -0.041*** -0.010*** 
                          (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Industry Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.31 0.68 0.43 0.68 0.50 
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In Table 4, I use different measures of cash to better understand the effect of long-term 
ownership on cash holdings. Column (1) simply regresses the long-term ownership and other 
controls on the real value of cash deviation. As can be seen, the coefficient of the long-term 
ownership is similar to the coefficient in Column (1) of Table 3. The reason for this similarity 
is that the cash deviation (𝐷𝑒𝑣) is equal to the residual value of the regression that regresses 
the main determinants of cash on cash level, in Equation (1); here, I also control for the same 
variables. However, in Column (2), I use the absolute value of the cash deviation instead of the 
real value. The estimation results support my first hypothesis H1, which suggests that long-
term institutional ownership decreases a firm’s cash deviation from its optimal cash level. In 
terms of economic significance, column (2) of Table 4 suggests that a 1-standard-devaition 
increase in long-term institutional ownership (21.1%) is associated with approximately one 
percent decrease in the absolute value of the cash deviation. 
To test the sensitivity of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash 
deviation across the optimal cash level, following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), 
Riddick and Whited (2009), and Palazzon (2012), I use the change in cash as a dependent 
variable with subsampling when firms either have an excess or cash deficit. Columns (3)–(7) 
suggest that the presence of long-term institutional investors is associated with an increase in 
cash holdings only for firms who hold less cash than the optimal level and a decrease in cash 
for firms with large excess cash holdings. The estimated coefficients of long-term institutional 
ownership are negative for firms with excess cash, but only significant for firms with a large 
excess cash level; and they are positive and significant for firms with a cash deficit, albeit larger 
for firms with a large cash deficit. In terms of economic significance, columns (5) and (7) of 
Table 4 suggest that a 1-standard-devaition increase in long-term institutional ownership 
(21.1%) is associated with an increase in the change of cash holdings by 1.08% and 1.34% for 
firms with cash deficit and firm with large cash deficit, respectively, and it is associated with a 
0.85% decrease in the change of cash holdings for firms with large excess cash. Overall, the 
results in Tables 3 and 4 show statistically significant support to hypothesis H1 and both sub-
hypotheses Ha and Hb.  
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Table 4. Long-term institutional ownership and cash deviations 
Table 4 reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash deviations. Column (1) shows the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash 
deviation (Dev). In Column (2), the absolute value of the cash deviation is the dependent variable (|Dev|). In Columns (3) – (7), the change in cash over one year from time t-
1 to t is the dependent variable. Column (3) shows the results of the full sample. Columns (4) – (7) show the results of subsamples of firms with excess cash and firms with 
cash deficit, respectively. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Industry 
and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable =           Dev           |Dev|           ΔCash           ΔCash           ΔCash           ΔCash           ΔCash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)    (4)          (5)    (6) (7) 
                          





Long-term IO -0.119*** -0.045*** -0.008 -0.026 0.051*** -0.040* 0.063*** 
                          (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021) 
Institutional Ownership   0.090*** 0.029** 0.009 0.030 -0.040** 0.034 -0.061** 
                          (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.022) 
Blockholding (5%)       0.011 -0.008 -0.019** -0.053*** 0.004 -0.059** 0.021* 
                          (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.021) (0.010) 
Size                      0.000 -0.007*** 0.000 -0.003 0.002* -0.001 0.004** 
                          (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage                  0.013 -0.085*** -0.010* -0.050*** 0.029*** -0.056*** 0.033* 
                          (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) 
Market-to-Book            -0.000 0.009*** 0.002 0.004 -0.002** 0.004 -0.001 
                          (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Cash Flow                 -0.011 -0.035*** 0.037*** 0.007 0.060*** 0.002 0.053*** 
                          (0.016) (0.008) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) 
Industry Sigma            -0.002 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.003 0.013 0.007 
                          (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) 
NWC                       -0.014 -0.046*** -0.064*** -0.074*** -0.056*** -0.080*** -0.073*** 
                          (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) 
R&D                       -0.006 0.079*** -0.003 0.040 -0.031 0.014 -0.022 
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                          (0.038) (0.016) (0.026) (0.047) (0.025) (0.049) (0.019) 
Capital Expenditure             -0.034 -0.116*** -0.277*** -0.344*** -0.229*** -0.361*** -0.241*** 
                          (0.036) (0.023) (0.034) (0.038) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043) 
Acquisition               -0.011 -0.138*** -0.377*** -0.413*** -0.331*** -0.453*** -0.348*** 
                          (0.023) (0.015) (0.032) (0.046) (0.035) (0.053) (0.044) 
Dividend   0.003 -0.014*** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.015*** 
                          (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
Industry Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.24 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.13 
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5.1.2 Institutional investors’ investment horizon and the value of cash holdings 
I further investigate the effect of long-term institutional investors on the value of cash 
holdings. In particular, I employ the excess return model, which allows an estimation of the 
moderating effect of long-term institutional investors on the relationship between changes in 
cash holdings and firm value. Table 5 presents the estimation results of Equation (5). 
In Columns (1)–(6), I regress the interaction term of long-term institutional ownership 
and the change in cash holdings on stock excess return. I use two measures for long-term 
institutional ownership: the ratio of total outstanding shares held by institutional long-term 
investors and a binary dummy variable differentiating between firms in the top and the bottom 
quartiles of long-term institutional ownership. Columns (1) and (2) present results on the full 
sample, and the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms show that long-term institutional 
ownership is positively moderating the effect of changes in cash on excess return. Columns 
(3)–(6) differentiate between firms with excess cash and firms with a cash deficit. The 
estimation results suggest that the positive moderating effect of long-term institutional 
investors holds true for firms with excess cash and firms with a cash deficit. These results 
support hypothesis H2.  
I further re-estimate Equation (5) by differentiating between firms with high and low 
long-term institutional ownership. Columns (7) and (8) show the estimation results for these 
subsamples. The coefficient estimate of the change in cash is much larger for firms with a high 
proportion of long-term institutional ownership (1.436) compared with firms with low long-
term institutional ownership (0.498). This is consistent with previously reported results and 
suggests that the marginal value of an additional dollar of cash is larger in the presence of long-
term institutional investors. Overall, the results in Table 5 support my prediction in hypothesis 
H2. 
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Table 5. Long-term institutional ownership and the value of cash holdings 
Table 5 reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the value of cash holdings using the excess return model of Faulkender and Wang (2006). Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the full 
sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the results of a subsample of firms with excess cash. Columns (5) and (6) show the results for a subsample of firms with cash deficits. Two measures are used for long-term institutional 
ownership: Long-term IO is defined as the ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional investors, and Long-term IO (dummy) is an indicator variable equalling 1 for firms in the top quartile of 
long-term institutional ownership, and zero for firms in the bottom quartile. In Columns (1) – (6), the variables of interest are the interactions between long-term IO and ΔCash/ME which indicate the moderating role 
of long-term institutional ownership on the effect of the change in cash holdings on excess return. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of the baseline specification of the excess return model on subsamples of firms 
in the top quartile of long-term institutional ownership and firms in the bottom quartile, respectively. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 
99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Dependent Variable = Excess Return 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                          
All firms All firms Excess cash Excess cash Cash deficit Cash deficit 
High long-term 
IO 
Low long-term    
IO 
Long-term IO       -0.037                          -0.029                          -0.045                                                    
                               [0.028]                         [0.047]                         [0.035]                                                    
Long-term IO X ΔCash/ME        1.130***                        1.218**                         1.393**                                                  
                               [0.391]                         [0.506]                         [0.587]                                                    
Long-term IO (dummy)                        0.004                           0.018                          -0.035                                    
                                               [0.023]                         [0.031]                         [0.036]                                    
Long-term IO (dummy) X ΔCash/ME                        0.564***                        0.614**                         0.116                                    
                                               [0.203]                         [0.257]                         [0.418]                                    
ΔCash/ME         0.386*          0.597***        0.261           0.485*          0.872***        1.550***        1.436***        0.498**  
                               [0.204]         [0.215]         [0.280]         [0.269]         [0.256]         [0.537]         [0.247]         [0.252]    
ΔEarnings/ME         0.126**         0.079           0.174           0.137           0.098**         0.059          -0.058           0.128*   
                               [0.056]         [0.058]         [0.111]         [0.089]         [0.048]         [0.075]         [0.080]         [0.075]    
ΔNet Assets/ME 0.203***        0.195***        0.207***        0.173**         0.181***        0.137**         0.209***        0.190**  
                               [0.035]         [0.056]         [0.059]         [0.082]         [0.042]         [0.064]         [0.050]         [0.079]    
ΔR&D/ME         -1.046*         -2.168**        -1.436          -2.025          -0.687          -2.723**        -1.203          -3.463**  
                               [0.632]         [0.959]         [1.016]         [1.475]         [0.763]         [1.291]         [1.183]         [1.495]    
ΔInterest/ME       -1.385**        -1.023          -1.612          -0.328          -0.455          -0.129          -2.351*          0.130    
                               [0.616]         [0.857]         [1.191]         [1.333]         [0.658]         [1.263]         [1.237]         [1.146]    
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ΔDividends/ME         0.353           0.268           0.667          -0.282           0.580           1.591*         -0.185           2.287*   
                               [0.450]         [0.574]         [0.576]         [0.814]         [0.672]         [0.850]         [0.639]         [1.260]    
New Finance/ME                  -0.042          -0.119           0.095           0.005          -0.208**        -0.280*         -0.252***       -0.043    
                               [0.070]         [0.109]         [0.105]         [0.150]         [0.083]         [0.164]         [0.098]         [0.148]    
L.Cash/ME                        0.425***        0.298***        0.439***        0.255***        0.807***        1.381**         0.168**         0.363*** 
                               [0.062]         [0.072]         [0.075]         [0.066]         [0.203]         [0.588]         [0.084]         [0.104]    
L.Cash/ME X ΔCash/ME       -0.548**        -0.297          -0.496*         -0.362          -0.537           1.036          -0.316          -0.327    
                               [0.236]         [0.182]         [0.280]         [0.223]         [0.483]         [0.807]         [0.239]         [0.242]    
Debt/MV                         -0.405***       -0.337***       -0.466***       -0.314***       -0.396***       -0.409***       -0.317***       -0.404*** 
                               [0.040]         [0.050]         [0.067]         [0.064]         [0.054]         [0.090]         [0.045]         [0.108]    
Debt/MV X ΔCash/ME         0.202          -0.709*          0.115          -0.642           0.325          -1.248*         -1.666***       -0.170    
                               [0.377]         [0.419]         [0.487]         [0.524]         [0.533]         [0.734]         [0.489]         [0.562]    
R2         0.07            0.06            0.06            0.07            0.09            0.09            0.10            0.05    
N 
        7657            3570            3732            1749            3925            1821            2259    1311  
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5.1.3 Institutional investors’ investment horizon and the use of excess cash 
I now focus on the moderating effect of long-term institutional ownership on the use of 
excess cash and a firm’s operating performance. First, in Table 6, I investigate the effect of 
long-term institutional ownership on the accumulation and dissipation of excess cash, 
following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith’s (2007) regression model. Then, Table 7 presents the 
results of Equation (6), which estimates the moderating effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on the use of excess cash and operating performance. Thus, the estimation results 
reported in Tables 6 and 7 are limited to firms with excess cash.  
Table 6. Long-term institutional ownership and accumulation and dissipation of excess 
cash 
Table 6 reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the accumulation and dissipation of excess cash. 
All Columns use a subsample of firms with excess cash. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the accumulation of excess cash. Columns (3) and (4) show the results of the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the dissipation of excess cash. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed 
definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable = ΔDev (t - t-1) ΔDev (t+1 - t) 
                                   (1)    (2)          (3)    (4) 
  Excess cash 
L.Long-term IO       -0.029***       
       [0.007]          
L.Long-term IO (dummy)         -0.015**      
         [0.006]        
L.Industry average Δ Dev        1.172***        1.176***     
       [0.084]         [0.109]        
Long-term IO            0.059***   
           [0.006]      
Long-term IO (dummy)              0.050*** 
                                     [0.006]    
Industry average Δ Dev            1.037***        1.071*** 
                                   [0.071]         [0.098]    
R2         0.08            0.10            0.08            0.12    
N         4184            2099            4266            2157    
 
In Table 6, Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results for the effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the accumulation of excess cash, and Columns (3) and (4) show the 
results for the effect on the dissipation of excess cash. Table 6 shows that long-term 
institutional ownership significantly affects both the accumulation and the dissipation of excess 
cash, but in different directions. In particular, the coefficient estimates of long-term 
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institutional ownership are negative in Columns (1) and (2), but positive in Columns (3) and 
(4). These results suggest that firms with a high presence of long-term institutional investors 
and excess cash tend to decrease the accumulation of more cash, but also decrease the 
dissipation of their excess cash holdings. These results, along with the previously reported 
results in Tables 3 and 4, can be interpreted as meaning that firms with a high proportion of 
long-term institutional ownership are less likely to have excess cash; and if they do, it is a low 
amount of excess cash and will be dissipated less aggressively compared with other firms. 
Overall, my findings are consistent with prior studies that suggest poorly governed firms 
dissipate their excess cash more aggressively than well-governed firms.  
Thus, in Table 7, I aim to investigate if the negative effect of excess cash on operating 
performance that is documented in prior literature is moderated by the presence of long-term 
institutional investors. I proxy for operating performance using operating return on net assets 
(𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴) and industry adjusted operating return on net assets (𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐴 [𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑]). 
Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) present the results for only firms with excess cash. The coefficient 
estimates for the interaction term are positive and statistically significant, except in the case of 
Column (5), which is positive, but not significant. In Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8), I use a 
subsample of firms with excess cash and high capital expenditure to better understand the 
efficiency in the use of excess cash in firms with high long-term institutional ownership. The 
estimation results are consistent with the prior results; however, the moderating effect is larger 
for firms with high spending in capital expenditure. These results support my prediction in 
hypothesis H3. 
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Table 7. The use of excess cash and operating performance 
Table 7 reports the results of the moderating role of long-term institutional ownership on the effect of excess cash on corporate operating performance. In Columns (1) – (4), the dependent variable is 
RONA which is defined as the ratio of operating income to the book value of net assets. In Columns (5) – (8), the dependent variable is RONA (Industry adjusted) which is defined as RONA minus the 
industry-year median RONA. Columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) show the results of a subsample of firms with excess cash. Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) show the results of a subsample of firms with excess 
cash and capital expenditure above industry median. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. Industry and year fixed effects are included in Columns (1) – (4), and firm 
and year fixed effects are included in Columns (5) – (8). All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable = RONA RONA (Industry adjusted) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                          


















L.Long-term IO                       -0.152***                       -0.057**                        -0.244***                       -0.051                    
                               [0.035]                         [0.028]                         [0.055]                         [0.052]                    
L.Long-term IO X L.Dev 
       0.305**                         0.335**                         0.239                           0.075                    
     [0.129]                         [0.152]                         [0.154]                         [0.187]                    
L.Long-term IO (dummy)                        -0.070***                       -0.002                          -0.134***                       -0.032    
                                               [0.026]                         [0.024]                         [0.051]                         [0.033]    
L.Long-term IO (dummy) X 
L.Dev 
                       0.101**                         0.150**                         0.101*                          0.143**  
                     [0.043]                         [0.059]                         [0.059]                         [0.063]    
L.Dev       -0.102***       -0.101***       -0.040          -0.062*         -0.079**        -0.075***        0.005          -0.122**  
                               [0.022]         [0.024]         [0.032]         [0.038]         [0.033]         [0.026]         [0.087]         [0.062]    
L.RONA                           0.593***        0.568*** 
       
0.706*** 
       
0.582***                 
                                                
                               [0.059]         [0.067]         [0.081]         [0.099]                                                                    
L.RONA (Industry adjusted)                                                                        
       0.293***        0.281*** 
       
0.355*** 
       0.438**  
                                                                                               [0.064]         [0.072]         [0.098]         [0.207]    
Net Assets                       0.057***        0.061*** 
       
0.039*** 
       
0.047*** 
       0.226***        0.188***        0.134**         0.034    
                               [0.008]         [0.010]         [0.007]         [0.012]         [0.037]         [0.067]         [0.053]         [0.025]    
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PP&E                            -0.051          -0.100          -0.019          -0.094          -0.309***       -0.386          -0.128          -0.316    
                               [0.047]         [0.079]         [0.049]         [0.081]         [0.112]         [0.272]         [0.108]         [0.205]    
Firm Fixed Effects           No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.55 0.6 0.57 0.61 0.68 0.78 0.69 0.81 
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5.2 Additional robustness12 
To check the robustness of my results, I conduct several additional tests. First, I 
differentiate between different types of long-term institutional investors. Second, to control for 
the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, I re-estimate my main models on 
the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings and cash deviation controlling 
for firm-year fixed effects instead of industry-year fixed effects. Third, I employ instrumental 
variable (IV) methods to revoke the potential concern of reverse causality. Fourth, I use an 
alternative widely used model of the value of cash holdings to check the robustness of my 
results to different estimation specifications. Fifth, I adopt an alternative method of testing the 
moderating effect of long-term institutional ownership on the use of excess cash and operating 
performance. Finally, I replicate my models controlling for main corporate governance 
characteristics. The following sections present these robustness tests, respectively.  
5.2.1 The heterogeneity of long-term institutional investors 
In Table 8, I re-estimate my baseline model on the effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on cash holdings and cash deviation differentiating between different types of long-
term institutional investors. First, I differentiate between indexer long-term investors who 
invest in a firm as a part of their investment in a particular stock market index and non-indexer 
long-term investors who intentionally choose to hold their positions for the long term. Panel A 
presents the heterogeneous effect of indexer and non-indexer long-term institutional ownership 
on cash holdings. As expected, the estimated coefficients are only negative and statistically 
significant for non-indexer long-term institutional investors. Conversely, long-term ownership 
by indexer investors seems to increase cash holdings, although the coefficient estimates are not 
statistically significant. 
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results for long-term institutional investors with high 
portfolio turnover and long-term institutional investors with low portfolio turnover. The 
estimation results show that only long-term institutional investors with a low portfolio turnover 
have a consistent negative significant effect on cash holdings, while the effect of long-term 
ownership by institutional investors with a high portfolio turnover is positive, but not 
significant except for one model at 10% P-value. The results in Table 8 are consistent with the 
 
12 The results for this section are presented in Appendix B. 
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idea that indexer and long-term institutional investors with high portfolio turnover are less 
interested and actively involved in firms’ policies, as they are more likely to be widely 
diversified and passive investors (Bushee, 1998; Wang, 2014).  
5.2.2 Firm fixed effects estimation 
The omitted variables bias is a potential concern that might affect my results. I address 
this bias by using firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 9a replicate the estimation regressions in Table 3 and Table 4 
respectively, but controlling for firm fixed effects instead of industry fixed effects. Table 9b 
replicates the first and last models in Table 5. The estimation results are consistent with the 
main previously reported results. Overall, my results on the negative effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on cash holdings and cash deviation and the positive moderating effect 
on the value of cash are robust for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity within firm level.  
5.2.3 IV estimation 
I further address the self-selection bias. One may expect that long-term institutional 
investors may choose to invest in firms with low cash holdings and small cash deviation rather 
than influence firm cash policy. To deal with this potential concern, I follow Huang and 
Petkevich (2016) and conduct a two-stage estimation with instrumental variables for long-term 
institutional ownership. Note that Huang and Petkevich use two instruments for institutional 
ownership: the industry median of institutional ownership and the lagged ownership. I perform 
a similar procedure, and the results for both stages are presented in Table 10. Column (1) of 
Table 10 presents the estimation results of the first stage, and Columns (2)–(6) present the 
second-stage results. Overall, the results are very similar in direction and magnitude to my 
main estimation results and support hypothesis H1, although the over-identification tests are 
not valid for a subsample of firms with excess cash and when using the absolute value cash 
deviation as the dependent variable. 
5.2.4 The value regression estimation 
To check the robustness of my results on the effect of long-term institutional ownership 
on the value of cash holdings, I adopt an alternative model to investigate my prediction in 
hypothesis H2. I use the value regression of Fama and French (1998) which was first used in 
the value of cash literature by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002) and Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (2006). Since then, this model has been widely used in the literature (e.g., Dittmar 
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and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der Waal, 2013; Bates, Chang and Chi, 
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+  𝜶𝒊 +  𝝉𝒕 +  𝝐𝒊𝒕, 
(7) 
where 𝑀𝑉 is market value of equity plus total liabilities. 𝑁𝐴 is net assets (total assets – cash 
and cash equivalents). 𝑋𝐶 is the difference between cash and cash equivalents and the optimal 
cash level predicated by Equation (1). 𝐸 is earnings before extraordinary items. 𝐷 is common 
dividends. I equals interest expense. 𝑅𝐷 is research and development expenses. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 are 
firm and year fixed effects. 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes a change of 𝑋 over two years 
from 𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡. 
 Table 11a presents the estimation results of the effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on the value of cash holdings using a market-to-book model, in Equation (7). The 
results are consistent with the estimation results reported in Table 5. Indeed, unlike in Equation 
(5), where I use the change in cash holdings over one year, Equation (7) uses the difference 
between the actual cash level and the predicted optimal cash level, namely, cash deviation. 
Using cash deviation ensures that I only account for the change in cash that is not related to the 
determinants of optimal cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Schauten, van Dijk and van der 
Waal, 2013). Though the interpretation of the interaction term will be slightly different, the 
overall results support hypothesis H2. In Table 11b, I re-estimate Equation (7) using the change 
in actual cash holdings, and I find consistent results, although these are only statistically 
significant when I proxy for long-term institutional ownership by binary dummy. 
5.2.5 Use of excess cash using subsamples 
Table 12 employs an alternative method to test the moderating effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the negative effect of excess cash and operating performance. While 
I use the interaction between long-term institutional ownership and excess cash in Table 8, I 
here subsample firms based on the proportion of long-term institutional ownership. I 
differentiate between firms with high levels of long-term institutional ownership (in the top 
quartile) and firms with low long-term institutional ownership (in the bottom quartile). The 
coefficient estimates of excess cash is negative and only statistically significant for firms with 
low long-term institutional ownership. It is worth noting that the estimated coefficient is 
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negative and significant in only one of the columns (Column 5) that used the subsample of 
firms with high long-term institutional ownership, though it is smaller than the coefficient of 
the subsample of firms with low long-term institutional ownership. While the estimation results 
in Table 12 do not provide direct support to hypothesis H3, the overall results in Tables 8 and 
12 do support hypothesis H3.  
5.2.6 Corporate governance characteristics 
The monitoring role of long-term institutional investors may depend on the corporate 
governance quality of firms. I address this concern by controlling for main corporate 
governance characteristics, particularly CEO duality, CEO tenure, Independent NED on Board 
(%), Board Size, and Board Size2. Panel A and Panel B of Table 13a replicate the estimation 
regressions in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively, but controlling for firms’ corporate 
governance. Panel A and Panel B of Table 13b replicate the models in Table 5 and Table 7. 
The estimation results are consistent with the main previously reported results. Overall, my 
results on the negative effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings and cash 
deviation and the positive moderating effect on the value of cash and the use of excess cash are 
robust after controlling for corporate governance characteristics. 
5.2.7 The Possible effect of the 2007-2010 financial crisis 
The relationship between long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings might be 
affected by the recent financial crisis. I address this concern by adopting subsample analysis. I 
replicate my main models using two subsamples, the first subsample excludes the years of the 
financial crisis and the other subsample only includes the years of the financial crisis. Panel A 
and Panel B of Table 14a replicate the estimation regressions in Table 3, but considering the 
possible effect of the financial crisis by using subsample analysis. Panel A and Panel B of Table 
14b replicate the models in Table 4 and Panel A and Panel B of Table 14c replicate the models 
in Table 5. The estimation results are consistent with the main previously reported results. 
Overall, my results on the negative effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings 
and cash deviation and the positive moderating effect on the value of cash are robust after 
controlling for the possible effect of 2007-2010 financial crisis. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the relationship between institutional investors’ investment 
horizon and corporate cash holdings for publicly traded UK firms for the period 2000–2016. 
In particular, I study the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings and cash 
deviation from the optimal level. I further explore the moderating role of long-term institutional 
investors on the value of cash and the use of excess cash. This study incorporates both the 
potential agency costs related to excess cash holdings and the precautionary needs of cash 
holdings by firms. I argue that long-term institutional investors will act as effective monitors 
and their higher presence will be associated with lower cash deviation from the optimal cash 
level, better use of cash, and ultimately a higher value of cash holdings.  
I find that the effect of long-term institutional investors on cash holding depends on the 
cash deviation from the optimal level. While long-term institutional ownership has a negative 
and significant effect on cash holdings, this relationship only exists for firms with excess cash 
and not for firms with a cash deficit. My findings further show that firms with a higher 
proportion of long-term institutional ownership increase their cash holdings when they have a 
cash deficit. Moreover, I find that institutional investors’ investment horizon affects the value 
of cash holdings and the use of excess cash. Using both the stock excess return model and the 
value model, I find that long-term institutional ownership is associated with a higher value of 
cash holdings. I also find that firms with a higher proportion of long-term institutional 
ownership efficiently use these excess cash reserves in value-creating investments that enhance 
a firm’s operating performance. Overall, my findings are consistent with my predictions on the 
positive monitoring role of long-term institutional investors in the context of corporate cash 
holdings.  
This study extends the existing literature on cash holdings in several ways. First, instead 
of using only the cash level as the dependent variable, I also use the cash deviation from the 
optimal level to enable us to focus on the component of cash that is not attributed to the main 
determinants of cash holdings. This component of cash has a negative significant effect on firm 
performance and value. 
Second, prior literature shows conflicting results on the effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on cash holdings; however, this study shows some evidence that may explain this 
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contradictory outcome. My findings show that the effect of long-term institutional ownership 
on cash holdings depends on the cash deviation (i.e. excess cash or cash deficit). 
Lastly, this study, within one research context, provides a comprehensive investigation 
of the relationship between institutional investors’ investment horizon and cash policies. This 
study not only focuses on the effect of long-term institutional investors on how much cash a 
firm holds, but also addresses how firms use this cash and how much this cash contributes to 
firm value. 
The findings of this paper suggest several directions and avenues for future research. 
Given that my empirical results support prior studies on the negative effect of cash deviation 
from the optimal level of cash on a firm’s value, future research should investigate the role of 
the firm’s environment and characteristics on moderating this negative relationship. On the one 
hand, for example, is the negative effect of cash deficit on firms’ operating performance and 
value more pronounced for firms that operate in industries with high growth or many 
investment opportunities? 
While this paper confirms prior results on the negative effect of excess cash on firm’s 
value of future operating performance and finds that long-term institutional ownership not only 
decreases excess cash but also positively moderates its negative effect, this paper did not 
distinguish between firms based on their exposure to the risk/costs of holding excess cash (i.e. 
firms with high agency and/or principal costs, weak internal governance or high cost of carry) 
or the need/benefits to hold more cash (i.e., financially constrained firms, during financial 
distress/crisis, or/and firms with uncertain/high investment opportunities).  
Moreover, this study did not investigate the speed of adjustment towards the optimal 
level of cash or the effect of adjustment costs of cash holdings. It may be interesting to explore 
the relationship between long-term institutional ownership and the speed of adjustment how 
the adjustment costs will moderate this relationship. While I show modest evidence that long-
term institutional ownership decreases (increases) excess cash accumulation (dissipation), 
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Essay 3. The effect of investor horizon on shareholder proposals 




This paper aims to study the role of investor horizon on shareholder proposals in the context 
of UK listed firms from 1998 to 2016. Building on the agency view and the monitoring function 
of institutional investors, I particularly investigate the influence of institutional investors with 
a long-term investment horizon on the probability of shareholder proposals targeting, market 
reaction to shareholder proposals, and voting outcome of these proposals. First, the targeting 
analysis shows that firms with larger proportions of long-term institutional investors are less 
likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. Then, I show that while cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) around the general meeting dates are negative on average, firms with more 
long-term investors experience positive CARs. Finally, the voting outcome analysis shows that 
long-term institutional investors are less likely to cast dissenting votes on shareholder proposals 
using several proxies for voting outcome. In further analysis, I show the established 
relationship in the literature, between pressure-resistant institutional ownership and 
shareholder proposals’ targeting and outcomes, is more pronounced for long-term investors. 
This paper not only confirms the previously reported important role of investor horizon on 
influencing a firm’s policies, governance and strategies, but also provides evidence on how 
such impact has occurred.  
 
Keywords: Cumulative abnormal return (CAR), investment horizon, institutional ownership, 
shareholder dissent, shareholder proposals, shareholder voting, targeting analysis 
 
 
*This paper has been peer-reviewed and accepted at the CGIR Paper Development Workshop during the 6th 
Annual International Corporate Governance Society Conference – ICGS 2020 where it has been presented on 
November 2020. 
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1. Introduction 
Loyalty (hold), exit (trade), or voice (activism) are the main channels in modern 
corporations through which shareholders are able to re-act and pro-act to a firm’s performance 
and strategies (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Hirschman, 1970). Gillan and Starks (2007) 
describe the possible responses of shareholders to corporate performance as a continuum, with 
one end being trading the shares and the other end being initiating takeovers or buyout. Positive 
shareholder activism lays between these two ends of this continuum. Thus, shareholder 
activism may take different forms such as voting at a firm’s general meeting, private 
intervention with the firm’s management, public campaigns, and shareholder proposals. This 
study investigates shareholder activism through focusing on shareholder proposals. 
 Despite the diverse legal and regulatory frameworks, shareholder proposals have been 
increasingly employed by investors around the world. This consistent increase in the use of 
shareholder proposals not only coincides with an increase in the voting in favour of shareholder 
proposals (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2011), but also with the marginal value of these proposals increasing over time (Denes, 
Karpoff and McWilliams, 2017). This global phenomena, which started in the US and has then 
been documented in other countries, attracts scholars to empirically investigate which of a 
firm’s characteristics attract shareholder proposals and how existing shareholders react (i.e. 
vote and trade) to shareholder proposals. Although the empirical shareholder proposal literature 
has been expanding since the 1990s, most studies mainly focus on US firms; however, many 
recent papers have documented inconsistent evidence with previously reported results 
(Buchanan et al., 2012; Denes, Karpoff and McWilliams, 2017; Goranova et al., 2017). In this 
paper, I aim to contribute to the shareholder proposal literature by investigating the role of 
institutional investors on shareholder proposals using a long and recent dataset of UK public 
firms. In particular, I examine the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon on the 
probability of shareholder proposals targeting and the reaction of existing shareholders towards 
shareholder proposals. 
 Prior studies mainly focus on the determinants and outcomes of shareholder proposals. 
While the existing results are still mixed and inconclusive, there is an overall consensus on the 
main determinants and consequences of shareholder proposals [For recent reviews on the 
determinants and outcomes, see Denes, Karpoff and McWilliams (2017) and Goranova and 
Ryan (2014)]. For example, shareholder proposals are more likely to target large and heavily 
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levered firms. Moreover, firms with poor stock price and operating performance and weak 
corporate governance are more likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. Other studies 
focus on CEO incentives (i.e. equity holdings and compensation) and board structure. However, 
the findings of the outcomes of shareholder proposals have changed over time and have mainly 
focused on market reaction and voting outcome. For example, while the earlier literature 
documents no or negative evidence on the market price reaction to shareholder proposals, 
recent studies show a positive market reaction, especially for well-governed firms 
(Borokhovich et al., 2006; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012). 
Moreover, the voting in favour of shareholder proposals and the adoption of the non-binding 
proposals have been increasing. The literature also provides weak and inconsistent evidence 
on future operating performance, CEO (turnover/compensation), and governance and other 
corporate practices. Despite prior studies using several theoretical lenses to interpret their 
findings, agency theory is by far the most used perspective (Goranova and Ryan, 2014). Overall, 
the existing literature built on agency theory suggests that firms with lower potential agency 
concerns are less likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals; and, if they are targeted, these 
proposals are more likely to receive positive voting and positive market reaction around the 
submission. 
 Building on the agency theory (Jensen, 1986), I argue that the investor horizon affects 
the probability of shareholder proposals targeting firms and the outcomes of these proposals. 
Institutional investors with a longer investment horizon have more incentives and capabilities 
to monitor a firm’s management and board (Gillan and Starks, 2007) and are more likely to 
intervene with their investee firms (Ryan and Schneider, 2002; McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 
2016), ultimately improving firms’ corporate decisions and governance (Harford, Kecskés and 
Mansi, 2018) and firm’s performance (Yin, Ward and Tsolacos, 2018). Long-term institutional 
investors are more likely to bear the costs associated with information collecting, as they obtain 
greater benefits thorough monitoring to enhance firm performance (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007; 
Borochin and Yang, 2017). Because of the efficient monitoring, firms with a large presence of 
long-term institutional investors have a lower cost of equity (Attig et al., 2013) and cost of debt 
(Elyasiani, Jia and Mao, 2010), their investments are less sensitive to cash flow (Attig et al., 
2012) and boosted when the firm is undervalued, are more likely to extract benefits from 
merger and acquisitions (Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2005), and are less exposed to insider 
trading (Fu et al., 2020) and earnings management (Wang, 2014). Therefore, I argue that 
focusing on the investment horizon may enhance understanding and provide consistent results 
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on the role of institutional investors on the determinants and the outcomes of shareholder 
proposals. 
 Prior studies have investigated the role of institutional ownership on shareholder 
proposals; however, most studies focus on US firms, and they report mixed results. In particular, 
studying the determinants of governance-related (i.e. board composition, executive pay, and 
anti-takeover provisions) shareholder proposals, some studies document a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and the probability of proposals targeting (Karpoff, Malatesta 
and Walkling, 1996; Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Cai and Walkling, 2011), while other 
scholars show a negative relationship (Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011; Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2011). 
However, some literature argues that the effect of institutional ownership might be 
heterogeneous, as the existing or potential business ties between the investee firm and some 
institutions (i.e. pressure-sensitive institutions such as banks and insurance companies) may 
lessen the monitoring function of such institutions (Brickley, Lease and Smith, 1988; Gordon 
and Pound, 1993). Differentiating between pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive 
institutions, Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) find that pressure-insensitive ownership 
is positively related to shareholder proposals targeting, whereas Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) 
find that firms with a higher presence of pressure-insensitive institutions are less likely to be 
targeted by shareholder proposals. However, the two papers study different contexts: European 
and US firms, respectively.  
The findings reported by the literature, mainly using the US context, on the effect of 
institutional ownership on the outcome of shareholder proposals are also mixed. On the one 
hand, the relationship between market price reaction to shareholder proposals and institutional 
ownership is shown to be negative (Thomas and Cotter, 2007); other studies find no statistically 
significant evidence for this relationship (Borokhovich et al., 2006; Cziraki, Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). 
On the other hand, the literature also documents positive (Thomas and Cotter, 2007; 
Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010; Cai and Walkling, 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011), 
negative (Morgan et al., 2011), and not statistically significant (Gordon and Pound, 1993; 
Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010) relationships between 
institutional ownership and positive voting on shareholder proposals. This study focuses on 
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institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon and, as mentioned above, these 
investors have more incentives and capabilities to effectively monitor their investee firms and 
improve firms’ governance and performance. Firms that are well-governed are less likely to be 
targeted by shareholder proposals and more likely to experience positive market reaction and 
positive voting. Thus, I expect that firms with a higher presence of long-term institutional 
investors would have a low probability of receiving shareholder proposals, but are more likely 
to have positive market reaction and positive voting on these proposals. 
This study investigates the role of the investment horizon of institutional investors on 
shareholder proposals submitted to publicly traded UK firms over a long period from 1998 to 
2016. Besides the high presence of institutional investors in UK firms (Ferreira and Matos, 
2008) and their active monitoring and engagement role with their investee firms (Aguilera et 
al., 2006; Hendry et al., 2007), the UK’s corporate law and governance systems provide an 
interesting context within which to study the relationship between institutional ownership and 
shareholder proposals. In the UK, regulators and policymakers tend to empower shareholders 
to engage with their investee firms, which can be clearly seen through shareholder rights 
granted by corporate law (Davies, Mulley and Bardell, 2019). The Companies Act 2006, 
Combined Code of Corporate Governance, and Stewardship Code are some examples of the 
encouraging legal environment towards shareholder activism. Indeed, Davies, Mulley and 
Bardell (2019) argue that the UK’s legal and regulatory framework of shareholder rights is the 
most empowering for shareholder activism when comparing to other European country 
frameworks. 
Despite the many similarities in the corporate governance systems and institutional 
ownership structure between the UK and US, there are some legal and institutional differences 
that show that the UK tends to empower shareholder activism more (Filatotchev and Dotsenko, 
2015). Importantly for this study, the US and UK have some fundamental differences in the 
rules that regulate shareholder proposals (i.e. the binding nature of proposals and calling for 
general meetings; see detailed discussion below in the background section) (Becht et al., 2009; 
Buchanan et al., 2012). 
Overall, the shareholder proposal is a powerful governance tool available to 
shareholders in the UK to implement corporate changes in their investee firms, and is even 
more powerful than in the US (Buchanan et al., 2012). Important differences between the UK 
and US and other European countries also exist in the practical implementation by activist 
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shareholders and the reaction by other voting shareholders towards these shareholder proposals. 
For example, the majority of UK shareholder proposals are submitted for issues related to the 
board and are more likely to receive positive votes (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; 
Buchanan et al., 2012; Filatotchev and Dotsenko, 2015).  
Despite the interesting context of the UK for the study of shareholder proposals, there 
exist a limited number of studies that investigate the determinants and outcomes of shareholder 
proposals in such a context (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Buchanan et al., 2012; 
Filatotchev and Dotsenko, 2015). In my study, I aim to broaden the empirical literature of 
shareholder proposals by not only providing additional evidence from the UK, but also by 
conducting a comprehensive analysis of shareholder proposals using a long and recent sample 
of shareholder proposals. Recent and comprehensive evidence on the determinants and 
outcomes of shareholder proposals is important, as recent literature documents the evolution 
over time of the use of shareholder proposals by activist shareholders, positive market reaction 
around proposal submission, and positive votes cast by voting shareholders. 
Additionally, this study contributes to the literature on the role of investor horizon on 
firm decision-making. On the one hand, while empirical studies mainly focus on the correlation 
relationship between investor horizon and several firms’ corporate decisions and governance 
practices, little is known about how that correlation occurs. I investigate how institutional 
investors with a long-term horizon interact with shareholder proposals, as it is an important 
governance tool for corporate change.  
On the other hand, this study argues that it is important to differentiate between 
institutional investors based on their investment horizon when studying shareholder activism. 
In particular, while the literature on shareholder proposals mainly documents that institutional 
ownership and shareholder proposals targeting are positively correlated, such results are 
contradictory to the common expectation of the effective monitoring function of institutional 
shareholders (Goranova et al., 2017). I conversely show that institutional ownership of long-
term shareholders decreases the likelihood of shareholder proposals targeting.  
Moreover, my findings on the market reaction to shareholder proposals submission 
show that firms with a higher presence of long-term institutional investors experience positive 
market reaction (i.e. positive cumulative abnormal returns [CAR] around general meetings with 
shareholder proposals), although many prior studies document negative reaction or in most 
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cases not statistically significant evidence. Finally, as mentioned above, the literature shows a 
positive and negative relationship between institutional ownership and the positive voting on 
shareholder proposals. However, I find consistent results for the positive voting on shareholder 
proposals in firms with a high proportion of long-term institutional ownership.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background and hypothesis development, Section 3 presents the econometric specifications for 
targeting and outcome analyses, Section 4 shows the data sources, Section 5 presents the results 
of the study, and Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Literature review 
2.1.1 Shareholder proposals 
Shareholder activism has become a common institutional factor to create changes in 
corporate strategy, governance, and ultimately performance (Goranova and Ryan, 2014). 
Shareholder activism may take different forms, ranging from private engagement with 
management (McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016) to public intervention (Gillan and Starks, 
2007). Shareholder activists also may have a different time horizon, from short-term purposes 
(e.g., some hedge funds) (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009, 2011) to long-term objectives 
(Hendry et al., 2007; Brav et al., 2018; Gloßner, 2019).  
However, regardless of the form that has been used or the time horizon of the activist, 
the ultimate goal is most likely to improve firm performance (Goranova and Ryan, 2014). 
Previous literature on shareholder activism supports this argument by documenting that weak 
corporate governance and underperformance are the most common incentives for shareholder 
activism [for a summary of antecedents of shareholder activism, see Goranova and Ryan, 
(2014)]. In their review of 73 empirical studies on the determinants and consequences of 
shareholder activism, Denes, Karpoff and McWilliams (2017) document that the marginal 
positive effect of shareholder activism has been increasing over time.  
 In this paper, I focus on shareholder proposals as one of the main public forms of 
shareholder activism (Buchanan et al., 2012). The number of shareholder proposals submitted 
to listed firms has been increasing over time (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Buchanan et al., 2012; 
Filatotchev and Dotsenko, 2015). This increase in shareholder proposals may represent 
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activists’ belief in the effectiveness of submitting proposals as a tool for corporate change 
(Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). Shareholder proposals are also considered to be a cost-
effective mechanism to implement corporate change compared with other channels of public 
activism (Bauer, Moers and Viehs, 2015). In addition, not only has the number of submitted 
proposals increased, but also the voting in favour of shareholder proposals (Gillan and Starks, 
2000, 2007; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011), and the adoption of shareholder proposals by 
management (Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010) has grown over 
time. A recent paper by He, Kahramn and Lowry (2020) shows that investors’ support levels 
for shareholder proposals are informative regarding future risks that firms face, even if these 
proposals fail to be adopted/implemented.  
 Prior studies mainly focus on investigating the determinants and outcomes of 
shareholder proposals, although primarily in a US context. To identify the main determinants 
for shareholder proposals’ targeting, studies focus on firms’ corporate policies and 
characteristics, stock price performance, operating performance, ownership structure, and 
governance issues (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996; 
Wahal, 1996; Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Ertimur, 
Ferri and Stubben, 2010; Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; 
Eding and Scholtens, 2017; Goranova et al., 2017, Gloßner, 2019). Although some studies 
focus on a specific type of shareholder proposal (i.e. corporate governance (Karpoff, Malatesta 
and Walkling, 1996; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011), executives’ pay (Cai and Walkling, 2011; 
Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011), and corporate social responsibility (Eding and Scholtens, 
2017; Gloßner, 2019) and poison pills (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998)), there exist main 
determinants that show consistent evidence on their significant effect on the probability of 
shareholder proposals targeting. 
In particular, shareholder proposals are more likely to target firms with large size, high 
debt, low stock return, poor operating performance, low insider ownership, and a highly 
independent board. However, the literature has failed to provide consistent results for the effect 
of institutional ownership on the probability of shareholder proposals targeting, although it is 
repeatedly studied as an important potential determinant (Goranova et al., 2017). While many 
studies find that an increase in institutional ownership is associated with an increase in the 
probability of shareholder proposals targeting (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Cziraki, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Cai and Walkling, 2011), other studies document a negative 
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relationship (Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; Eding and 
Scholtens, 2017). Overall, activist shareholders tend to target underperformed and poor-
governed firms by submitting proposals.  
 Another trend of the literature studies the outcomes of shareholder proposals. The 
market reaction to shareholder proposals is by far the most studied factor in the literature. Prior 
studies mainly use stock abnormal return around the initial press announcement of shareholder 
proposals (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Wahal, 1996), the proxy mailing date 
(Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; Cai and Walkling, 2011; 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011) or the general meeting date (Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Cziraki, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012) to understand how market 
participants (i.e. existing shareholders of targeted firms and other investors) react to such an 
event. 
Although the shareholder proposal is a governance device to propose corporate changes, 
many studies document a negative market reaction. However, recent studies argue and find that 
market participants positively react to shareholder proposals that have targeted well-governed 
firms (Borokhovich et al., 2006; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 
2012). Moreover, many studies focus on the operating performance of targeted firms and 
expectations of higher future performance; however, most of these studies failed to find 
consistent supporting evidence (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and 
Zenner, 1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; Buchanan et al., 2012). 
Other studies investigate CEO turnover and compensation, and while most of these 
studies find no significant difference between targeted and controlled firms (Karpoff, Malatesta 
and Walkling, 1996; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999), some 
papers show modest evidence for higher CEO turnover (Buchanan et al., 2012) and lower 
compensation (Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011) for targeted firms. Scholars also study the 
effect of shareholder proposal submission on other outcomes, such as corporate policies, 
namely, payout (Smith, 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999) and capital expenditure (Smith, 
1996; Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012), earning management (Hadani, Goranova and Khan, 
2011), governance issues (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Prevost, Rao and Williams, 2012; 
Marquardt and Wiedman, 2016), and corporate social responsibility (Gloßner, 2019). 
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 Furthermore, the voting outcome of shareholder proposals and the 
implementation/adoption of the non-binding proposals (i.e. those which have not exceeded the 
required majority vote or are not binding by law even if they do exceed) are common aspects 
examined in the literature (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996; 
Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri 
and Stubben, 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). Prior studies generally examine similar 
determinants of shareholder proposals targeting as determinants for the voting outcome. 
However, the literature also finds that the type and sponsor of shareholder proposals affect the 
voting outcomes (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; 
Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010; Bauer, Moers and Viehs, 2015). 
In the context of the implementation/adoption of shareholder proposals, besides the 
determinants of the voting outcome, prior studies argue and find that the management/board 
are more likely to implement/adopt shareholder proposals that have received a high number of 
positive votes (Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010). Overall, a firm’s 
performance and governance and the proposal’s type and sponsor are the main determinants of 
the voting outcomes of shareholder proposals; besides these factors, the voting outcome is also 
an important determinant of the implementation/adoption of shareholder proposals. 
2.1.2 Proxy rules and practices in the UK 
The government and investors associations in the UK continue to promote shareholder 
activism (Davies, Mulley and Bardell, 2019). Filatotchev and Dotsenko (2015) argue that the 
UK provides a favourable investment legal system for shareholder activism. In particular, 
proxy rules in the UK make the shareholder proposal a powerful governance tool for corporate 
changes (Buchanan et al., 2012). For example, a shareholder or group of shareholders with a 
5% voting right could call for an enforceable emergency general meeting (EGM) to submit a 
proposal (Trevan et al., 2019), and this right is granted by statute and cannot be deprived even 
by a firm’s articles of association (Buchanan et al., 2012). 
Moreover, while in the US shareholders need costly contested solicitation to nominate 
board directors, shareholders in UK firms can simply submit a shareholder proposal with their 
nominees with no major cost of solicitation (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010). Indeed, 
the proxy rules provide the right for a shareholder to submit more than one proposal for the 
same general meeting. To submit a proposal in the UK, a shareholder must own at least 5% of 
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the firm’s issued equity or submit as part of a group of 100 shareholders owning at least 100 
GBP of equity in the targeted firm (Trevan et al., 2019). 
 The UK provides an interesting context to study shareholder proposals, as these 
proposals are binding. Unlike many other countries, including the US, shareholder proposals 
in the UK are binding in nature when they exceed the majority requirement for votes. This 
binding voting gives shareholders greater power to implement corporate changes so long as the 
majority of shareholders are in agreement. The binding nature of shareholder proposals also 
can be an effective disciplinary device for a firm’s management (Levit and Malenko, 2011). 
Indeed, voting shareholders have been showing increasing support for shareholder proposals 
in recent years; however, the implementation/adoption of shareholder proposals is still limited, 
although increasing, for non-binding shareholder proposals (Levit and Malenko, 2011). For 
example, Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2010) document that, while 24.3% of shareholder 
governance proposals received majority voting, only 7.6% of proposals have been implemented 
in US firms.  
When comparing with other European countries, UK firms show more intense 
shareholder activism through shareholder proposals (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010). 
Not only have small UK firms been targeted by shareholder proposals, but also large UK firms 
have been targeted as well, such as Vodafone, Sainsbury’s, HSBC, and Tesco (Filatotchev and 
Dotsenko, 2015). Shareholder proposals submitted to UK firms are more likely to receive 
majority voting than shareholder proposals in other European firms (Cziraki, Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2010). Another distinctive characteristic of shareholder proposals in the UK is that 
they mainly seek board changes. In particular, while shareholder proposals seeking corporate 
board changes represent 30% in US firms (Buchanan et al., 2012) and 10.5% in European firms 
(Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010), the figure for these types of proposals in the UK has 
been calculated as 66.2% (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010) or even 85% (Buchanan et 
al., 2012). Although the probability of shareholder proposals receiving majority votes is higher 
in the UK than in other European countries, the proposals related to board changes still have a 
higher probability of being passed in UK firms (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010). 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
This paper aims to study the role of investor horizon in a firm’s decision-making by 
focusing on three aspects of shareholder proposals. As aforementioned, prior studies in 
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shareholder proposals literature mainly focus on the determinants (i.e. the likelihood of a firm 
being targeted by shareholder proposals) and the outcomes of shareholder proposals. In the 
context of the outcomes, while operation performance, corporate policies, and governance 
features are studied by scholars, the market reaction and the voting outcome are by far the most 
common aspects examined in the literature. Therefore, I focus on the influence of institutional 
investors with a long-term horizon on the likelihood of shareholder proposals targeting, market 
reaction to shareholder proposals submission, and voting outcome of shareholder proposals, 
which are discussed below.  
2.2.2 Likelihood of shareholder proposals targeting 
Recent literature shows that good corporate governance quality decreases the likelihood 
of a firm being targeted by shareholder proposals (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). Moreover, 
shareholders consider a firm’s ownership structure when submitting shareholder proposals 
(Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). Shareholder activism 
literature attributes the increase in shareholder activism to the increase in institutional 
ownership (Denes, Karpoff and McWilliams, 2017). Many papers document a positive 
relationship between both institutional ownership and ownership concentration with the 
likelihood of shareholder activism (Goranova and Ryan, 2014).  
 Yet, given that institutional ownership is considered an external corporate governance 
mechanism, and institutional ownership improves firms’ governance quality (Harford, Kecskés 
and Mansi, 2018), the aforementioned findings—that governance quality decreases 
shareholder proposals and institutional ownership increases proposal submission—are 
puzzling. If institutional ownership always increases corporate governance quality, firms with 
a higher proportion of institutional ownership will be in less need of shareholders’ public 
intervention. However, this contradiction may be attributed to the heterogeneity between 
institutional shareholders in terms of governance structure and regulatory requirements (Boyd 
and Solarino, 2016), information asymmetry (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007), and even voting 
and activism behaviour (Bauer, Moers and Viehs, 2015; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2016; 
McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016; Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016; Benton and You, 
2018; Gloßner, 2019). 
 The investment horizon of shareholders is an important factor that determines the 
monitoring effectiveness of institutional ownership (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007; Gillan and 
Starks, 2007; McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016; Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2018, Yin, 
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Ward and Tsolacos, 2018). Thus, long-term institutional ownership improves corporate 
governance quality (Doidge et al., 2015; McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016; Borochin and 
Yang, 2017). In addition to improving corporate governance quality, recent studies document 
the positive effects of long-term institutional ownership on firms’ financial reporting quality 
(Bushee, Goodman and Sunder, 2018), insider trading and earning management (Wang, 2014; 
Fu et al., 2020), innovation (Bushee, 1998), corporate social responsibility (Durand, Paugam 
and Stolowy, 2019; Fu, Tang and Yan, 2019; Gloßner, 2019), director pay policies (Dong and 
Ozkan, 2008; Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016), corporate investing policies (Cella, 2010), 
corporate financing policies (Cleary and Wang, 2017), and payout policies (Gaspar et al., 2012).  
 Moreover, shareholders with a long-term investment horizon are better informed 
(Huang and Petkevich, 2016; Borochin and Yang, 2017) and actively engage with management 
behind the scenes (McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016). While long-term institutional 
shareholders are more likely to vote in support of say-on-pay proposals, firms with a higher 
proportion of long-term institutional ownership are less likely to have excess executive pay 
(Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 2016). Thus, given that long-term institutional shareholders 
prefer and have the ability to privately engage with their investee firms (McCahery, Sautner 
and Starks, 2016) and they improve the firms’ corporate decision-making and governance 
(Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2018), I argue that firms with higher proportions of long-term 
institutional ownership are less likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals13. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
H1: Firms with a higher presence of long-term institutional investors are less likely to be 
targeted by shareholder proposals. 
2.2.3 Market reaction to shareholder proposals 
Previous literature documents contradictory results on the market reaction to 
shareholder proposals (Denes, Karpoff and McWilliams, 2017). Although the shareholder 
 
13 Brandes, Goranova and Hall (2008) propose a conceptual view of two dimensions on how firms interact with institutional 
investors. They suggest that firms’ interactions with shareholders would vary depend on the timing (responsive versus 
anticipatory) and the nature of firm response (substantive versus symbolic). Because of the intensive behind-the-scenes 
engagement of long-term institutional investors (McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016) and their long investment horizon in 
the firm, I expect that the interaction/response of firms with a higher presence of long-term institutional ownership are more 
likely to be anticipatory and substantive. In such an environment of anticipatory and substantive interaction/response by the 
firm’s management, shareholders are in less need to engage in public activism (i.e. submitting proposals). Although Brandes, 
Goranova and Hall (2008) discuss their conceptual view within the context of compensation plans, I expect it to be compatible 
with other important corporate decisions/actions. 
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proposal is considered as an important governance mechanism for corporate change, 
interestingly, most literature reports a negative market price reaction to shareholder proposals 
(Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Smith, 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; 
Prevost and Rao, 2000; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010), although some results are not 
statistically significant. However, recent evidence shows that the corporate governance quality 
of targeted firms affects the market price reaction to shareholder proposals (Borokhovich et al., 
2006; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012). 
 Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) document a positive market price reaction to passed 
shareholder proposals, but this relationship is larger for strongly governed targeted firms. Using 
the regression discontinuity design, Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe (2012) find that shareholder 
proposals that receive majority voting by a small margin cause positive abnormal returns. They 
also confirm that the positive market reaction is larger for governance proposals and in well-
governed firms. Furthermore, Borokhovich et al. (2006) find that well-monitored targeted firms 
experience a better market price reaction around shareholder proposals than less monitored 
targeted firms. As firms with a higher proportion of long-term institutional ownership seem to 
be well-monitored and governed, I expect these firms will experience positive abnormal returns 
in response to shareholder proposals. 
The investment horizon of investors plays an important role in market price stability. 
Institutional investors with a long investment horizon foster CEOs through compensation 
contracts to pursue long-term market value rather than a short-term increase in stock price 
(Cadman and Sunder, 2014). Firms with larger proportions of long-term institutional 
ownership have lower idiosyncratic volatility than other firms with more short-term 
institutional investors (Chichernea, Petkevich and Zykaj, 2015). In fact, in response to market 
shocks, the stock market prices are more stable for firms held mostly by long-term institutional 
investors, while the stock prices of firms held mostly by short-term institutional investors 
experience amplified drops (Cella, Ellul and Giannetti, 2013). Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H2: An increase in the presence of long-term institutional investors is associated with an 
increase in the positive market reaction to shareholder proposals. 
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2.2.4 Voting outcome of shareholder proposals 
Besides the influence of institutional ownership structure on the market reaction to 
shareholder proposals, the voting outcome of shareholder proposals varies with the institutional 
ownership structure. Most of the shareholder proposals literature mainly differentiates between 
insider/CEO ownership and institutional ownership, and documents that insider/CEO 
ownership decreases and institutional ownership increases the votes cast in favour of 
shareholder proposals (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Thomas and Cotter, 
2007; Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010). Some studies argue there exists heterogeneity in the 
voting behaviour of institutional shareholders towards shareholder proposals (Cziraki, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Cai and Walkling, 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011).  
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) and Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) argue that 
pressure-insensitive institutional shareholders are more likely to vote in favour of shareholder 
proposals, as they are less likely to have existing or potential business ties with the investee 
firms. Conducting their study on only corporate governance shareholder proposals submitted 
to US firms between 1996 and 2005, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) find supporting evidence 
for their argument. However, Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) study all shareholder 
proposals in the UK and some other European countries from 1998 to 2008 and find no 
statistically significant evidence to support their argument. However, in counter to their 
expectation, one of their models reveals that pressure-sensitive institutional ownership 
increases the voting in favour of shareholder proposals.  
 In this paper, I also argue that the voting outcome of shareholder proposals varies with 
the institutional ownership structure. However, instead of arbitrarily classifying institutional 
shareholders based on their types, I use the investment horizon of institutional shareholders at 
investee firm level. The investment horizon plays an important role in the activism behaviour 
of institutional investors (Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Ashraf, Jayaraman and Ryan, 2012; 
McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016). For example, Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2016) find 
that long-term institutional investors are more likely to vote in favour of management-
sponsored say-on-pay proposals, although firms with a higher proportion of long-term 
ownership are less likely to have excess executive pay. Moreover, long-term institutional 
investors tend to improve a firm’s long-term value and enhance its governance through their 
consistent and effective monitoring. Shareholder proposals are more likely to be passed in well-
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performing and well-governed firms as well. I expect that long-term institutional ownership 
increases the positive voting on shareholder proposals. Therefore, I hypothesize:  
H3: An increase in the presence of long-term institutional investors is associated with an 
increase (decrease) in the positive (dissenting) votes on shareholder proposals.  
3. Econometric Specifications 
3.1 Targeting analysis 
To test hypothesis H1 on the probability of targeting firms by shareholder proposals, I 
conduct logistic regression models (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Bizjak and 
Marquette, 1998; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; 
Marquardt and Wiedman, 2016; Gloßner, 2019). I estimate the following specification: 
 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, (1) 
where 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for firms being targeted by at least one 
shareholder proposal and zero for matched-peer firms. 𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂  is the ratio of long-term 
institutional ownership. I control for three sets of firm-specific characteristics: 𝐼𝑂 is the firm-
ownership controls, 𝐶𝐺  is the firm-governance controls, and 𝑋  represents firm-financial 
controls. 𝜖 is an i.i.d. error term.  
 Following previous studies (Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Bizjak and 
Marquette, 1998; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Marquardt 
and Wiedman, 2016), I use an industry-size matching procedure for my targeting analysis. For 
each target firm in an event year, I match a peer with the closest size within the same two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry code. To ensure that my results are not driven 
by the proxy I used for size, I use four different proxies for size (market-to-book, total assets, 
revenue, and market capitalization). Moreover, I run my target analysis model pooling all 
match peers with the different size proxies as matched firms. 
3.2 Outcome analyses 
To test my second and third hypotheses (H2 and H3) on the relationship between long-
term institutional ownership and the outcome of shareholder proposals, I conduct both linear 
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and logistic regression models. I distinguish between two types of shareholder proposal 
outcomes.  
Market reaction analysis: The first type of outcome of shareholder proposals is a 
performance outcome, in which I use CARs as my dependent variable (Karpoff, Malatesta and 
Walkling, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; 
Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). I estimate the 
following specification using the OLS regression model: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
(2) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is the CAR around the general meeting date. I use eight different event windows, 
from a two-day window to a one-month window, to calculate CAR. 𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂 is the ratio of long-
term institutional ownership. I control for three sets of firm-specific characteristics: 𝐼𝑂 is the 
firm-ownership controls, 𝐶𝐺 is the firm-governance controls, and X represents firm-financial 
controls. I also control for proposal-level control; proposal topic (corporate governance [CG] 
proposals and corporate social responsibility [CSR] proposals) and proposal outcome (defeated 
and passed). Finally, I control for the type of general meeting, where 𝐸𝐺𝑀 is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the proposal is put to vote in an EGM. 𝜖 is an i.i.d. error term.  
Voting outcome analysis: The other type of outcome analysis is voting outcome, in 
which I use different proxies for shareholder dissent on shareholder proposals. For my voting 
outcome analysis, I estimate the following specification using logistic regressions (Cziraki, 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; 
Bauer, Moers and Viehs, 2015; Matsusaka, Ozbas and Yi, 2019) and ordinary least squares 
regressions (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; 
Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010; Matsusaka, Ozbas and Yi, 2019): 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
(3) 
where 𝑌 denotes the dependent variables for shareholder voting. I use three different proxies 
for shareholder voting: Defeated (Passed) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the proposal is 
put to vote and does not (does) exceed the majority voting requirement, and Dissent is the 
logistic transformation of the ratio of votes against and voter abstains to the total votes cast. 
𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑂  is the long-term institutional ownership. I control for three sets of firm-specific 
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characteristics: 𝐼𝑂 is the firm-ownership controls, 𝐶𝐺 is the firm-governance controls, and 𝑋 
is firm-financial controls. I also control for proposal topic (CG proposals and CSR proposals) 
and emergency general meeting 𝐸𝐺𝑀. 𝜖 is an i.i.d. error term. 
4. Data and Variables 
4.1 Sample and data sources 
To empirically test my hypotheses on the relationship between investor horizon and 
shareholder proposals in the context of UK traded firms on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
over the period 1998–2016, I collect my data from different sources. 
First, I obtain the shareholder proposals data from the Manifest database. This database 
contains 792 shareholder proposals during the studied period; however, only 541 proposals 
were submitted to non-financial firms (financial firms are classified as those with SIC codes 
6000–6999). These proposals have been submitted to 152 general meetings in 94 firms. Then, 
using Thomson Reuters Datastream database, I collect accounting and financial information 
for the UK firms traded on the LSE to match targeted firms with industry-size peer firms. I 
further collect ownership data for targeted and matched firms from Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Ownership & Profiles module. I obtain the most recent ownership data on the calendar quarter 
ending prior to the meeting date. Lastly, I collect CG characteristics from Manifest. To mitigate 
the potential effect of large outliers, all counting firm-level variables are winsorized at the top 
and bottom 1% level.  
4.2 Variables 
Dependent variable 
 Targeting analysis: My dependent variable for the targeting analysis is Target Firm. 
The dependent variable is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was targeted with 
at least one shareholder proposal at the given year, and zero for the industry-size matched firm. 
I use a two-digit SIC for industry identification, and I use four different proxies for size.  
 Market reaction analysis: I use the CAR, 𝐶𝐴𝑅, around the general meeting date as a 
proxy for market reaction to shareholder proposals. I use the Market model over the 200-day 
period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Gillan and 
Starks, 2000; Borokhovich et al., 2006; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Renneboog 
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and Szilagyi, 2011). I use the FTSE All Share as the benchmarking index in the model. I use 
eight different event windows around the general meeting date. The shortest windows are two-
day windows, [-1,0] and [0.+1], and the longest window is a one-month window, [-10,+10].  
 Voting outcome analysis: I use three variables to proxy for the voting outcome of 
shareholder proposals. To ensure that my results are not driven by the proxy used for voting 
outcome, I use both indicator and continuous variables, similar to Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben 
(2010); Gine, Moussawi and Sedunov (2017); and Matsusaka, Ozbas and Yi (2019). For the 
indicator variable, two variables have been used. First, Defeated is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the shareholder proposal is put to vote, but does not exceed the majority voting 
requirement. The second indicator variable is Passed, which equals 1 if the shareholder 
proposal is put to vote and exceeds the majority voting requirement. Furthermore, I use 
shareholder dissent as the ratio of dissenting votes to the total votes cast. Following previous 
studies by Conyon (2016) and Alkalbani, Cuomo and Mallin (2019), I use the logistic 
transformation to ensure that the ordinary least squares estimator will predict probabilities 
within the range of zero to one. Thus, my third dependent variable for the voting outcome 
Dissent is defined as the logistic transformation of the ratio of abstains and against votes to the 
total votes cast. 
Explanatory variables 
 My main explanatory variable is long-term institutional ownership, long-term IO. I 
measure institutional ownership variables as the total percentage of shares held by institutional 
shareholders to the total outstanding shares at the last quarter prior to the general meeting date. 
To test my hypotheses, I differentiate between institutional shareholders based on their 
investment horizon.  
As proxy for investment horizon, I use the actual investment duration at the firm level 
for each institutional investor (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Attig et al., 2012; Wang, 2014, Yin, 
Ward and Tsolacos, 2018). Then, I aggregate at the firm-quarter level the institutional 
ownership using different thresholds of shareholders’ investment horizons. Thus, Long-term 
IO (Medium-term IO/Short-term IO) is defined as the ratio of total shares held by long-term 
(medium-term/short-term) institutional shareholders with investment duration of at least eight 
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quarters (or more than four for medium-term, and less than four quarters/at most four quarters 
for short-term).14  
Control variables 
 In my models about targeting and outcome analyses, I use three sets of the most 
common firm-level controls that have been used in the shareholder proposals literature (e.g. 
Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 
2000; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; Ertimur, Ferri and 
Stubben, 2010; Cai and Walkling, 2011; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011; Bauer, Moers and 
Viehs, 2015). First, I control for a firm’s stock performance, operating performance, and 
relevant characteristics, such as share return, share turnover, return on asset, total assets, 
leverage, R&D, and capital expenditure. 
Second, I control for a broad set of the firm’s CG characteristics, which includes board 
size, board size squared, the ratio of non-executive directors, the ratio of female directors, CEO 
duality, and CEO tenure. 
Third, I control for the firm’s ownership structure, which includes total institutional 
ownership, ownership concentration, CEO ownership, and CEO ownership concentration. In 
addition to the aforementioned controls, in the outcome analyses, I control for the proposal 
topic (CG proposals and CSR proposals) and EGM. 
Finally, I also control for the voting outcome of shareholder proposals in my analysis 
of market reaction. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the number of shareholder proposals across the sample years by the 
topic of proposal and voting outcome. Panel A shows that 86.3% of shareholder proposals 
submitted to UK firms are related to CG issues. Indeed, 90% of the CG proposals are related 
to elections (200 proposals) and removal (216 proposals) of board directors. Although I study 
a longer period than previous studies that focus on UK shareholder proposals, a similar trend 
 
14 Using different thresholds for duration does not change my results. For example, I have also used 12 quarters for long-term 
institutional shareholders and 2 quarters for short-term institutional investors.  
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of the dominance of CG proposals has been reported. Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) 
document that 77% of shareholder proposals summited in the UK between 1998 and 2008 are 
related to board and other governance issues. 
In untabulated analysis, I check for the potential multi-collinearity in all my estimation 
models. I follow prior ownership literature and shareholder activism literature (e.g., Bushee, 
1998; Callen and Fang, 2013; Kim et. al, 2016; Neubaum and Zahra; 2006; Sauerwald, Van 
Oosterhout and Van Essen, 2016; Tihanyi et. al, 2003) and adopt Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) analysis to test for multi-collinearity. I find that all VIFs of the independent variables in 
all my estimated regression models are below the conventional rule-of-thumb value of 10 
(Neter et al, 1983). An exception is that there are two of the control variables, Board Size and 
CEO ownership, which are highly correlated with their powers, Board Size2 and CEO 
ownership2, and have high VIFs that exceed the value of 10. However, as all these variables 
are control variables not the variables of interests in my study and the high values are caused 
by the inclusion of powers, these high VIFs ‘is not problem and can be safely ignored’ (Allison, 
2012). For robustness, I re-run my models without including Board Size2 and CEO ownership2, 
the VIFs of Board Size and CEO ownership diminish below 10 and the results are consistent 
my main models.  
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Table 1. Shareholder proposals across time 
This table provides three panels for the distribution of the types of shareholder proposals submitted to UK firms and their voting outcome. Panel A shows the number of proposals related to corporate governance (CG), 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), or other issues across the years 1998–2016. Panel B presents the number of proposals that have been defeated, passed, or withdrawn per year. Panel C shows the average of the ratio 
of for, abstain or against votes to the total votes cast for all shareholder proposals submitted in each particular year. 
Event    
Year 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
  Panel A 
CG 2 13 3 3 8 1 38 18 19 37 29 47 47 20 7 54 35 41 45 467 
CSR 0 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 3 4 6 37 
Other 3 2 2 7 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 6 1 0 1 4 3 1 37 
All 5 16 7 12 10 2 41 19 21 41 31 51 54 22 10 57 42 48 52 541 
  Panel B 
Defeated 5 16 7 12 10 2 11 15 9 35 16 33 22 12 4 27 36 21 10 303 
Passed 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 4 8 0 3 15 22 3 6 11 1 14 18 135 
Withdrawn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 2 3 5 7 0 3 5 7 10 49 
Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 10 0 5 0 0 16 0 6 14 54 
  Panel C 
For 6.1% 25.7% 19.3% 10.5% 18.9% 8.3% 48.9% 33.1% 45.2% 21.5% 19.1% 31.1% 40.7% 29.6% 49.6% 39.9% 19.7% 48.2% 56.5% 30.1% 
Abstain 0.0% 1.5% 3.9% 8.1% 0.5% 2.5% 1.2% 1.5% 4.6% 2.4% 2.3% 0.8% 3.3% 4.3% 3.3% 1.3% 0.9% 1.5% 3.8% 2.5% 
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 Buchanan et al. (2012) report almost similar numbers to the present study, stating that 
86% of proposals submitted by institutions are board and governance proposals, and the 
percentage is higher for other types of shareholders except retail shareholders. Panel A also 
shows that there is an increasing trend of CSR proposals. Particularly, while there were only 
19 CSR proposals during the first 14 years (1998–2011), 18 CSR proposals have been 
submitted during the last five years of the sample.  
 Panel B of Table 1 shows that the more than two-thirds of shareholder proposals put to 
vote do not exceed the majority voting requirement. Thus, almost 30% of shareholder proposals 
have received the majority voting requirement to pass, with Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi 
(2010) also reporting a similar percentage. Further details are provided in Panel C, which 
presents the percentage of votes for and against shareholder proposals, as well as abstentions. 
On average, shareholder proposals submitted to UK firms received 30.1% for votes, 2.5% 
abstain votes, and 68.4% against votes. Overall, Table 1 shows consistent results with prior 
literature on the upward trend on the number of shareholder proposals and the voting in favour 
of these proposals.15  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the means of target firms and the cross-sectional 
t-test results for the difference between the means of target firms and matched firms. Table 2 
shows that, while targeted firms have 41.3% of institutional ownership, matched firms, on 
average, have a larger proportion of institutional ownership by 8.5%. Further, target firms have 
a smaller proportion of long-term institutional ownership by 7.5% than matched firms. On the 
one hand, target firms are larger and have a larger board size and older non-executive directors; 
on the other hand, target firms experience lower stock return, return on asset, and share turnover, 





15 Figures C1, C2, and C3 in Appendix C visualize the number of shareholder proposals and voting outcomes across years.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of target and matched firms 
This table provides summary statistics for our main variables and controls of target firms and the t-test statistics of the mean differences between target firms and matched 
firms. A target firm is defined as one in which at least one shareholder proposal was submitted in a particular year. Each target firm is matched with a peer firm by year, 
industry (2-digit SIC) and size. Four different proxies have been used for size in our matching procedure: Market-to-book (MTB), total assets, revenue, and market 
capitalization. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% 




  MTB Total Assets Revenue Market Cap. All Matched 
                            N Mean Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff. 
Long-term IO                134   0.303   0.071**    0.087***   0.071**    0.070**    0.075*** 
Institutional Ownership             134   0.413   0.101***   0.094***   0.075**    0.071**    0.085*** 
Medium-term IO              134   0.044   0.025**    0.020      0.011      0.009      0.016*   
Short-term IO               134   0.066   0.004     -0.014     -0.005     -0.008     -0.006    
Blockholding (5%)         134   0.394   0.019      0.051      0.024      0.060*     0.039    
Board Size                  131   7.626  -0.752*    -0.787*    -0.382     -0.980**   -0.727**  
Non-executive Ratio         131   0.613  -0.016     -0.013     -0.015     -0.041*    -0.021    
Average Age Non-executive   123  60.191  -0.947     -1.168*    -1.986***  -0.965     -1.265**  
Board Female Ratio          131   0.059   0.007      0.021*     0.019      0.004      0.013    
CEO Duality                 131   0.092  -0.013     -0.038     -0.044      0.001     -0.024    
CEO Tenure                  111   4.120   1.244*     0.760      0.667      1.719**    1.108*   
CEO Ownership               127   0.238  -0.235     -0.234     -0.237     -0.159     -0.216    
Share Return                124  -0.004   0.047      0.163*     0.110      0.211**    0.134**  
Share Turnover              126   0.969   2.103      1.849      1.796      1.562      1.824*   
Total Assets                136  13.745  -0.895***  -0.643**   -0.993***  -1.012***  -0.885*** 
Leverage                    136   0.209  -0.020      0.023     -0.008      0.005      0.000    
ROA                         136  -0.094   0.072**    0.057*     0.063**    0.037      0.057**  
Capital Expenditure         136   0.054  -0.010      0.005      0.012      0.007      0.004    
R&D                       136   0.006   0.001      0.000      0.005      0.005      0.003    
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 Table 3 shows that the stock market in general reacts negatively to the submission of 
shareholder proposals. The negative reaction of the stock market is mainly pronounced around 
an EGM and a meeting with multiple shareholder proposals. While the CAR is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% for all event windows for defeated shareholder proposals, there 
is some evidence on the positive market reaction when shareholder proposals receive the 
majority voting requirement to pass. Table 4 presents the market reaction to shareholder 
proposals based on the proportion of long-term institutional ownership of the target firm. While 
the first four quintiles show evidence of negative market reaction, interestingly, the fifth 
quintile, where target firms have the largest proportion of long-term institutional ownership, 
shows a positive market reaction for shareholder proposals.  
 Both Tables 2 and 4 provide some evidence supporting my first and second hypotheses. 
Table 2 shows that, consistent with H1, firms with a larger proportion of long-term institutional 
ownership are less likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. Table 4 shows that target 
firms with a higher proportion of long-term institutional ownership are more likely to 
experience positive CAR around shareholder proposal meeting dates. Such a result is consistent 
with my expectations in hypothesis H2. However, the next section provides more robust 
econometric estimations, controlling for firm, event, and proposal-level variables. 
A deeper analysis of the market reactions to different mixes of proposals might be 
interesting to enrich the understating on where the stock market reaction exists. Tables C2-C4 
in appendix C provide further results for the market reactions with different mixes of 
shareholder proposals’ types and outcomes. For one-proposal meetings, Table C2 suggests 
there is some evidence on short-term negative market reaction around the general meeting if 
shareholder proposal is defeated. In the cases where the proposal is not defeated, there is also 
a significant short-term market reactions to CG proposals; however, while the market reaction 
is negative for proposals that aim to elect new director, it is positive when the proposals aims 
to remove exciting director. For meetings with multi shareholder proposals, Table C3 shows 
similar results to Table 3 on the negative market reactions to defeated shareholder proposals 
and around EGM, and positive reaction if at least one shareholder proposals has not been 
defeated. However, Table C3 further shows that the negative reaction for defeated proposals is 
higher and only exist if the proposal has been defeated in EGM not the regular AGM, but the 
positive market reaction for not defeated proposals seems to exist for both EGM and AGM 
though the coefficients and significant level are much lower than in the case of defeated 
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proposals. Further differentiating between shareholder proposals types provides interesting 
results yet the number of observations are small to suggest robust conclusion. For example, it 
seems the negative market reaction for defeated proposals in EGM and positive market reaction 
for not defeated are only statistically significant for CG proposals that aim to elect new 
directors. Overall, results in Table C2 and C3 suggest that the outcome, defeated or not defeated, 
and the type of meeting, EGM or AGM, have the main influence on the market reaction to 
shareholder proposals, and to lesser extent that shareholder proposals that aim to elect new 
directors seem to have an effect on the market reaction. 
Moreover, Table C4 differentiates the market reactions between first time targeting by 
shareholder proposals and subsequent/not-first targeting meetings. Panel A shows that the 
negative market reaction for defeated shareholder proposals only exists in the first time firm is 
targeted by shareholder proposals, and Panel B shows that this negative reaction is driven by 
CG proposals, especially proposals that aim to remove existing directors, and EGM. Panel C 
shows that there is a positive market reaction around meetings with not defeated proposals that 
only exists for first time targeted meetings and is driven by CG proposals that aim to remove 
existing directors and EGM. Table C4 shows supporting results on the importance of the 
outcome of shareholder proposals and type of meeting in determining the market reaction 
around the general meeting date; however, Table C4 further provides evidence that the market 
reaction around shareholder proposals meetings mainly exists in the first time firm is targeted 
by shareholder proposals.  
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Table 3. Cumulative abnormal returns around shareholder proposals 
This table shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns around the general meeting date by number of proposals per meeting, voting outcome of proposals, related issues of 
shareholder proposals, and meeting type. The Market model based on a 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. The FTSE 
All Share index has been used for benchmarking. The cross-sectional t-test has been used to test the significance of mean differences.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 
of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  CAR 
  [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
Shareholder proposal -1.275*** -0.477** -0.649** -2.273*** -1.944*** -3.546*** -0.621 -1.226 
  (-4.03) (-1.99) (-2.56) (-4.62) (-3.83) (-6.68) (-0.98) (-1.57) 
N 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 
One-proposal per meeting -1.077 -0.843 -1.533 -0.398 -0.255 -0.563 1.369 0.122 
  (-1.60) (-1.43) (-1.62) (-0.33) (-0.18) (-0.40) (0.85) (0.07) 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Multi-proposals per meeting -1.299*** -0.432* -0.542** -2.500*** -2.149*** -3.907*** -0.862 -1.390 
  (-3.76) (-1.67) (-2.08) (-4.70) (-3.97) (-6.88) (-1.26) (-1.64) 
N 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
Defeated proposals -2.445*** -1.260*** -1.028*** -3.510*** -4.031*** -5.730*** -3.914*** -5.146*** 
  (-6.05) (-4.26) (-3.16) (-5.47) (-6.54) (-8.47) (-5.22) (-6.34) 
N 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
Passed proposals 0.614 0.306 0.0250 1.492 1.719 0.661 4.411*** 8.022*** 
  (1.18) (0.82) (0.04) (1.66) (1.56) (0.61) (3.34) (3.90) 
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Withdrawn proposals -0.129 1.143 -0.335 -4.342** -0.822 -2.263 -2.728 -2.957 
  (-0.12) (1.61) (-0.32) (-2.66) (-0.41) (-1.15) (-1.23) (-1.03) 
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
CG proposals -1.483*** -0.602** -0.626** -2.640*** -2.237*** -4.002*** -0.961 -1.459* 
  (-4.12) (-2.22) (-2.30) (-4.78) (-4.01) (-6.80) (-1.36) (-1.69) 
N 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 385 
CSR proposals 0.0238 0.0607 -0.445 0.638 0.474 0.467 0.445 0.710 
  (0.05) (0.15) (-0.88) (1.20) (0.82) (0.74) (0.53) (0.53) 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
EGM -1.428*** -0.393 -0.802 -3.336*** -4.215*** -5.470*** -3.704*** -4.369*** 
  (-2.74) (-1.10) (-1.58) (-4.63) (-4.93) (-6.11) (-3.63) (-3.60) 
N 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
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Table 4. Cumulative abnormal returns by quintiles of long-term institutional ownership 
This table shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns around general meeting date by quintiles of long-term institutional ownership. The Market model based on a 200-day period 
ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. The FTSE All Share index has been used for benchmarking. The cross-sectional t-test has been 
used to test the significance of mean differences. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Long-term IO  
CAR 
[-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
1st Quintile -0.854 -1.137* 0.437 -1.284 -3.744*** -4.230*** -3.629*** -3.090* 
  (-1.18) (-1.83) (1.03) (-1.05) (-3.57) (-3.97) (-2.95) (-1.97) 
N 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
2nd Quintile -0.833 0.266 0.165 -3.965*** -1.669 -3.974*** -1.468* -6.857*** 
  (-1.59) (0.56) (0.38) (-4.78) (-1.47) (-3.14) (-1.67) (-5.96) 
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
3rd Quintile -1.624* -1.437** -0.848 -2.856* 1.150 -2.567* 8.879*** 3.366 
  (-1.89) (-2.20) (-1.21) (-1.74) (0.76) (-1.99) (5.84) (1.41) 
N 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
4th Quintile -4.034*** -0.583 -3.485*** -4.341*** -6.524*** -8.481*** -8.773*** -4.036** 
  (-5.00) (-1.25) (-4.88) (-4.50) (-6.27) (-6.51) (-6.26) (-2.60) 
N 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
5th Quintile 1.255*** 0.619 0.901*** 0.997** 1.268** 1.637** 2.300* 4.190*** 
  (3.24) (1.43) (3.66) (2.52) (2.23) (2.38) (1.91) (2.68) 
N 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
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5. Estimation Results 
5.1 Investor horizon and shareholder proposals targeting 
I will now explore the relationship between long-term institutional ownership and the 
probability of a firm being targeted by shareholder proposals. Table 5 shows that, while 
institutional ownership decreases the likelihood of a firm being targeted by shareholder 
proposals, this effect is driven mainly by institutional shareholders with a long investment 
horizon. While the coefficient estimate of long-term institutional ownership is negative and 
significant in all models, the coefficient estimates of ownership of institutional investors with 
a shorter investment horizon (i.e. medium-term and short-term) are not only less statistically 
significant, but also positive in some models. To ensure my results are not driven by the proxy 
I used for size in my matching procedure, in Columns (1)–(8), I use four different proxies for 
size, and the results remain consistent. In Columns (9) and (10), I also run my regression model, 
including all matched-peer firms with all four size proxies, and the results remain unchanged. 
In terms of economic significance, column (10) of Table 5 suggests that when all control 
variables at their mean values, an increase in long-term institutional ownership from the first 
quartile (median) to the third quartile is associated with a 11.3% (4.35%) decrease in the 
probability of a firm being targeted by shareholder proposals. Overall, the results in Table 5 
support my first hypothesis H1.  
My findings are consistent with the trend found in some studies that show a negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and the likelihood of shareholder proposals 
targeting (Johnson and Shackell, 1997; Ertimur, Ferri and Muslu, 2011; Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2011). However, I find that this negative relationship is mainly driven by long-term 
institutional ownership. Similar to the literature, I find that CEO ownership decreases the 
likelihood of shareholder proposals targeting (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2010; 
Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011), but I find modest evidence that this relationship is quadratic. 
As it is well documented in prior studies that large firms and firms with poor stock and 
operating performance are more likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals, Table 5 also 
shows that stock return and return on asset (total asset) decrease (increase) the probability of 
targeting. I also find that the increase in board size, board diversity (i.e. females on the board), 
and CEO tenure decrease the likelihood of shareholder proposals targeting, which is consistent 
with the idea that firms with better governance practices are less likely to be targeted. Overall, 
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Table 5. Target analysis and investor horizon 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the effect of the investment horizon of institutional investors on the probability of a firm being targeted by shareholder proposals. The dependent variable 
target firm is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firms are being targeted by at least one shareholder proposal at a given year, 0 for matched (non-target) firms. Columns (1) - (8) show the results using different proxies 
for size in our matching procedure: Market-to-book (MTB), total assets, revenue, and market capitalization. Columns (9) and (10) replicate the estimation when pooling all matched firms with the four different size 
proxies in one regression. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through 
clustering by firms. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                    Dependent variable = Target Firm 
  MTB Total Assets Revenue Market Cap. All Matched 
                                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)             (9)            (10)    
Institutional Ownership                      -2.185**                        -2.085**                        -2.038*                         -2.711***                       -1.920**                  
                                         [1.004]                         [0.935]                         [1.088]                         [1.029]                         [0.926]                    
Long-term IO                                              -1.986**                        -2.407**                        -2.514**                        -2.649**                        -2.047**  
                                                         [1.011]                         [1.032]                         [1.177]                         [1.086]                         [0.957]    
Medium-term IO                                            -3.415                          -4.908***                        0.283                          -3.714*                         -1.906    
                                                         [2.216]                         [1.807]                         [2.272]                         [1.987]                         [1.633]    
Short-term IO                                             -2.276                           4.104                          -0.697                          -0.955                          -0.337    
                                                         [2.779]                         [2.881]                         [2.884]                         [3.089]                         [2.311]    
Blockholding (5%)                        1.037           1.015          -0.508          -0.460          -0.704          -0.697           0.045           0.058          -0.195          -0.206    
                                         [1.085]         [1.086]         [0.987]         [0.991]         [1.109]         [1.112]         [1.012]         [1.018]         [0.787]         [0.786]    
Board Size                                -0.548          -0.524          -0.369          -0.443          -0.472          -0.521          -0.854*         -0.862*         -0.572*         -0.615*   
                                         [0.403]         [0.418]         [0.382]         [0.400]         [0.339]         [0.354]         [0.450]         [0.452]         [0.298]         [0.317]    
Board Size2         0.038           0.037           0.034           0.039           0.029           0.032           0.059**         0.059**         0.040**         0.042**  
                                         [0.024]         [0.025]         [0.023]         [0.024]         [0.019]         [0.020]         [0.028]         [0.028]         [0.017]         [0.018]    
Non-executive Ratio                       -0.527          -0.496           0.532           0.706          -0.479          -0.649           2.348           2.403           0.323           0.370    
                                         [1.655]         [1.652]         [1.700]         [1.866]         [1.757]         [1.802]         [1.862]         [1.924]         [1.499]         [1.521]    
Average Age Non-executive                 0.058           0.056           0.029           0.027           0.076*          0.083*          0.008           0.007           0.044           0.045    
                                         [0.048]         [0.049]         [0.043]         [0.045]         [0.046]         [0.047]         [0.047]         [0.047]         [0.037]         [0.037]    
Board Female Ratio                        -1.183          -1.309          -4.236**        -4.030*         -5.221**        -4.845**        -3.377*         -3.356          -2.489          -2.328    
                                         [2.271]         [2.287]         [2.089]         [2.152]         [2.442]         [2.462]         [2.014]         [2.072]         [1.896]         [1.920]    
CEO Duality                                0.601           0.598           1.402           1.421           1.417           1.432           1.032           1.039           0.732           0.745    
                                         [0.781]         [0.803]         [0.859]         [0.918]         [1.148]         [1.115]         [0.737]         [0.735]         [0.709]         [0.719]    
CEO Tenure                                -0.085**        -0.087**        -0.077          -0.083*         -0.105*         -0.106*         -0.102*         -0.101*         -0.083          -0.082    
                                         [0.043]         [0.044]         [0.048]         [0.049]         [0.059]         [0.060]         [0.053]         [0.053]         [0.052]         [0.053]    
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CEO Ownership                             -1.646          -2.042          -3.383          -3.794          46.074          44.446         -11.227*        -11.055*         -3.981          -3.943    
                                        [11.597]        [11.766]        [17.002]        [16.953]        [29.407]        [28.205]         [6.270]         [6.259]         [5.156]         [5.193]    
CEO Ownership2         0.168           0.194           0.288           0.306          -3.003          -2.890           0.794*          0.781*          0.321           0.316    
                                         [0.775]         [0.787]         [1.138]         [1.133]         [1.961]         [1.882]         [0.420]         [0.419]         [0.348]         [0.350]    
Share Return                               0.181           0.166          -0.457          -0.395          -0.197          -0.173          -0.456*         -0.433*         -0.273          -0.257    
                                         [0.270]         [0.273]         [0.284]         [0.291]         [0.196]         [0.192]         [0.249]         [0.240]         [0.219]         [0.211]    
Share Turnover                            -0.368          -0.378          -0.276          -0.287          -0.299          -0.324           0.111           0.089          -0.219          -0.228    
                                         [0.246]         [0.245]         [0.180]         [0.193]         [0.250]         [0.257]         [0.326]         [0.330]         [0.203]         [0.207]    
Total Assets                               0.383**         0.372**         0.199           0.203           0.471**         0.494**         0.236           0.234           0.287**         0.294**  
                                         [0.153]         [0.153]         [0.137]         [0.140]         [0.196]         [0.197]         [0.155]         [0.155]         [0.120]         [0.123]    
Leverage                                  -0.081          -0.108          -1.547          -1.665          -0.575          -0.390          -2.274*         -2.214*         -1.330          -1.230    
                                         [1.597]         [1.601]         [1.252]         [1.289]         [1.449]         [1.483]         [1.283]         [1.276]         [1.052]         [1.046]    
ROA                                       -3.084***       -3.219***       -1.624*         -1.576          -0.862          -0.332          -0.735          -0.775          -1.320*         -1.223*   
                                         [1.190]         [1.196]         [0.938]         [1.028]         [1.000]         [1.001]         [0.882]         [0.909]         [0.724]         [0.725]    
R&D                                      4.092           4.031           3.582           2.372           0.012          -0.033           0.840           0.600           1.429           1.466    
                                         [5.734]         [6.083]         [5.517]         [5.331]         [5.099]         [4.620]         [5.752]         [5.804]         [4.679]         [4.673]    
Capital Expenditure                        1.094           1.373          -5.097          -5.333         -10.292**       -10.720**        -6.651*         -6.415*         -5.699          -5.662    
                                         [3.786]         [3.772]         [3.435]         [3.628]         [4.889]         [5.241]         [3.702]         [3.728]         [4.130]         [4.166]    
Pseudo R2                           0.23            0.24            0.23            0.24            0.25            0.26            0.26            0.26            0.20            0.20    
N          190             190             198             198             200             200             200             200             497             497    
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5.1 Investor horizon and market reaction 
I next focus on the relationship between long-term institutional ownership and the 
outcome of shareholder proposals. I conduct my outcome analysis using two levels of outcome. 
I start with the first level which I call market reaction outcome. Table 6 presents the results for 
the market reaction analysis to test my second hypothesis H2. I use CAR with eight different 
event windows to examine the market reaction around shareholder proposal meetings. These 
windows range from a two trading days window, [0,+1], to one trading month, [-10,+10]. In 
Table 6, I present all eight event windows of CAR.  
Table 6 shows that long-term institutional ownership increases the CARs around 
shareholder meeting dates. This result can be interpreted as meaning that firms with a higher 
presence of long-term institutional investors will experience a positive market reaction to 
shareholder proposals. Seven out of the eight event windows of CAR show statistically 
significant results. In terms of economic significance, results from Table 6 suggest that an 
increase in long-term institutional ownership from the first quartile (median) to the third 
quartile is associated with an 8.26% (3.73%) increase in CAR [-1,+1] and with an 21.2% 
(9.62%) increase in CAR [-10,+10].  
Indeed, prior studies document mixed results on the effect of institutional ownership on 
market reaction. While some studies find no statistically significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and CAR (Borokhovich et al., 2006; Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi, 
2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011), others find some evidence for a positive relationship 
(Gillan and Starks, 2000; Cuñat, Gine and Guadalupe, 2012). Interestingly, Thomas and Cotter 
(2007) find a significant negative relationship as well. Thus, my findings might contribute to 
this contradictory picture by documenting how the investment horizon is an important 
determinant of institutional investors’ reaction to shareholder proposal submissions. This result 
is also in line with the fact that well-monitored firms tend to experience a positive market 
reaction to shareholder proposals.  
The results of control variables in Table 6 are generally consistent with the literature. 
For example, I find CEO ownership decreases CAR, similar to Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011), 
and to other studies that use total insider ownership as a control instead (Borokhovich et al., 
2006; Thomas and Cotter, 2007). Moreover, I find supporting evidence for the effect of the 
voting outcome of shareholder proposals on the market reaction to these proposals (Gillan and 
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Starks, 2000; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). I find that, while there is modest evidence—
although, only for short event windows—on the positive relationship between passed proposals 
and CAR, defeated proposals are associated with consistent negative market reaction across 
most event windows of CAR. 
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Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns and investor horizon 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the cumulative abnormal returns. Eight different event windows are used 
to calculate CAR. The Market model based on a 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. The FTSE All Share index has been 
used for benchmarking. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial 
correlation through clustering by firms. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                    Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal returns 
  [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
                                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)    
Long-term IO                              17.757***        7.872**        10.999**        15.586          20.945***       22.994***       24.250**        45.763*** 
                                         [5.332]         [3.345]         [4.261]        [10.083]         [7.862]         [8.565]         [9.987]        [10.935]    
Institutional Ownership                       -9.502*         -3.185          -7.965*         -4.329         -13.649*        -14.295         -14.026         -20.797**  
                                         [4.938]         [2.615]         [4.102]         [9.751]         [7.875]         [8.698]         [9.265]         [9.054]    
Blockholding (5%)                      -6.386*          1.466          -5.960*         -2.462          -2.840          -5.558          -3.566          -8.628    
                                         [3.480]         [2.528]         [3.456]         [5.882]         [6.044]         [6.826]         [6.952]         [7.765]    
Board Size                                 0.676           2.347*         -0.752           2.317          -1.743          -1.936          -3.024          -2.995    
                                         [1.063]         [1.202]         [0.959]         [1.678]         [1.797]         [1.605]         [2.536]         [2.536]    
Board Size2        -0.040          -0.100*          0.022          -0.098           0.054           0.079           0.129           0.236    
                                         [0.060]         [0.060]         [0.053]         [0.088]         [0.088]         [0.088]         [0.132]         [0.152]    
Non-executive Ratio                        0.206          -1.664           3.832           4.665          -1.654          -2.404          -5.371           6.423    
                                         [5.278]         [5.080]         [5.249]         [6.201]         [8.631]         [9.833]         [9.954]        [11.941]    
Average Age Non-executive               -0.041          -0.034          -0.171*         -0.119          -0.258          -0.134           0.166          -0.237    
                                         [0.124]         [0.124]         [0.102]         [0.157]         [0.195]         [0.200]         [0.205]         [0.255]    
Board Female Ratio                         4.676          -1.264          -1.264          24.870*        -12.047          -1.246          -4.411         -21.645    
                                         [8.564]         [7.784]         [7.023]        [13.406]        [12.310]        [14.599]        [18.050]        [27.937]    
CEO Duality                               -1.086          -4.666**         1.271          -6.120*         -2.788          -4.146           0.630          -3.393    
                                         [2.213]         [1.791]         [2.427]         [3.572]         [3.679]         [4.724]         [4.680]         [7.681]    
CEO Tenure                                 0.109           0.178           0.143           0.107           0.260          -0.007          -0.328          -0.681    
                                         [0.196]         [0.186]         [0.181]         [0.290]         [0.407]         [0.410]         [0.436]         [0.443]    
CEO Ownership                            -35.990          -2.768        -215.571        -291.387*       -525.677***     -359.100**       160.154          85.155    
                                        [84.397]        [39.648]       [158.421]       [153.160]       [134.603]       [160.042]       [318.653]       [167.009]    
CEO Ownership2         2.383           0.160          14.369          19.423*         35.069***       23.940**       -10.610          -5.698    
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                                         [5.624]         [2.637]        [10.561]        [10.209]         [8.970]        [10.666]        [21.241]        [11.121]    
Share Return                              -0.864          -0.382          -0.746          -0.689           0.141           0.487           2.347          -5.191    
                                         [1.490]         [1.417]         [1.362]         [2.178]         [2.130]         [2.333]         [2.771]         [3.214]    
Share Turnover                             1.052*          0.581           0.885           0.370          -1.988          -1.029          -2.419          -0.803    
                                         [0.626]         [0.515]         [0.602]         [1.288]         [1.341]         [1.392]         [1.552]         [1.588]    
Total Assets                              -1.116*         -0.655*         -0.468          -2.229**         0.373          -0.129          -0.305          -2.516**  
                                         [0.613]         [0.375]         [0.558]         [0.935]         [0.935]         [0.989]         [1.187]         [1.218]    
Leverage                                  -6.180          -3.075          -5.949          -6.739         -15.023*        -17.933*         -4.113         -18.577    
                                         [4.743]         [4.275]         [4.403]         [7.769]         [8.443]         [9.088]         [8.828]        [11.228]    
ROA                                        0.123          -1.926          -0.451           6.461*          8.868**        13.533***       14.458***       14.753**  
                                         [1.963]         [1.970]         [2.097]         [3.458]         [3.597]         [4.042]         [5.373]         [7.353]    
R&D                                     -6.821          -7.851          10.285         -11.338           1.609          -7.758         -22.292         -34.414    
                                        [10.369]        [10.239]        [11.251]        [25.145]        [19.746]        [21.690]        [28.027]        [37.030]    
Capital Expenditure                       -0.324           0.521          -0.817          26.498          12.283          16.717          11.921          17.429    
                                         [9.313]         [6.669]        [11.597]        [16.382]        [14.170]        [18.213]        [21.436]        [28.528]    
CG Proposal                               -3.940*         -2.647*          0.017          -3.481          -2.651          -3.381         -10.848**        -5.143    
                                         [2.058]         [1.397]         [1.780]         [2.508]         [2.937]         [3.353]         [4.501]         [3.724]    
CSR Proposal                              -2.119          -2.381          -0.117          -2.876          -2.040          -0.240          -5.240           0.783    
                                         [1.970]         [1.663]         [1.720]         [2.814]         [3.022]         [3.791]         [3.999]         [4.814]    
Passed                                     0.244           0.113           0.800           7.536**        -2.682          -2.289          -7.428           1.489    
                                         [1.679]         [1.313]         [1.828]         [3.511]         [3.499]         [4.020]         [4.924]         [6.311]    
Defeated                                  -4.068**        -4.575***        0.220           0.252          -6.266*         -8.023*        -13.065***      -13.171*   
                                         [1.555]         [1.557]         [1.925]         [2.462]         [3.219]         [4.051]         [4.702]         [7.001]    
EGM                                       -2.482          -0.309          -2.804          -2.908          -1.950          -0.244          -0.070          -1.677    
                                         [1.909]         [1.508]         [1.762]         [3.268]         [3.217]         [3.396]         [4.050]         [5.045]    
R2                               0.41            0.43            0.23            0.37            0.46            0.46            0.43            0.41    
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Similar to Borokhovich et al. (2006), I find that a firm’s operating performance is 
positively associated with market reaction, although they document positive, but not 
statistically significant, coefficients. Finally, the results in Table 6 are also supporting the 
argument that the general meeting date is an appropriate event date to study market reaction to 
shareholder proposals. Overall, the results documented in Table 6 support my prediction in H2 
and are consistent with the literature.  
5.1 Investor horizon and voting outcome 
To test my third hypothesis H3, I use several proxies for the voting outcome of 
shareholder proposals. Table 7 presents the results for all three proxies. Table 7 shows that 
long-term institutional ownership decreases the probability of a shareholder proposal being 
defeated, increases the probability of a shareholder proposal being passed, and decreases the 
level of dissent on shareholder proposals. In terms of economic significance, column (1) of 
Table 7 suggests that an increase in long-term institutional ownership from the first quartile 
(median) to the third quartile is associated with a 51.3% (42%) decrease in the probability of a 
shareholder proposal being defeated. These results are consistent with the majority of studies 
in the literature that document a positive association between institutional ownership and the 
positive voting outcome (i.e. voting in favour to the shareholder proposal) (Gordon and Pound, 
1993; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; 
Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010; Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2011). However, some coefficients 
were not statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, my findings reveal that this positive relationship is mainly driven by 
institutional investors with a long-term horizon. Indeed, this result is consistent with the 
findings by Gine, Moussawi and Sedunov (2017) who differentiate between different classes 
of institutional investors (i.e. bank ownership, investment advisor ownership, insurance 
company ownership, etc.). They find that a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and positive voting on shareholder proposals is more pronounced in the case of 
public pension fund ownership, which is characterized by a long-term investment horizon. 
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Table 7. Voting outcome and investor horizon 
This table presents the results of logistic and OLS regressions examining the effect of long-term institutional ownership 
on the voting outcome of shareholder proposals. Columns (1) and (2) shows the logistics estimations and Column (3) 
shows the OLS estimations. Defeated (Passed) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the shareholder proposal is put to vote 
and does not (does) exceed the majority voting requirement, zero otherwise. Dissent is the logistic transformation of the 
ratio of against and abstain votes to the total votes cast. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in 
Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through 
clustering by firms. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable =     Defeated          Passed    Dissent   
                                    
    (1)        (2)        (3)    
Long-term IO                              -7.146**        15.115***       -2.342*   
                                         [3.213]         [4.055]         [1.266]    
Institutional Ownership                            4.729*        -13.383***        1.317    
                                         [2.540]         [4.085]         [1.294]    
Blockholding (5%)                        3.116**        -4.968**         0.617    
                                         [1.472]         [2.040]         [0.654]    
Board Size                                -0.053          -0.971           0.543*** 
                                         [0.679]         [0.971]         [0.176]    
Board Size2         0.065           0.003          -0.018**  
                                         [0.046]         [0.053]         [0.008]    
Non-executive Ratio                       -4.331           3.930           1.865    
                                         [3.839]         [3.471]         [1.146]    
Average Age Non-executive                 -0.004          -0.011          -0.032    
                                         [0.072]         [0.050]         [0.024]    
Board Female Ratio                         1.477          -7.344          -3.576*   
                                         [5.041]         [8.814]         [2.034]    
CEO Duality                               -0.069           0.639          -0.909    
                                         [1.212]         [1.823]         [0.643]    
CEO Tenure                                -0.182*          0.025           0.098*   
                                         [0.095]         [0.116]         [0.055]    
CEO Ownership                            -13.993          74.584*        -49.861**  
                                        [27.906]        [41.984]        [21.685]    
CEO Ownership2         0.940          -4.962*          3.330**  
                                         [1.860]         [2.798]         [1.445]    
Share Return                               1.622**        -1.092           0.590**  
                                         [0.780]         [0.899]         [0.224]    
Share Turnover                            -0.192           0.268          -0.188    
                                         [0.453]         [0.420]         [0.157]    
Total Assets                              -0.647*          0.616*         -0.161    
                                         [0.361]         [0.341]         [0.118]    
Leverage                                   6.197          -4.520           0.962    
                                         [3.917]         [3.299]         [1.250]    
ROA                                        2.530*          0.142           3.544*** 
                                         [1.413]         [1.545]         [0.500]    
R&D                                     -0.474          10.265*          7.066**  
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                                         [9.889]         [6.184]         [3.041]    
Capital Expenditure                       -8.530           2.760           5.071**  
                                         [5.252]         [6.061]         [2.273]    
CG Proposal                               -1.474           1.226          -0.324    
                                         [1.326]         [1.509]         [0.428]    
CSR Proposal                               0.136           1.102          -0.771    
                                         [1.558]         [1.193]         [0.782]    
EGM                                        1.393          -1.112          -0.819*** 
                                         [0.910]         [1.053]         [0.282]    
R2 (Pseudo)                       (0.38)     (0.40)        0.46    
N      322        322           222    
 
Table 7 also shows that an increase in a firm’s stock return and/or operating 
performance is associated with a lower level of positive voting on shareholder proposals, with 
similar results documented in the literature (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Strickland, Wiles and 
Zenner, 1996; Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben, 2010; Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2011). I also find that dissent voting on shareholder proposals increases with board 
size, CEO tenure, CEO ownership concentration, capital expenditure, and R&D, but decreases 
when a firm’s board has more female directors, when CEO ownership increases, and in EGMs. 
Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) also control for 
board size and CEO ownership, and my results are similar to theirs. Overall, the results 
documented in Table 7 support my prediction in H3 and are consistent with prior findings.  
5.1 Additional robustness16 
To check the robustness of my results, I conduct several additional tests. First, in Table 
8, I use alternative proxies for the voting outcome of shareholder proposals. Following Ertimur, 
Ferri and Muslu (2011) and Stathopoulos and Voulgaris (2016), I use a dummy variable to 
indicate if dissent or for voting on a shareholder proposal exceeds a threshold. I use the median 
of dissent and for voting of all shareholder proposals in the sample as my threshold. Thus, I 
use a Dissent (high)/ For (high) dummy variable which equals 1 if dissent voting/for voting on 
a shareholder proposal is larger than the sample median dissent voting/for voting, and zero 
otherwise. Further, I also use a dummy variable, Passed & Withdrawn, which is similar to my 
Passed variable used in Table 7, but includes shareholder proposals that have been withdrawn 
 
16 The results of this section are presented in Appendix C. 
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before the general meeting date. Bauer, Moers and Viehs (2015) argue and find that withdrawn 
proposals are an effective governance device for change, as managers discuss and try to settle 
the proposed matter with the proposal’s sponsor in order to prevent the proposals being put on 
vote during the general meeting. I also use an alternative measure of a Dissent variable by 
excluding abstain votes and only considering against votes, as abstain votes do not necessarily 
mean that abstaining shareholders oppose the proposed matter (Stathopoulos and Voulgaris, 
2016). Finally, I use the percentage of for (in favour) votes to the total votes cast as a voting 
outcome of shareholder proposals, following many studies in the shareholder proposal 
literature (Gordon and Pound, 1993; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Thomas and Cotter, 2007). 
Overall, the results documented in Table 8 are consistent with Table 7’s results and support my 
prediction in H3 that long-term institutional ownership is associated with higher (lower) 
positive (dissent) voting on shareholder proposals.  
 Second, I conduct propensity score matching (PSM) analysis to mitigate the selection 
bias when matching treated firms with control firms, following prior studies (Bauer, Moers and 
Viehs, 2015; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2016; Alkalbani, Cuomo and Mallin, 2019). In Table 
9a, I employ PSM to match firms targeted by shareholder proposals (treated group) with firms 
with similar observable firm characteristics (control group). I use all the firm-level independent 
variables in Equation (1), except ownership variables. The outcome variable is long-term 
institutional ownership. Using five different matching algorithms, Table 9a shows that target 
firms have significantly lower long-term institutional ownership than control group firms by 
about 10%. These results are consistent with the results reported in Table 5 and in line with my 
hypothesis H1.  
Next, I also use PSM to match target firms with a high proportion of long-term 
institutional ownership (treated group) with other target firms with a low proportion (control 
group), and the outcome variables are CARs, in Table 9b, and different proxies for voting, in 
Table 9c. I use all the firm-level independent variables in Equations (2) and (3), respectively, 
except ownership variables. Table 9b shows that CARs around shareholder proposals meetings 
are significantly higher in targeted firms with a high presence of institutional investors than 
firms with a low presence. Table 9c shows that the positive (dissent) voting of shareholder 
proposals is higher (lower) in firms with higher long-term institutional ownership. Overall, 
these results are in line with results reported in Table 6 and Table 7 and support my predictions 
in H2 and H3, respectively. 
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 Third, I differentiate between long-term institutional investors based on investment 
strategy at firm level (index versus non-index) (Harford, Kecskés and Mansi, 2018) and at 
portfolio level (high portfolio turnover versus low portfolio turnover) (Yan and Zhang, 2009). 
Non-index and low portfolio turnover long-term institutional shareholders are expected to be 
better informed and efficient monitors (Bushee, 1998). Tables 10a and 10b replicate Tables 6 
and 7, respectively, but divide long-term institutional investors into indexer versus non-indexer 
and high-turnover versus low-turnover investors. 
On the one hand, Panels A of Tables 10a and 10b show, as expected, that the previously 
reported results on the effect of long-term institutional ownership on market reaction and voting 
outcome are mainly driven by non-indexer institutional investors rather than indexer 
institutions. 
On the other hand, Panel B of Table 10a interestingly shows that, while the high 
presence of long-term institutional investors with high turnover at their portfolio level is 
associated with higher CARs, this relationship is not statistically significant for investors with 
a low-turnover portfolio. However, Panel B of Table 10b shows that an increase in the presence 
of long-term institutional investors with a low-turnover portfolio is significantly associated 
with an increase (decrease) in positive (dissent) voting on shareholder proposals, while 
investors with a high-turnover portfolio seem to have less influence on the voting outcome. 
 Fourth, Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988, p. 277) divide institutional investors based 
on their ‘susceptibility to management pressure’ into institutions with high potential 
influence—pressure-sensitive (i.e. banks, insurance companies and trusts)—and institutions 
with low potential influence—pressure-resistant (i.e. mutual funds and public pension funds). 
They argue and find that pressure-resistant institutions are more likely to oppose management 
by voting against management anti-takeover proposals. Many studies later adopt such 
classifications and confirm the active monitoring role of pressure-resistant institutional 
investors (Almazan, Hartzell and Starks, 2005; Chen, Harford and Li, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 
2008). 
Recently, scholars have adopted the pressure-sensitive versus pressure-resistant 
argument to investigate the effect of institutional ownership on shareholder proposals’ 
probability and outcome. Borokhovich et al. (2006) argue that, unlike pressure-sensitive 
blockholders, pressure-resistant blockholders are viewed as effective monitors by the market, 
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and they find supporting evidence that firms with the presence of pressure-resistant 
blockholders experience a positive market reaction to shareholder proposal submission. 
Additionally, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) find that pressure-resistant institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with the probability of shareholder proposals targeting, but 
this is positively related to CAR around the announcement of shareholder proposal submissions 
and voting in favour of these proposals. In contrast, Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2010) 
find that both pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional ownership increases the 
probability of shareholder proposals targeting. However, the results are stronger for the latter, 
and they interestingly find that both variables are not significantly related to CAR nor the 
voting outcome of shareholder proposals.  
 In Tables 11a, 11b, and 11c, I not only differentiate between pressure-sensitive and 
pressure-resistant institutional investors, but I also further divide them based on their 
investment horizon, following Chen, Harford and Li (2007). It can be observed that Table 11a 
confirms the established argument by previous studies on the effective monitoring role of 
pressure-resistant institutions and shows consistent results with Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011). 
That is, both pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional ownership is negatively 
associated with the probability of shareholder proposals targeting, although it is only 
statistically significant for the latter. 
When I further differentiate institutional investors based on investor horizon, it seems 
that the negative association is mainly driven by long-term institutional investors. Furthermore, 
Tables 11b and 11c focus on the market reaction and voting outcome and show that, while total 
pressure-resistant institutional ownership is neither statistically related to market reaction nor 
voting outcome, the coefficient estimates of the long-term proportion are statistically 
significant. The estimates suggest that firms with a high presence of pressure-resistant 
institutional investors with long-term horizon experience positive market reaction to 
shareholder proposals and positive voting on these proposals. It is worth mentioning that all 
the coefficient estimates of long-term pressure-resistant institutional ownership, reported in 
Tables 11a, 11b, and 11c, are larger than the total long-term institutional ownership’s 
coefficients, as reported in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively. 
Finally, I differentiate long-term institutional investors based on their domiciled 
country. Previous studies show that domestic institutional investors have information 
advantage about local firms compared with foreign institutional investors [see for example 
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Ferreira et al. (2017)], as the latter seem to suffer from asymmetric information (Phung and Le, 
2013). Additionally, previous studies argue that domestic institutional investors are more likely 
to have business ties and better networks with their local investee firms (Gillan and Starks, 
2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Bena et al., 2017). Kim et al. (2016) study a sample of listed 
firms from 29 countries to investigate the monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors in 
mitigating earning management. In particular, they find that domestic institutional investors 
are better able to constrain earning management due to the proximity of monitoring information 
as compared to their foreign counterparts. However, they find the monitoring effectiveness of 
foreign institutional investors improves as they become more familiar with the accounting 
practices and culture of the host country, especially if these investors are from countries with 
strong shareholder protection and the investee firms are in countries with weak shareholder 
protection. Chhaochharia, Kumer and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012) document similar results that 
firms with high local institutional ownership are less likely to engage in earning management 
practices, and these firms have better internal governance and are more profitable. 
In the context of the UK, Hendry et al., 2007 interview UK institutional investors and 
document that the mainstream of domestic institutional investors in the UK actively engage 
and communicate with their investee firms, and they consider their activism as original part of 
their stewardship towards their agents. Thus, I expect the effect of long-term institutional 
investors on the probability of shareholder proposals targeting and the outcome of shareholder 
proposals will be more pronounced for domestic ownership. 
In Tables 12a, 12b, and 12c, I differentiate between foreign and domestic institutional 
investors based on their investment horizon. Table 12a shows that foreign institutional 
investors with short-term investment horizon increases the targeting probability. On the other 
hand, the findings show that domestic institutional ownership is negatively associated with the 
probability of shareholder proposals targeting, but the results are driven by long-term domestic 
institutional investors. Furthermore, Tables 12b and 12c focus on the market reaction and 
voting outcome. While both foreign and domestic institutional ownership are neither 
statistically related to market reaction nor voting outcome, the long-term institutional 
ownership coefficient estimates are statistically significant with more consistent results for 
domestic institutional investors. Overall, my results support the aforementioned literature on 
the heterogeneity between domestic and foreign institutional investors, but I further show that 
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foreign and domestic investment horizon plays an important but different role in their activism 
behaviour using the shareholder proposals channel.  
6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the role of investor horizon on the targeting probability and 
outcomes of shareholder proposals. In particular, I study the effect of long-term institutional 
ownership on the probability of shareholder proposals targeting, market reaction around 
shareholder proposal meetings, and voting outcome of shareholder proposals. Building on the 
agency view and monitoring role of institutional investors, I expect that the presence of 
institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon is associated with a lower 
probability of shareholder proposals targeting and a better outcome of shareholder proposals. 
This study focuses on shareholder proposals that have been submitted to publicly listed UK 
firms for the period 1998–2016. The UK provides an interesting context to study shareholder 
proposals. Not only are the UK’s legal and institutional frameworks thriving to empower 
investors and protect minority investors, but also the proxy rules and the practical 
implementation of shareholder proposals are distinctive from other contexts such as in the US. 
 I find that firms with a higher proportion of long-term institutional ownership are less 
likely to be targeted by shareholder proposals. Further, I focus on the influence of long-term 
institutional ownership on the outcomes of shareholder proposals. For the market reaction to 
shareholder proposals, my findings show that an increase in the presence of long-term 
institutional investors is associated with higher CARs around shareholder proposal meetings. 
Moreover, my analysis on the voting outcome of shareholder proposals reveals that shareholder 
proposals submitted to firms with a higher proportion of long-term institutional ownership 
receive lower dissent voting and are more (less) likely to be passed (defeated). In further 
analysis, I confirm the heterogeneity previously documented by earlier studies in the effect of 
pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional ownership on shareholder proposals’ 
targeting and outcome. However, my findings suggest that the negative relationship between 
pressure-resistant ownership and the probability of shareholder proposals’ targeting, and the 
positive relationship with market reaction and in favour voting, only exist for pressure-resistant 
institutional investors with a long-term horizon. I also employ PSM analysis and use several 
proxies for voting outcome, and my findings are unchanged. Overall, my findings support my 
predictions.  
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This study contains several potential limitations that could provide avenues for future 
research. First, owing to data unavailability, I did not consider the potential effect of the sponsor 
identity on the outcomes of shareholder proposals that are documented within some US-based 
studies. Besides controlling for its potential effect in the outcome models, it would be 
interesting to investigate how the sponsor identity of shareholder proposals would moderate 
the relationship between institutional ownership and market reaction and voting outcome. 
Bauer, Moers and Viehs (2016) show that institutional ownership increases the probability of 
a shareholder proposal being withdrawn if it is sponsored by institutions. 
Second, this study, similar to most prior research investigating public shareholder 
activism (i.e. shareholder proposals and campaigns), considers ‘visible activism’, which 
implicitly overrides the role of private shareholder activism (i.e. behind-the-scenes negotiations) 
(Goranova et al., 2017). McCahery, Sautaner and Starks (2016) document that long-term 
institutional investors more intensively intervene with their investee firm behind the scenes. I 
further find comparatively supporting evidence that shareholder proposals are more likely to 
be withdrawn before they put on vote in firms with a higher presence of long-term institutional 
investors. As mentioned earlier, prior studies show that long-term institutional ownership is 
positively associated with firm’s governed. While I argue that the negative association between 
long-term institutional ownership and shareholder proposals could be due to better CG/ 
monitoring and higher/effective private engagement with the management, future research 
investigation of this issue would be of great value. 
Third, this research did not study the effect of shareholder proposals on targeted firms’ 
future operating performance and long-term value. Indeed, prior studies find no or modest 
evidence on the long-term effect of shareholder proposal submission. However, because 
shareholder proposals in the UK are binding by law if passed and mainly seek board changes 
(appointment and removal of directors), it would be expected to find that there is a long-term 
effect of passed shareholder proposals. A counter argument that should be considered with 
shareholder proposals, especially binding ones, is that they might disrupt the decision-making 
process within the firm, which might lead to negative consequences (Bainbridge, 2006). 
Notwithstanding, this relationship might be moderated by firm’s corporate governance or 
ownership structure. For example, Neubaum and Zahra (2002) find that while institutional 
investors’ activism has no significant effect on firm’s corporate future performance, this 
relationship is significantly and positively moderated by long-term institutional ownership. 
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Finally, as mentioned in the background section and confirmed by this study, the 
number and the outcomes (i.e. market reaction and voting outcome) of shareholder proposals 
have been evolving over time. Thus, in future research, scholars should seek to explore the role 
of the financial crisis and other corporate scandals in the evolution of shareholder activism. 
This is especially important, since these crises are followed by new/reviewed regulations which 
tend to empower shareholders and encourage more shareholder engagement. For example, my 
descriptive statistics show that, while the average annual number of shareholder proposals is 
14 from 1998 to 2006, there were 44 during the period of the financial crisis from 2007 to 
2010.17 Then, there is a clear decrease in 2011 and 2012 followed by a rebound to an average 
of 59 proposals per year from 2013 to 2016. It is worth mentioning that the Financial Reporting 
Council published updated versions of the UK Corporate Governance Code and Stewardship 
Code in 2012.  
  
 
17 The increase is larger for shareholder proposals targeting financial institutions. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis consists of three essays that aim to investigate the role of institutional 
investors’ investment horizon on firm’s corporate policies. While the first two essays focus on 
the impact of the presence of institutional investors with long-term horizon on corporate cash 
holdings as essential element in corporate finance, the third essay studies the role of investor 
horizon on firm’s decision-making though its effect on the probability of targeting firm with 
shareholder proposals and the outcome of these proposals. This thesis focuses on the UK firms 
traded on the London Stock Exchange over the period from 2000 to 2016. 
The first essay provides novel empirical evidence on the impact of long-term 
institutional ownership on corporate cash holdings. I build on economic perspectives, the 
behavioural theory and the value-creation versus value-appropriation literatures. My analysis 
shows that long-term institutional ownership is associated with lower cash holdings and that 
this negative relationship is significantly more pronounced for firms with high agency costs. I 
further show that the link between long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings is 
context specific. In particular, my findings show that firms with high presence of long-term 
institutional investors hold more cash if they are more diversified and face lower agency costs; 
however, firms with high presence of long-term institutional investors are pressured to further 
reduce their cash holding when agency costs are high even if they operate in industries with 
high growth opportunities and industries with high R&D intensity. Overall, my findings are 
robust to several estimation strategies; firm fixed effect estimation, IV estimation and control 
for firm’s corporate governance, and consistent with my predications. 
 Beyond the scope of the first essay, the documented empirical evidence suggests new 
directions and potential avenues for future research. First, as this essay finds that the magnitude 
of the agency costs could aggravate or alleviate the negative relationship between long-term 
institutional ownership and firms’ cash holdings and that large cash holdings are often 
connected to potential problems, an interesting research question might be as follows: does the 
impact of long-term institutional ownership on cash depend on the level of cash that firm holds? 
Second, this essay suggests that the monitoring role of long-term institutional investors is 
driven by the implications of cash for firm performance. Thus, what is the relationship between 
the presence of long-term institutional investors and the value of firms’ cash holdings? Third, 
the interplay between different theories and perspectives enables this study to enrich our 
understanding of how the firms’ contexts and characteristics determine the relevance of theory 
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being adopted to explain corporate cash holdings. Adopting a multi-view approach could 
contribute to the literature of cash holdings. Fourth, the findings of this study support recent 
research on the importance of considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors when 
studying their monitoring role and the influence on firms’ policies. Finally, while this essay 
focuses on firms’ cash holdings as a channel to study the impact of contexts on the monitoring 
role of long-term institutional investors, exploring other channels with relative contexts is a 
fruitful area for future research to confirm my novel evidence. 
The second essay investigates the effect of institutional investors’ investment horizon 
on the cash deviation from the optimal level of cash. Incorporating agency concerns and 
precautionary needs of cash holdings, I find that the impact of long-term institutional 
ownership on corporate cash holdings depends on the cash deviation from the optimal level of 
cash. On the one hand, I find that long-term institutional ownership is negatively associated 
with cash holdings only for firms with excess cash; on the other hand, firms with high presence 
of long-term institutional investors increase cash when they hold cash below the optimal level. 
I further show that long-term institutional ownership is associated with higher value of cash 
holdings. The second essay also shows that long-term institutional ownership has positive 
moderating effect on the negative relationship between excess cash and firm’s operating 
performance. Overall, my findings support my predications on the positive monitoring role of 
long-term institutional investors on how much firm holds cash, how firm uses excess cash and 
how much cash contributes to firm value. Overall, my findings are in line with my predications 
and are robust to several robustness tests.    
The findings of the second essay suggest several directions and avenues for future 
research. First, incorporating both the agency and the precautionary motive views helps explain 
the contradictory findings in the literature on the effect of long-term institutional ownership on 
the level of a firm’s cash holdings. Second, this study did not consider the effect of adjustment 
costs of cash holdings. It may be interesting to explore how the adjustment costs will moderate 
the relationship between long-term institutional ownership and a firm’s cash holdings. Finally, 
my empirical results support prior studies on the negative effect of cash deviation from the 
optimal level of cash on a firm’s value. Future research should investigate the role of the firm’s 
environment and characteristics on moderating this negative relationship. For example, is the 
negative effect of cash deficit on firms’ operating performance and value more pronounced for 
firms that operate in industries with high growth or many investment opportunities? 
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In the third/last essay, I build on the agency view and the monitoring function of 
institutional investors to investigate the impact of institutional investors with long-term 
investment horizon on the probability of shareholder proposal targeting, the market reaction to 
shareholder proposal and the voting outcome of these proposals. First, my targeting analysis 
shows that firms with high proportion of long-term institutional ownership are less likely to be 
targeted by shareholder proposals. Then, I show that while cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) around dates of shareholder proposal general meeting are negative on average, firms 
with high presence of long-term institutional investors experience positive CARs. Further, the 
voting outcome analysis shows that shareholder proposals targeting firms with high proportion 
of long-term institutional ownership receive less (more) dissent (in favour) voting using serval 
voting proxies. In further analysis, I show the established relationship in the literature between 
pressure-resistant institutional ownership and shareholder proposal’s targeting and outcome is 
driven by long-term institutional investors. This essay not only confirms the previously 
reported important role of investor horizon on influencing firm’s polices, governance and 
strategies, but also provides evidence on how such impact occurred. 
The last essay contains several potential limitations that could provide avenues for 
future research. First, owing to data unavailability, I did not consider the potential effect of the 
sponsor identity on the outcomes of shareholder proposals that are documented within some 
US-based studies. Besides controlling for its potential effect in the outcome models, it would 
be interesting to investigate how the sponsor identity of shareholder proposals would moderate 
the relationship between institutional ownership and market reaction and voting outcome. 
Second, this essay, similar to most prior research investigating public shareholder activism (i.e. 
shareholder proposals and campaigns), considers ‘visible activism’, which implicitly overrides 
the role of private shareholder activism (i.e. behind-the-scenes negotiations) (Goranova et al., 
2017). Third, this research did not study the effect of shareholder proposals on targeted firms’ 
future operating performance and long-term value. Future research cloud explore the effect of 
shareholder proposals on future operating performance and how this relationship might be 
moderated by institutional ownership. Finally, as discussed in the essay that the number and 
the outcomes (i.e. market reaction and voting outcome) of shareholder proposals have been 
evolving over time. Thus, in future research, scholars should seek to explore the role of the 
financial crisis and other corporate scandals in the evolution of shareholder activism. This is 
especially important, since these crises are followed by new/reviewed regulations which tend 
to empower shareholders and encourage more shareholder engagement.  
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Overall, this thesis focuses on the role of institutional investors in corporate finance and 
corporate governance. The findings of this thesis support recent research on the importance of 
considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors when studying their monitoring role and 
their influence on firms’ policies. This thesis focuses on the institutional investors’ investment 
horizon and finds such distinction is an important determinant of the monitoring and engaging 
behaviour of institutional investors. However, while this finding is true and confirms recent 
empirical literature on the role of investment horizon, this thesis also show some evidence that 
even institutional investors with long investment horizon might have different abilities and 
incentives/interests to influence firms’ policies (i.e. indexer vs. non-indexer, pressure-sensitive 
vs. pressure-resistant, and foreign vs. domestic). Future studies that aim to investigate the role 
of institutional ownership must not only critically take into account the heterogeneity of 
institutional investors but should also simultaneously consider the different distinctions that 
theoretically have been argued and empirically have been documented in the literature to affect 
the role of institutional investors. As recent literature on institutional ownership focuses on 
how the monitoring and engagement role of institutional investors mitigates the negative effect 
of agency-principle agency costs on firm’s value, future research should pay also attention to 
effect of the principle-principle agency costs that might arise from the heterogeneous 
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Appendix A 






Cash The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of assets. 
Independent variables 
Long-Term IO  The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors, with investment duration of at least eight quarters (two years). 
Long-Term IO (non-
indexer) 
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who do not invest in the studied firm as such firm being part of 
a particular stock market index.  
Long-Term IO (indexer) The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who invest in the studied firm as such firm being part of a 
particular stock market index.  
Long-Term IO (low 
portfolio turnover) 
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who have a low turnover portfolio.  
Long-Term IO (high 
portfolio turnover) 
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who have a high turnover portfolio. 
Control variables 
Institutional Ownership The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. 
Blockholding (5%) The ratio of total outstanding shares held by large investors (not 
necessarily institutional) with at least 5% shareholding. 
Size The natural log of the book value of total assets.  
Leverage The ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets.  
Market-to-book The ratio of (the book value of assets – the book value of equity + the 
market value of equity) to the book value of assets. 
Cash Flow The ratio of (EBITD – debt interest – taxes –  dividend) to the book value 
of total assets.  
Industry Sigma The average standard deviation of cash flows of all firms in the same 
industry (two-digit SIC) and over the past 10 years. Due to precautionary 
reasons, I expect that firms operating in an industry with high volatile 
cash flow will hold more cash. 
NWC The ratio of (current assets – current liabilities + cash) to the book value 
of assets.  
R&D The ratio of research and development to sales. Due to frequent missing 
data in research and development expenses, I follow most literature and 
substitute the missing data of research and development expenses with 
zero when missing.  
Capital Exp. The ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total assets.  
Acquisition The acquisitions to the book value of total assets.  
Dividend (dummy) A dummy variable equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table A2. Cash holdings and industry competition 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings is moderated by industry competition and severity of agency 
costs. The analysis is performed on the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term 
institutional investors, with investment duration of at least 8 quarters (2 years). Agency cost is defined as high (low) if firm-specific agency cost above (below) median value of the inverse asset 
turnover variable. Industry Competition is defined as the sum of squared market shares of firms in an industry, where firm sales are used to calculate market shares. Detailed definitions of all 
variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-
level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 























  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Long-term IO -0.068** -0.028 -0.098**       
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.045)       
Long-term IO (nonindexer)    -0.049* -0.010 -0.081* 
   
    (0.026) (0.031) (0.049) 
   
Long-term IO (low turnover)       -0.024 0.004 -0.042 
 
      (0.022) (0.025) (0.043) 
Industry Competition -0.001 0.022 -0.003 -0.002 0.014 0.007 -0.002 0.014 0.004 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.042) (0.022) (0.022) (0.042) (0.022) (0.021) (0.042) 
Long-term IO x Industry Competition -0.101*** -0.085* -0.112*       
 (0.039) (0.046) (0.066) 
   
   
Long-term IO (nonindexer) x Industry 
Competition    
-0.101** -0.062 -0.141*    
    (0.043) (0.046) (0.081) 
   
Long-term IO (low) x Industry Competition       -0.125*** -0.081* -0.167** 
 
      (0.042) (0.046) (0.074) 
Institutional Ownership 0.093*** 0.062** 0.115*** 0.056*** 0.030 0.076*** 0.039*** 0.023 0.049** 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.034) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.014) (0.016) (0.024) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.002 -0.016 0.026 0.020 -0.008 0.054* 0.014 -0.009 0.043 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.029) (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016) (0.017) (0.029) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
R2 0.386 0.421 0.413 0.387 0.420 0.415 0.388 0.421 0.415 
N 11239 6708 4421 11202 6692 4403 11121 6654 4362 
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Table A3. Cash holdings and corporate governance 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings is moderated by corporate governance and severity of agency 
costs. The analysis is performed on the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors, with investment duration of at least 8 quarters (2 years). Agency cost is defined as high (low) if firm-specific agency cost above (below) median value of the inverse asset turnover variable. 
Corporate governance is a proxy of the overall quality of firm's corporate governance, and it exactly measures firm’s ‘systems and processes, which ensure that its board members and executives act in 
the best interests of its long term shareholders. It reflects a company's capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of 
incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate long term shareholder value.' Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. *,** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 























  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Long-term IO -0.129** -0.141** -0.078       
 (0.044) (0.057) (0.094)       
Long-term IO (nonindexer)    -0.155*** -0.162** -0.112 
   
    (0.052) (0.056) (0.104) 
   
Long-term IO (low turnover)       -0.171*** -0.162** -0.152 
 
      (0.057) (0.059) (0.123) 
Corporate Governance -0.048 -0.039 -0.057 -0.048 -0.044 -0.043 -0.052* -0.033 -0.078 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.070) (0.033) (0.031) (0.068) (0.027) (0.026) (0.054) 
Long-term IO x Corporate Governance 0.104 0.120* 0.035       
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.126) 
   
   
Long-term IO (nonindexer) x Corporate Governance 
   
0.129 0.159* 0.005    
    (0.076) (0.074) (0.141) 
   
Long-term IO (low) x Corporate Governance       0.178** 0.158** 0.148 
 
      (0.077) (0.070) (0.159) 
Institutional Ownership 0.009 0.036 -0.020 -0.003 0.016 -0.003 -0.021 0.005 -0.046 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.039) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.029 0.027 0.041 0.047* 0.042* 0.064 0.039 0.037 0.051 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.035) (0.024) (0.024) (0.040) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) 
          
R2 0.419 0.513 0.395 0.422 0.515 0.403 0.420 0.514 0.397 
N 2578 1556 1011 2576 1555 1010 2577 1555 1011 
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Table A4. Cash holdings and firm opacity 
The table presents the results of OLS regressions examining how the effect of long-term institutional ownership on firm cash holdings is moderated by firm opacity and severity of agency 
costs. The analysis is performed on the sample of the UK public firms during the period from 2000 to 2016. Long-term IO is defined as a ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term 
institutional investors, with investment duration of at least 8 quarters (2 years). Agency cost is defined as high (low) if firm-specific agency cost above (below) median value of the inverse 
asset turnover variable. Firm opacity is the opacity index developed by Anderson et al. (2009), where this index consists of four proxies for firm-level opacity (the natural logarithm of the 
daily trading volume of firm's stocks,  the daily average of the bid-ask spread which is defined as ask price less bid price divided by the average of the ask and bid prices, the natural logarithm 
of the number of analysts following each frim in a given year, and the square of the difference between analysts' mean forecasts of earning-per-share (EPS) and the actual firm EPS). Detailed 
definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A Table A1. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by 
firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 























  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Long-term IO -0.167*** -0.158*** -0.147**       
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.065)       
Long-term IO (nonindexer)    -0.178*** -0.130** -0.212** 
   
    (0.051) (0.052) (0.080) 
   
Long-term IO (low turnover)       -0.161*** -0.119** -0.173* 
 
      (0.052) (0.055) (0.082) 
Firm Opacity -0.037 -0.082* -0.009 -0.042 -0.069 -0.034 -0.026 -0.056 -0.012 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.057) (0.040) (0.041) (0.058) (0.036) (0.037) (0.051) 
Long-term IO x Firm Opacity 0.164** 0.179** 0.132       
 (0.066) (0.076) (0.118) 
   
   
Long-term IO (nonindexer) x Firm Opacity    0.197** 0.155* 0.230 
   
    (0.081) (0.085) (0.146) 
   
Long-term IO (low) x Firm Opacity       0.197** 0.154* 0.200 
 
      (0.080) (0.083) (0.139) 
Institutional Ownership 0.037 0.032 0.021 0.012 0.007 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.015 
 (0.021) (0.032) (0.033) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.012 0.007 0.029 0.030 0.020 0.049 0.022 0.013 0.041 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.043) (0.023) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022) (0.021) (0.044) 
          
R2 0.441 0.522 0.433 0.442 0.521 0.435 0.440 0.521 0.433 
N 5669 3356 2248 5667 3355 2247 5662 3351 2246 
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Definitions of Variables 
Panel A: Ownership variables 
Long-term IO The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors, with investment duration of at least eight quarters (two years). 
Long-term IO (dummy) A dummy variable equals 1 for firms in the top quartile of long-term 
institutional ownership, and zero for firms in the bottom quartile. 
Long-term IO (non-indexer) The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who do not invest in the studied firm as such firm being part of a 
particular stock market index.  
Long-term IO (indexer) The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who invest in the studied firm as such firm being part of a 
particular stock market index.  
Long-term IO (low portfolio 
turnover) 
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who have a low turnover portfolio.  
Long-term IO (high 
portfolio turnover) 
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who have a high turnover portfolio. 
Institutional Ownership The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. 
Blockholding (5%) The ratio of total outstanding shares held by large investors (not necessarily 
institutional) with at least 5% shareholding. 
Panel B: Cash dependent variables 
Cash The ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of assets. 
Dev 
The difference between the actual cash level the firm holds and the 
predicted optimal cash level. 
|Dev| The absolute value of Dev. 
Excess cash Equals to Dev when Dev > 0, and missing otherwise. 
Cash deficit Equals to Dev when Dev < 0, and missing otherwise. 
Large excess cash Equals to Dev when Dev at top tertile, and missing otherwise. 
Large cash deficit Equals to Dev when Dev at bottom tertile, and missing otherwise. 
Panel C: Firm-level controls 
Size The natural log of the book value of total assets. 
Leverage The ratio of short and long debt to the book value of total assets. 
Market-to-book 
The ratio of (the book value of assets – the book value of equity + the 
market value of equity) to the book value of total assets. 
Cash Flow 
The ratio of (EBITD – debt interest – taxes – dividend) to the book value of 
total assets. 
Industry Sigma 
The average standard deviations of cash flows of all firms in the same 
industry (two-digit SIC) and over the past 10 years. 
NWC 
The ratio of (current assets – current liabilities – cash) to the book value of 
assets. 
R&D The ratio of research and development expenses to sales. 
Capital Expenditure    The ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total assets. 
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Acquisition The acquisitions to the book value of total assets. 
Dividend A dummy variable equals 1 if the firm paid a dividend, and zero otherwise. 
Panel D: Excess return model 
Excess return               The stock return over time t-1 to t minus Fama and French’s (1993) 25-size 
and book-to-market matched portfolio return from time t-1 to t. 
ΔCash/ME                   The ratio of change of cash and cash equivalents from time t-1 to t to the 
market value of equity at time t-1. 
ΔEarnings/ME               The ratio of change of earnings before extraordinary items from time t-1 to 
t to the market value of equity at time t-1. 
ΔNet Assets/ME             The ratio of change of net assets (the book value of assets – cash and cash 
equivalents) from time t-1 to t to the market value of equity at time t-1. 
ΔR&D/ME                    The ratio of change of research and development expenses from time t-1 to 
t to the market value of equity at time t-1. 
ΔInterest/ME               The ratio of change of interest expenses from time t-1 to t to the market 
value of equity at time t-1. 
ΔDividends/ME              The ratio of change of common dividends from time t-1 to t to the market 
value of equity at time t-1. 
Cash/ME                     The ratio of cash and cash equivalents at time t to the market value of 
equity at time t-1. 
Debt/MV                     The ratio of short and long debt at time t to the market value of equity plus 
short and long debt at time t. 
New Finance/ME              The ratio of new finance (net new equity issues + net new debt issues) at 
time t to the market value of equity at time t-1. 
Panel E: Operating performance analysis 
RONA                        The ratio of operating income at time t over the net assets at time t. 
RONA (Industry adjusted)           The ratio of operating income at time t over the net assets at time t minus 
the industry-year median ratio of operating income over the net assets. 
Net Assets                  The natural log of the net assets at time t. 
PP&E                        
The ratio of property, plant and equipment book value at time t to the net 
assets at time t. 
Panel F: Market-to-book model 
Market Value/NA             The ratio of market value of equity plus total liabilities at time t to the net 
assets (the book value of assets – cash and cash equivalents) at time t. 
ΔCash/NA                 The ratio of change of cash and cash equivalents from time t-1 to t to the 
net assets at time t. 
XCash/NA                 The ratio of difference between cash and cash equivalents at time t and the 
predicated optimal level to the net assets at time t-1. 
ΔF2 Market Value/NA         The ratio of change of market value of equity plus total liabilities over at 
time t to t+2 to the net assets at time t. 
ΔL2 Net Assets/NA           The ratio of change of net assets over at time t-2 to t to the net assets at time 
t. 
ΔF2 Net Assets/NA           The ratio of change of net assets over at time t to t+2 to the net assets at 
time t. 
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Earnings/NA                 The ratio of earnings before extraordinary items at time t to the net assets at 
time t. 
ΔL2 Earnings/NA             The ratio of change of earnings before extraordinary items over at time t-2 
to t to the net assets at time t. 
ΔF2 Earnings/NA             The ratio of change of earnings before extraordinary items over at time t to 
t+2 to the net assets at time t. 
R&D/NA                      The ratio of research and development expenses at time t to the net assets at 
time t. 
ΔL2 R&D/NA                  The ratio of change of research and development expenses over at time t-2 
to t to the net assets at time t. 
ΔF2 R&D/NA                  The ratio of change of research and development expenses over at time t to 
t+2 to the net assets at time t. 
Dividends/NA                The ratio of common dividends at time t to the net assets at time t. 
ΔL2 Dividends/NA            The ratio of change of common dividends over at time t-2 to t to the net 
assets at time t. 
ΔF2 Dividends/NA            The ratio of change of common dividends over at time t to t+2 to the net 
assets at time t. 
Interest/NA                 The ratio of interest expenses at time t to the net assets at time t. 
ΔL2 Interest/NA             The ratio of change of interest expenses over at time t-2 to t to the net assets 
at time t. 
ΔF2 Interest/NA             The ratio of change of interest expenses over at time t to t+2 to the net 
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Table 8. The heterogeneous effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings 
(robustness) 
Table 8 reports the results of the heterogeneous effects of long-term institutional investors on cash holdings. Panel A shows the 
results of indexer and non-indexer long-term institutional investors, and Panel B shows the results of long-term institutional investors 
with low and high portfolio turnover. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial 
correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
Dependent variable = Cash Cash Cash |Dev| |Dev| |Dev| 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Long-term IO (indexer) 0.075 
 0.109 0.036  0.051 
 (0.069) 
 (0.067) (0.044)  (0.042) 
Long-term IO (non-indexer) 
 -0.098*** -0.075***  -0.041*** -0.034*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.015)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Institutional Ownership -0.020 0.053*** 0.023 -0.013* 0.018* 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.009 0.030* 0.023 -0.008 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.24 0.25 
N 7430 11218 7424 7430 11218 7424 
Panel B 
Dependent variable = Cash Cash Cash |Dev| |Dev| |Dev| 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Long-term IO (high portfolio 
turnover) 
0.076  0.047 0.067*  0.058 
 (0.068) 
 (0.069) (0.037)  (0.038) 
Long-term IO (low portfolio 
turnover) 
 -0.079*** -0.065***  -0.029*** -0.019* 
 
 (0.013) (0.017)  (0.009) (0.010) 
Institutional Ownership -0.011 0.031** 0.018 -0.012* 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.028 0.024 0.033 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.24 
N 8850 11137 8792 8850 11137 8792 
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Table 9a. Long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings with firm fixed effect 
(robustness) 
Table 9a reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings and cash deviations using firm 
fixed effect. Panel A replicates the models in Table 3 but using firm fixed effect instead of industry fixed effect. Panel B 
replicates the models in Table 4 but using firm fixed effect instead of industry fixed effect. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls 
and firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed 
definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A 
  Dependent Variable = Cash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    





Long-term IO -0.099*** -0.093*** -0.017 -0.093*** -0.016* 
                          (0.018) (0.027) (0.010) (0.030) (0.008) 
Institutional Ownership   0.092*** 0.112*** 0.022** 0.114*** 0.014 
                          (0.015) (0.024) (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) 
Blockholding (5%)       0.003 -0.016 -0.007 -0.015 -0.005 
                          (0.016) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.65 0.83 0.65 0.84 0.71 
N 11135 4430 6409 3530 3419 
Panel B 
Dependent Variable =          Dev           |Dev|           ΔCash           ΔCash           ΔCash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
  
All firms All firms All Firms Excess cash Cash deficit 
Long-term IO -0.099*** -0.033** 0.007 -0.021 0.054*** 
                          (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.034) (0.016) 
Institutional Ownership   0.092*** 0.034*** -0.020 0.005 -0.062*** 
                          (0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.036) (0.020) 
Blockholding (5%)       0.003 0.001 -0.031*** -0.054** 0.001 
                          (0.016) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.011) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.50 0.50 0.16 0.28 0.31 
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Table 9b. Long-term institutional ownership and the value of cash holdings with firm fixed 
effect (robustness) 
Table 9b reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the value of cash holdings using firm fixed effect. 
Table 9b replicates the first and last two columns of Table 5. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and firm and year fixed effects are included 
in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table 
B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Dependent Variable = Excess Return   
           (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                          
All firms All firms 
High long-term 
IO 
Low long-term    
IO 
Long-term IO -0.073       
                          (0.059)       
Long-term IO X ΔCash/ME 1.049**       
                          (0.451)       
Long-term IO (dummy)   -0.131     
                            (0.099)     
Long-term IO (dummy) X 
ΔCash/ME 
  0.523**     
                            (0.206)     
ΔCash/ME  0.592** 1.000*** 1.597*** 0.757* 
                          (0.212) (0.258) (0.307) (0.371) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.23 0.33 0.36 0.35 
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Table 10. IV estimation of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings 
(robustness) 
Table 10 reports the results of 2SLS regressions of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings. Column (1) shows the 
results of the first stage regression where the industry median of long-term institutional ownership and lagged long-term institutional 
ownership are used as instruments for long-term institutional ownership. Columns (2) – (6) show the results of the second stage regression. 
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. 
Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables 
are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable = 
Long-term    
IO    
        Cash            Cash            Cash             Dev           |Dev|    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)    
                          All firms All firms Cash deficit Excess cash All firms All firms 
  (First-stage) (Second-stage) 
Industry Median of Long-term IO        0.042***                                                                                 
     (0.006)                                                                                 
Lagged Long-term IO  0.442***                                                                                 
                          (0.023)                                                                                 
Long-term IO   -0.132*** -0.094** 0.000 -0.122*** -0.067*** 
                            (0.032) (0.040) (0.012) (0.031) (0.017) 
Institutional Ownership   0.494*** 0.107*** 0.066* 0.013 0.099*** 0.045** 
                          (0.020) (0.028) (0.035) (0.008) (0.028) (0.015) 
Blockholding (5%)       -0.023*** 0.009 -0.005 0.012* 0.009 -0.010 
                          (0.005) (0.017) (0.019) (0.006) (0.016) (0.009) 
Size                      0.002** -0.009*** -0.020*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.007*** 
                          (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Leverage                  -0.001 -0.255*** -0.348*** -0.160*** 0.017 -0.082*** 
                          (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.017) (0.010) 
Market-to-Book            -0.001 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.014*** -0.001 0.008*** 
                          (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash Flow                 -0.000 -0.018 -0.050** 0.012** -0.008 -0.033*** 
                          (0.004) (0.015) (0.019) (0.005) (0.015) (0.009) 
Industry Sigma            0.005*** -0.000 0.013* 0.001 -0.005 0.005 
                          (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
NWC                       -0.003 -0.124*** -0.207*** -0.067*** -0.006 -0.054*** 
                          (0.002) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) 
R&D                       0.013** 0.173*** 0.234*** 0.115*** -0.016 0.071*** 
                          (0.005) (0.040) (0.033) (0.015) (0.040) (0.016) 
Capital Expenditure             -0.038*** -0.185*** -0.309*** -0.073*** -0.039 -0.092*** 
                          (0.010) (0.037) (0.044) (0.019) (0.036) (0.021) 
Acquisition               -0.050*** -0.214*** -0.356*** -0.051*** -0.022 -0.145*** 
                          (0.014) (0.026) (0.024) (0.014) (0.025) (0.014) 
Dividend         0.010*** -0.017*** -0.044*** -0.010*** 0.007 -0.016*** 
                          (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Year Fixed Effects                Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald        197.86 147.69 174.18 197.86 197.86 
Hansen j statistic                   0.96 3.61 2.63 0.25 4.40 
Hansen j (p-value)        0.33 0.06 0.10 0.62 0.04 
R2 0.92 0.28 0.64 0.39 0.00 0.21 
N 10461 10457 4263 6194 10457 10457 
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Table 11a. Long-term institutional ownership and the value of cash holdings using the market-to-book model (robustness) 
Table 11 reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the value of cash holdings using the market-to-book model of Fama and French (1998). Columns (1) and (2) show the 
results of the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the results of a subsample of firms with excess cash. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of a subsample of firms with cash deficits. Two measures 
are used for long-term institutional ownership: Long-term IO is defined as the ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional investors and Long-term IO (dummy) is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 for firms in the top quartile of long-term institutional ownership, and zero for firms in the bottom quartile. In Columns (1) – (6), the variables of interest are the interactions between 
long-term IO and XCash/NA which indicate to the moderating role of long-term institutional ownership on the effect of excess cash on market-to-book value. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of the 
baseline specification of the market-to-book model on subsamples of firms in the top quartile of long-term institutional ownership and firms in the bottom quartile, respectively. Standard errors (in 
brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables 
are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
                          Dependent Variable = Market value/Net Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                          
All firms All firms Excess cash Excess cash Cash deficit Cash deficit 
High long-term 
IO 
Low long-term    
IO 
Long-term IO       -0.102                          -0.550*                          0.250                                                    
                               [0.159]                         [0.318]                         [0.210]                                                    
Long-term IO X XCash/NA         2.412***                        2.425**                         3.758                                                    
                               [0.799]                         [1.067]                         [2.305]                                                    
Long-term IO (dummy)                        -0.015                          -0.358                           0.409**                                  
                                               [0.140]                         [0.229]                         [0.206]                                    
Long-term IO (dummy) X XCash/NA                        1.890***                        2.147***                        5.498***                                 
                                               [0.306]                         [0.388]                         [1.923]                                    
XCash/NA             0.147           0.175           0.191          -0.220           1.586**         0.047           2.108***       -0.132    
                               [0.262]         [0.274]         [0.371]         [0.395]         [0.698]         [0.955]         [0.286]         [0.404]    
ΔF2 Market Value/NA        -0.254***       -0.197***       -0.274***       -0.238***       -0.246***       -0.132*         -0.210***       -0.047    
                               [0.027]         [0.042]         [0.033]         [0.036]         [0.050]         [0.071]         [0.040]         [0.113]    
ΔL2 Net Assets/NA        0.043           0.075           0.108           0.068          -0.154          -0.139          -0.037           0.129    
                               [0.068]         [0.074]         [0.121]         [0.102]         [0.094]         [0.090]         [0.105]         [0.154]    
ΔF2 Net Assets/NA         0.746***        0.605***        0.839***        0.761***        0.543***        0.407***        0.365***        0.417*** 
                               [0.097]         [0.105]         [0.153]         [0.144]         [0.088]         [0.135]         [0.117]         [0.124]    
Interest/NA                     -0.092           0.352          -0.203           0.635           0.363           0.175           1.862***       -0.268    
                               [0.261]         [0.314]         [0.366]         [0.415]         [0.324]         [0.393]         [0.465]         [0.600]    
ΔL2 Earnings/NA        0.288***        0.412**         0.128           0.345           0.153           0.089           0.008           0.740*** 
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                               [0.105]         [0.166]         [0.148]         [0.272]         [0.095]         [0.257]         [0.178]         [0.151]    
ΔF2 Earnings/NA        0.100           0.354          -0.175           0.145           0.443**         0.726***        1.370***        0.016    
                               [0.227]         [0.238]         [0.344]         [0.584]         [0.209]         [0.228]         [0.340]         [0.356]    
Dividends/NA                     7.007***        6.700***        6.468**         6.416**         8.333***       11.071***        5.784***       19.308*** 
                               [1.887]         [1.846]         [2.902]         [2.568]         [1.789]         [2.928]         [1.748]         [6.189]    
ΔL2 Dividends/NA        1.616           0.922           3.357          -1.118           1.286          -0.406           1.354          -2.451    
                               [1.217]         [1.115]         [2.379]         [1.609]         [1.045]         [1.790]         [1.167]         [3.354]    
ΔF2 Dividends/NA        6.325***        3.412***        6.966***        2.708*          5.741***        5.355***        3.249***        4.764    
                               [1.547]         [1.055]         [2.129]         [1.635]         [1.051]         [1.532]         [1.026]         [3.020]    
Interest/NA                     -2.314           7.465*          2.514           3.806          -4.747          -0.194           2.759          10.147    
                               [3.667]         [4.282]         [5.427]         [8.137]         [3.744]         [5.283]         [4.865]         [7.574]    
ΔL2 Interest/NA       -4.094*         -4.870***       -4.617          -3.596          -1.012          -4.140*         -3.446*         -4.717    
                               [2.209]         [1.865]         [3.247]         [2.938]         [2.523]         [2.439]         [2.001]         [4.325]    
ΔF2 Interest/NA        -5.725**        -0.110          -4.755          -0.093          -2.330           0.812           4.076          -2.722    
                               [2.564]         [3.131]         [3.821]         [5.159]         [3.400]         [2.527]         [4.373]         [2.549]    
R&D/NA                           7.363***        7.843***        4.841*          8.599***       11.967***        1.056           6.656***        8.255*** 
                               [1.914]         [1.747]         [2.658]         [2.402]         [3.173]         [4.555]         [2.406]         [2.323]    
ΔL2 R&D/NA         0.881          -3.960**         1.430          -4.514          -0.506          -1.548          -4.228          -1.852    
                               [1.465]         [1.921]         [2.299]         [3.380]         [1.323]         [2.384]         [3.135]         [2.489]    
ΔF2 R&D/NA        2.573**         2.719           1.406           0.467           1.771           8.038*          4.751**        -1.693    
                               [1.071]         [2.028]         [1.379]         [1.462]         [2.230]         [4.435]         [2.351]         [2.107]    
Firm Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2         0.81            0.85            0.83            0.86            0.77            0.87      0.88      0.77    
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Table 11b. Long-term institutional ownership and the value of cash holdings using the market-to-book model (robustness) 
Table 11b reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the value of cash holdings using the market-to-book model of Fama and French (1998). Columns (1) and (2) show the 
results of the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) show the results of a subsample of firms with excess cash. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of a subsample of firms with cash deficits. Two measures 
are used for long-term institutional ownership: Long-term IO is defined as the ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional investors and Long-term IO (dummy) is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 for firms in the top quartile of long-term institutional ownership, and zero for firms in the bottom quartile. In Columns (1) – (6), the variables of interest are the interactions between 
long-term IO and ΔL1 Cash which indicate to the moderating role of long-term institutional ownership on the effect of the change in cash holdings on market-to-book value. Columns (7) and (8) show the 
results of the baseline specification of the market-to-book model on subsamples of firms in the top quartile of long-term institutional ownership and firms in the bottom quartile, respectively. The standard 
errors reported in brackets are robust to Huber-White sandwich estimators. Firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed 
definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
                          Dependent Variable = Market value/Net Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                          
All firms All firms Excess cash Excess cash Cash deficit Cash deficit 
High long-term 
IO 
Low long-term    
IO 
Long-term IO       -0.125                          -0.175                          -0.169                                                    
                               [0.202]                         [0.377]                         [0.171]                                                    
Long-term IO X ΔL1 Cash         1.451                           0.997                           0.918                                                    
                               [1.155]                         [1.332]                         [1.893]                                                    
Long-term IO (dummy)                        -0.156                          -0.854***                       -0.322*                                   
                                               [0.212]                         [0.279]                         [0.190]                                    
Long-term IO (dummy) X ΔL1 Cash                        1.046**                         1.069**                         2.058*                                   
                                               [0.417]                         [0.470]                         [1.231]                                    
ΔCash/NA             0.263           0.840***        0.329           0.462**         0.174           0.277           1.150***        0.838*** 
                               [0.308]         [0.219]         [0.332]         [0.233]         [0.421]         [0.528]         [0.309]         [0.260]    
ΔF2 Market Value/NA        -0.247***       -0.235***       -0.228***       -0.240***       -0.366***       -0.304***       -0.286***       -0.192*** 
                               [0.039]         [0.040]         [0.045]         [0.033]         [0.054]         [0.087]         [0.049]         [0.050]    
ΔL2 Net Assets/NA        0.283***       -0.003           0.370**        -0.128           0.023           0.066          -0.078          -0.148    
                               [0.108]         [0.080]         [0.159]         [0.111]         [0.073]         [0.103]         [0.103]         [0.121]    
ΔF2 Net Assets/NA         0.951***        0.807***        0.901***        0.775***        0.819***        0.663***        0.760***        0.613*** 
                               [0.093]         [0.098]         [0.128]         [0.113]         [0.106]         [0.128]         [0.199]         [0.111]    
Interest/NA                     -2.491***       -0.960**        -3.564***       -0.812          -0.666          -0.918*          1.177          -1.691*** 
                               [0.771]         [0.390]         [1.100]         [0.508]         [0.467]         [0.516]         [1.031]         [0.586]    
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ΔL2 Earnings/NA        0.503**         0.277           0.325          -0.019           0.393***        0.487**        -0.029           0.347    
                               [0.212]         [0.178]         [0.288]         [0.310]         [0.114]         [0.222]         [0.203]         [0.286]    
ΔF2 Earnings/NA       -1.229***       -0.593**        -1.814***       -1.115***       -0.208          -0.112           0.231          -0.553*   
                               [0.409]         [0.285]         [0.548]         [0.301]         [0.327]         [0.505]         [1.026]         [0.320]    
Dividends/NA                    14.714***       10.915***       16.464***       12.047***       11.447***       11.499***       10.792***       -1.374    
                               [2.149]         [2.300]         [3.234]         [3.535]         [2.097]         [2.964]         [2.092]         [8.556]    
ΔL2 Dividends/NA        0.247          -0.253           1.369          -3.099           0.713           0.616           0.658           1.734    
                               [1.199]         [1.240]         [2.262]         [1.938]         [1.073]         [1.772]         [1.236]         [3.643]    
ΔF2 Dividends/NA        9.702***        4.734***       11.657***        4.971***        7.654***        6.581***        4.621***        1.404    
                               [1.522]         [1.228]         [2.198]         [1.782]         [1.271]         [1.643]         [1.157]         [3.196]    
Interest/NA                      0.830           7.540           7.542           1.794          -3.865           8.249           3.860          12.410    
                               [4.143]         [5.201]         [6.514]         [7.660]         [3.911]         [5.647]         [5.287]         [9.702]    
ΔL2 Interest/NA       -8.496***       -7.581**       -13.958***       -7.878*         -0.877          -1.048          -3.819*        -16.048**  
                               [2.565]         [3.495]         [4.114]         [4.191]         [2.176]         [3.035]         [2.027]         [7.832]    
ΔF2 Interest/NA       -10.196***       -6.625**        -8.022**        -4.966          -6.205*         -2.309          -0.614          -9.434**  
                               [2.601]         [3.250]         [3.874]         [5.030]         [3.296]         [3.080]         [5.351]         [3.704]    
R&D/NA                           4.289**         6.420***        2.924          10.169***        7.202***        2.214           8.356***       10.256*** 
                               [1.664]         [1.885]         [2.537]         [1.778]         [2.474]         [4.259]         [2.197]         [2.509]    
ΔL2 R&D/NA         2.668*          0.171           2.312          -2.498           0.768          -1.706          -0.234          -1.734    
                               [1.403]         [1.973]         [2.207]         [2.296]         [1.510]         [2.527]         [2.356]         [2.739]    
ΔF2 R&D/NA        3.316***        7.025***        4.152**         9.226***        2.195           9.216**         3.699**        10.722**  
                               [1.220]         [2.114]         [1.695]         [3.005]         [2.114]         [4.386]         [1.878]         [5.245]    
Firm Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2         0.76            0.82            0.76            0.87            0.76            0.81     0.84     0.81    
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Table 12. The use of excess cash and operating performance (robustness) 
Table 12 reports the results of the moderating role of long-term institutional ownership on the effect of excess cash on corporate operating performance. The sample in this table includes only 
firms with excess cash. In Columns (1) – (4), the dependent variable is RONA which is defined as the ratio of operating income to the book value of net assets. In Columns (5) – (8), the 
dependent variable is RONA (Industry adjusted) which is defined as RONA minus the industry-year median RONA. Columns (1) and (5) (Columns (2) and (6)) show the results of a subsample 
of firms with excess cash and in the top (bottom) quartile of long-term institutional ownership. Columns (3) and (7) (Columns (4) and (8)) show the results of a subsample of firms with excess 
cash, in the top (bottom) quartile of long-term institutional ownership and with capital expenditure above industry median. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
Industry and year fixed effects are included in Columns (1) – (4), and firm and year fixed effects are included in Columns (5) –(8). All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. 
Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable = RONA RONA (Industry adjusted) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                          
Excess cash & 
high long-term 
IO 
Excess cash & 
low long-term 
IO 










Excess cash & 
high long-term 
IO 
Excess cash & 
low long-term 
IO 











L.Dev        0.038          -0.104***       -0.015          -0.067*         -0.059**        -0.071***        0.020          -0.095*   
                               [0.030]         [0.023]         [0.019]    [0.036]      [0.028]         [0.024]         [0.020]         [0.049]    
L.RONA                           0.817***        0.473***        0.747*** 0.492***                                                                 
                               [0.095]         [0.071]         [0.081]    [0.107]                                                                 
L.RONA (Industry 
adjusted)                                                                        
       0.782***        0.233***        0.449***        0.369    
                                                                                               [0.133]         [0.072]         [0.074]         [0.249]    
Net Assets                       0.013**         0.125***        0.000           0.104***       -0.026***        0.501***       -0.022*          0.218*   
                               [0.006]         [0.021]         [0.004]         [0.025]         [0.009]         [0.127]         [0.013]         [0.119]    
PP&E                            -0.040          -0.297**        -0.002          -0.316*         -0.153          -0.934*          0.030          -1.006**  
                               [0.045]         [0.142]         [0.018]         [0.167]         [0.095]         [0.480]         [0.049]         [0.433]    
Firm Fixed Effects           No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.75 0.56 0.69 0.56 0.73 0.75 0.78 0.79 
N 1282 876 784 462 1194 590 723 260 
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Table 13a. Long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings with corporate governance 
controls (robustness) 
Table 13a reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings and cash deviations with controlling 
for main corporate governance characteristics. Panel A replicates the models in Table 3. Panel B replicates the models in Table 4. 
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and 
years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and 
the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
                          Dependent Variable = Cash    
                                   (1)    (2)          (3)             (4)             (5)    
                          





Long-term IO -0.111*** -0.078*** 0.000 -0.061** -0.003 
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.011) (0.024) (0.008) 
CEO Duality -0.013* -0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
CEO Tenure -0.001* -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Independent NED in Board 
(%) 
0.026 0.031* 0.002 0.036* 0.005 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.006) (0.020) (0.006) 
Board Size 0.004 -0.014** 0.006** -0.016* 0.008** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) 
Board Size2 -0.000 0.001** -0.000** 0.001** -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Ownership 0.090*** 0.069** 0.008 0.052* 0.002 
  (0.020) (0.027) (0.010) (0.027) (0.010) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.012 -0.011 0.007 -0.005 0.008 
  (0.017) (0.020) (0.006) (0.022) (0.007) 
Firm-level controls                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.34 0.70 0.48 0.70 0.56 























Dependent Variable =           Dev           |Dev|           ΔCash           ΔCash           ΔCash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)    (4)          (5)    
                          All firms All firms All firms Excess cash Cash deficit 
Long-term IO -0.111*** -0.045*** 0.006 0.013 0.053*** 
  (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) (0.025) (0.012) 
CEO Duality -0.013* -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
CEO Tenure -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* 0.001*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Independent NED in Board 
(%) 
0.026 0.014 -0.004 -0.007 -0.014* 
  (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007) 
Board Size 0.004 -0.009** -0.004*** -0.009** -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Board Size2 -0.000 0.001** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Ownership 0.090*** 0.034** -0.004 0.005 -0.045*** 
  (0.020) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.015) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.012 -0.004 -0.015 -0.056** 0.012 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.009) (0.024) (0.010) 
Firm-level controls                       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.13 
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Table 13b. Long-term institutional ownership and the value of cash holdings with 
corporate governance controls (robustness) 
Table 13b reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the value of cash holdings with controlling 
for main corporate governance characteristics. Panel A replicates the first and last columns of Table 6. Panel B replicates 
Columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) in Table 7, respectively. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity 
and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are 
in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
  Dependent Variable = Excess Return   
           (1)             (2)    (3) (4) 
                          
All firms All firms 
High long-term 
IO 
Low long-term    
IO 
Long-term IO 0.185*   
   
                          (0.100)   
   
Long-term IO X ΔCash/ME 0.979***   
   
                          (0.328)   
   
Long-term IO (dummy)   -0.026 
   
                            (0.057) 
   
Long-term IO (dummy) X ΔCash/ME   0.328 
   
                            (0.221) 
   
ΔCash/ME  0.513* 1.004*** 1.675*** 0.793 
                          (0.241) (0.324) (0.368) (0.452) 
Institutional Ownership -0.273** -0.014 0.199** -0.503** 
  (0.098) (0.105) (0.090) (0.214) 
Blockholding (5%) 0.101 -0.018 -0.105 0.377 
  (0.103) (0.164) (0.061) (0.302) 
CEO Duality 0.008 0.051 0.014 0.084 
  (0.028) (0.052) (0.028) (0.101) 
CEO Tenure 0.002* 0.005* 0.003 0.003 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
Independent NED in Board (%) 0.084 0.256 0.001 0.628** 
  (0.077) (0.150) (0.091) (0.279) 
Board Size -0.010 -0.055* -0.021 -0.172 
  (0.016) (0.030) (0.029) (0.173) 
Board Size2 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.012 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) 
Firm-level controls                       Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                0.10 0.12 0.24 0.13 
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Panel B 
Dependent Variable =  RONA RONA (Industry adjusted) 
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)    (4) 
                          
Excess cash & high capital expenditure 
L.Long-term IO                 -0.082   -0.084*   
                          (0.049)   (0.047)   
L.Long-term IO X L.Dev 
0.473**   0.445**   
(0.177)   (0.177)   
L.Long-term IO (dummy)    -0.028   -0.032 
                            (0.032)   (0.034) 
L.Long-term IO (dummy) X L.Dev   0.169***   0.161*** 
  (0.046)   (0.047) 
L.Institutional Ownership 0.021 0.035 0.028 0.036 
  (0.054) (0.072) (0.054) (0.071) 
L.Blockholding (5%) 0.007 0.051 0.014 0.062 
  (0.070) (0.082) (0.070) (0.088) 
L.CEO Duality 0.052 0.018 0.045 0.009 
  (0.031) (0.047) (0.031) (0.046) 
L.CEO Tenure 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
L.Independent NED in Board (%) -0.011 -0.034 -0.019 -0.015 
  (0.075) (0.072) (0.077) (0.077) 
L.Board Size -0.045 -0.053 -0.037 -0.052 
  (0.040) (0.087) (0.040) (0.089) 
L.Board Size2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Firm-level controls                       Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                0.83 0.87 0.83 0.86 
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Table 14a. Long-term institutional ownership and cash holdings considering the possible effect of 
the 2007-2010 financial crisis (robustness) 
Table 14a reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings considering the possible effect of the 2007-
2010 financial crisis. Panel A replicates the models in Table 3 but with using a subsample that excludes years from 2007 to 2010. Panel B 
replicates the models in Table 3 but with using a subsample that only includes years from 2007 to 2010. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry 
and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of 
variables are in Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A (subsample excluding years from 2007 to 2010) 
  Dependent Variable = Cash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    





Long-term IO -0.117*** -0.086*** -0.003 -0.074** -0.009 
                          (0.020) (0.025) (0.010) (0.025) (0.009) 
Institutional 
Ownership   
0.088*** 0.059** 0.009 0.042 
0.008 
                          (0.018) (0.025) (0.009) (0.028) (0.008) 
Blockholding (5%)          0.005 -0.017 0.010 -0.017 0.007 
                          (0.017) (0.020) (0.006) (0.022) (0.007) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.320 0.682 0.459 0.679 0.519 
N 8107 3327 4779 2684 2624 
Panel B (subsample only years from 2007 to 2010) 
  Dependent Variable = Cash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    





Long-term IO -0.117** -0.061 -0.016 -0.040 -0.016 
                          (0.026) (0.033) (0.013) (0.052) (0.015) 
Institutional 
Ownership   
0.089* 0.066 0.028 0.069 
0.021 
                          (0.029) (0.042) (0.016) (0.053) (0.025) 
Blockholding (5%)          0.026 0.001 0.013 0.005 0.013 
                          (0.030) (0.036) (0.008) (0.033) (0.010) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.298 0.687 0.381 0.696 0.485 
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Table 14b. Long-term institutional ownership and cash deviations considering the possible effect of 
2007-2010 financial crisis (robustness) 
Table 14b reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on cash holdings considering the possible effect of the 2007-
2010 financial crisis. Panel A replicates the models in Table 4 but with using a subsample that excludes years from 2007 to 2010. Panel B 
replicates the models in Table 4 but with using a subsample that only includes years from 2007 to 2010. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust 
to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms and years. Firm-level controls and industry and year 
fixed effects are included in all regressions. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed definitions of variables are in 
Appendix B Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A (subsample excluding years from 2007 to 2010) 
Dependent Variable =          Dev           |Dev|           ΔCash           ΔCash           ΔCash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
  
All firms All firms All firms Excess cash Cash deficit 
Long-term IO -0.117*** -0.050*** -0.013 -0.028 0.041** 
                          (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.020) (0.015) 
Institutional 
Ownership   
0.088*** 0.032** 0.008 0.020 -0.032* 
                          (0.018) (0.012) (0.009) (0.022) (0.017) 
Blockholding (5%)          0.005 -0.011 -0.026** -0.075*** 0.006 
                          (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.010) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.014 0.245 0.057 0.103 0.123 
N 8107 8107 7544 3070 4473 
Panel B (subsample only years from 2007 to 2010) 
Dependent Variable =          Dev           |Dev|           ΔCash           ΔCash           ΔCash    
                                   (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
  
All firms All firms All firms Excess cash Cash deficit 
Long-term IO -0.117** -0.035 0.016 0.005 0.079** 
                          (0.026) (0.019) (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) 
Institutional 
Ownership   
0.089* 0.023 0.002 0.042 -0.061* 
                          (0.029) (0.018) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) 
Blockholding (5%)          0.026 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
                          (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.013) 
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects           Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.033 0.259 0.085 0.139 0.144 
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Table 14c. Long-term institutional ownership and the value of cash holdings considering the 
possible effect of 2007-2010 financial crisis (robustness) 
Table 14c reports the results of the effect of long-term institutional ownership on the value of cash holdings considering the possible effect of 
the 2007-2010 financial crisis. Panel A replicates first and last two models in Table 5 but with using a subsample that excludes years from 
2007 to 2010. Panel B replicates first and last two models in Table 5 but with using a subsample that only includes years from 2007 to 2010. 
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity. All variables are truncated at the 1% and the 99% levels. Detailed 
definitions of variables are in Appendix Table B1. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A (subsample excluding years from 2007 to 2010) 
  Dependent Variable = Excess Return   
           (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                          
All firms All firms 
High long-term 
IO 
Low long-term    
IO 
Long-term IO 0.055*       
                          (0.029)       
Long-term IO X ΔCash/ME 0.580**       
                          (0.280)       
Long-term IO (dummy)   0.082***     
                            (0.027)     
Long-term IO (dummy) X 
ΔCash/ME 
  0.536***     
                            (0.176)     
ΔCash/ME  0.645*** 0.498** 1.493*** 0.598* 
                          (0.161) (0.200) (0.413) (0.276) 
R2 0.079 0.085 0.379 0.427 
N 4500 2144 1302 500 
Panel B (subsample only years from 2007 to 2010) 
  Dependent Variable = Excess Return   
           (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                          
All firms All firms 
High long-term 
IO 
Low long-term    
IO 
Long-term IO -0.180***       
                          (0.054)       
Long-term IO X ΔCash/ME 1.745**       
                          (0.757)       
Long-term IO (dummy)   -0.109***     
                            (0.039)     
Long-term IO (dummy) X 
ΔCash/ME 
  0.669*     
                            (0.370)     
ΔCash/ME  0.057 0.642* 1.984** 0.122 
                          (0.381) (0.347) (0.471) (0.710) 
R2 0.075 0.079 0.530 0.486 
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Definitions of variables 
Dependent Variables 
Target Firm 
A dummy variable equals 1 if firms are being targeted by at least one 
shareholder proposal at a given year, 0 for matched (non-target) firms.  
CAR 
The cumulative abnormal return around meeting date using the 
market model based on a 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the 
meeting date and benchmarking to the FTSE All Share index.  
Defeated 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a shareholder proposal has been put on 
vote but does not exceed the majority voting requirement, and zero 
otherwise. 
Passed 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a shareholder proposal has been put on 
vote and exceeds the majority voting requirement, and zero otherwise. 
Dissent  
A logistic transformation of dissent voting which is defined as the 
ratio of against and abstain votes to the total votes cast. In particular, 
Dissent is defined as the natural log of the dissent voting to one minus 
the dissent voting. 
Against 
A logistic transformation of against voting which is defined as the 
ratio of against votes to the total votes cast. In particular, Against is 
defined as the natural log of the against voting to one minus the 
against voting. 
For The ration of for (in favour) votes to the total votes cast. 
Dissent (high) 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a shareholder proposal has been put on 
vote and received dissent voting above the median of dissent voting of 
the sample, and zero otherwise. 
For (high) 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a shareholder proposal has been put on 
vote and received for voting above the median of for voting of the 
sample, and zero otherwise. 
Passed & Withdrawn 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a shareholder proposal has been put on 
vote and exceeds the majority voting requirement or if a shareholder 
proposal has been withdrawn before the general meeting date, and 
zero otherwise. 
Independent Variables 
Long-term IO                
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors, with investment duration of at least eight quarters (two 
years). 
Long-term IO (non-index)    
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who do not invest in the studied firm as such firm being part 
of a particular stock market index.  
Long-term IO (index)  
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who invest in the studied firm as such firm being part of a 
particular stock market index.  
Long-term IO (low turnover)    
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who have a low turnover portfolio.  
Long-term IO (high turnover)   
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all long-term institutional 
investors who have a high turnover portfolio. 
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Control Variables 
Institutional Ownership             The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. 
Medium-term IO              
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all medium-term 
institutional investors, with investment duration of between four 
quarters and eight quarters. 
Short-term IO               
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by all short-term 
institutional investors, with investment duration of at most 4 quarters 
(1 year). 
Blockholding (5%)         
The ratio of total outstanding shares held by large investors (not 
necessarily institutional) with at least 5% shareholding. 
Board Size                  The total number of directors on the board. 
Board Size (squared)      The square of the total number of directors on the board. 
Non-executive Ratio         
The ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of directors 
on the board. 
Average Age Non-executive   The average age of non-executive directors on the board. 
Board Female Ratio          
The ratio of female directors to the total number of directors on the 
board. 
CEO Duality                 A dummy variable if the CEO is also the chairman of the board. 
CEO Tenure                  The number of years of the CEO in the position. 
CEO Ownership               The ratio of total outstanding shares held by CEO. 
CEO Ownership (squared)   The square of the ratio of total outstanding shares held by CEO. 
Share Return                
The stock price return adjusted to dividends in the year prior to the 
general meeting date. 
Share Turnover              
The ratio of total shares sold during the year prior to the general 
meeting date to the total number of outstanding shares. 
Total Assets                The natural log of the book value of total assets. 
Leverage                    The ratio of short and long debt to the book value of total assets. 
ROA                         The ratio of net income to the book value of total assets. 
Capital Expenditure         The ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total assets. 
R&D                       
The ratio of research and development to the book value of total 
assets. 
EGM 
A dummy variable equals 1 if a shareholder proposal has been 
submitted to an emergency general meeting. 
GG proposal 
A dummy variable equals 1 if the issue of the shareholder proposal is 
related to the board (election, removal, other) or shareholder rights. 
CSR proposal 
A dummy variable equals 1 if the issue of the shareholder proposal is 
related to social matters (donations, etc.), the firm’s workforce, and 
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Table 8. Different proxies for voting outcome (robustness) 
This table presents the results of logistic and OLS regressions examining the effect of long-term institutional ownership on voting 
outcome of shareholder proposals using alternative measures for voting outcome. Columns (1) – (3) show the logistics estimations 
and columns (4) and (5) show the OLS estimations. Dissent (high) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the dissent voting of a 
shareholder proposal is above the median dissent voting of the sample, zero otherwise. For (high) is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if the for voting of a shareholder proposal is above the median for voting of the sample, zero otherwise. Passed & Withdrawn is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the shareholder proposal is put to vote and does exceed the majority voting requirement or if the 
shareholder proposal has been withdrawn before the general meeting date, zero otherwise. Against is the logistic transformation of 
the ratio of against votes to the total votes cast. For is the ratio of for votes to the total votes cast. Detailed definitions of the remaining 
variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial 
correlation through clustering by firms. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable = 






                                    
         (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)    
Long-term IO                            -16.014**        13.326***        8.820**        -2.864**         0.653*** 
                                         [7.959]         [4.727]         [3.628]         [1.344]         [0.200]    
Institutional Ownership                     17.249**       -10.715***       -7.602***        1.542          -0.459**  
                                         [7.575]         [4.141]         [2.858]         [1.273]         [0.181]    
Firm-level controls         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
Proposal-level controls         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes         Yes 
R2 (Pseudo)                          (0.61)        (0.65)        (0.33)         0.36            0.54    
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Table 9a. Propensity score matching and target analysis (robustness) 
This table presents the difference of long-term institutional ownership between target firms and matched control firms using a 
propensity score matching approach. Firms have been matched using all firm-level independent variables in Equation (1) except 
ownership variables. A target firm is defined as one at which at least one shareholder proposal was submitted in a particular year. 
The control firms’ subsample includes all UK listed firms in LSE which have not been targeted by shareholder proposals. We use 
five different matching algorithms: one nearest neighbour NN(1), three nearest neighbours NN(3), five nearest neighbours NN(5), 
Radius and Kernel. All matching algorithms impose common support and a caliper of 0.01. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
    Target Firms Control Firms Diff. SE t-statistics 
Matching algorithm 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NN(1) ATT 0.322 0.421 -0.097 0.035 -2.80*** 
NN(3) ATT 0.322 0.425 -0.103 0.028 -3.66*** 
NN(5) ATT 0.322 0.434 -0.112 0.027 -4.17*** 
Radius ATT 0.322 0.427 -0.105 0.023 -4.55*** 
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Table 9b. Propensity score matching and cumulative abnormal return (robustness) 
This table presents the difference of cumulative abnormal return around shareholder proposal meetings between target firms with 
different proportions of long-term institutional ownership. High (low) long-term IO firms are firms with above (below) the median 
of long-term institutional ownership. Firms have been matched using all firm-level independent variables in Equation (2) except 
ownership variables. We use eight different windows to estimate the cumulative abnormal return; [-1,+1],...,[-10,+10].We use 
three different matching algorithms: one nearest neighbour NN(1), Radius and Kernel. All matching algorithms impose common 
support and a caliper of 0.01. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
    
High long-term IO 
Firms 
Low long-term IO 
Firms 
Diff. SE t-statistics 
Matching algorithm 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CAR [-1,+1] 
  
          
NN(1) ATT -0.695 -4.921 4.226 2.458 1.72*   
Radius ATT -0.695 -4.882 4.187 2.000  2.09**  
Kernel ATT -1.655 -5.513 3.857 1.544  2.50**  
CAR [-1,0]             
NN(1) ATT 0.323 -2.502 2.825 1.843 1.53    
Radius ATT 0.323 -2.296 2.619 1.57  1.67*   
Kernel ATT -0.441 -3.546 3.105 1.33  2.33**  
CAR [0,+1]             
NN(1) ATT -1.459 -6.411 4.952 4.765 1.04    
Radius ATT -1.459 -6.411 4.952 2.409  2.06**  
Kernel ATT -0.778 -4.836 4.058 1.359  2.99*** 
CAR [-2,+2]             
NN(1) ATT -2.465 -7.158 4.693 5.356 0.88    
Radius ATT -2.465 -7.227 4.762 2.896 1.64*   
Kernel ATT -2.476 -13.1 10.627 2.637   4.03*** 
CAR [-1,+5]             
NN(1) ATT -1.646 -4.460 2.815 7.957 0.35    
Radius ATT -1.646 -4.492 2.846 4.353 0.65    
Kernel ATT -1.670 -14.36 12.69 2.875 4.42*** 
CAR [-1,+7]             
NN(1) ATT -2.696 -5.717 3.022 7.201 0.42    
Radius ATT -2.696 -5.779 3.083 4.149 0.74    
Kernel ATT -3.279 -15.28 12.00 3.018 3.98*** 
CAR [-5,+5]             
NN(1) ATT -0.404 1.122 -1.526 8.002 -0.19    
Radius ATT -0.404 1.328 -1.732 3.764 -0.46    
Kernel ATT -2.428 -10.75 8.325 2.945  2.83*** 
CAR [-10,+10]             
NN(1) ATT -0.329 -7.465 7.137 4.907 1.45    
Radius ATT -0.329 -7.694 7.362 3.796  1.94*   
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Table 9c. Propensity score matching and voting outcome (robustness) 
This table presents the difference of voting outcomes of shareholder proposals between target firms with different proportions 
of long-term institutional ownership. High (low) long-term IO firms are firms with above (below) the median of long-term 
institutional ownership. Firms have been matched using all firm-level independent variables in Equation (3) except ownership 
variables. We use four different proxies for voting outcome: Dissent (For) which is defined as the ratio of against and abstain 
(for) votes to the total votes cast, and  Defeated (Passed) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the shareholder proposal is put to 
vote and does not (does) exceed the majority voting requirement, zero otherwise. We use five different matching algorithms: 
one nearest neighbour NN(1), three nearest neighbours NN(3), five nearest neighbours NN(5), Radius and Kernel. All matching 
algorithms impose common support and a caliper of 0.01. Detailed definitions of remaining variables are reported in Appendix 
C Table C1. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
    
High long-
term IO Firms 
Low long-term 
IO Firms 
Diff. SE t-statistics 
Matching 
algorithm 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dissent             
NN(1) ATT 0.633 0.881 -0.249 0.086  -2.90*** 
NN(3) ATT 0.633 0.875 -0.242 0.071  -3.41*** 
NN(5) ATT 0.633 0.873 -0.240 0.063  -3.75*** 
Radius ATT 0.633 0.872 -0.239 0.071  -3.43*** 
Kernel ATT 0.618 0.901 -0.283 0.069  -4.12*** 
Defeated             
NN(1) ATT 0.609 0.812 -0.203 0.186 -1.09    
NN(3) ATT 0.609 0.826 -0.217 0.154 -1.41    
NN(5) ATT 0.609 0.822 -0.214 0.156 -1.37    
Radius ATT 0.609 0.821 -0.212 0.152 -1.40    
Kernel ATT 0.614 0.762 -0.148 0.134 -1.10    
For             
NN(1) ATT 0.368 0.119 0.250 0.056  2.91*** 
NN(3) ATT 0.368 0.125 0.243 0.083  2.93*** 
NN(5) ATT 0.368 0.124 0.245 0.082  2.99*** 
Radius ATT 0.368 0.121 0.248 0.067  3.70*** 
Kernel ATT 0.362 0.103 0.259 0.071  3.63*** 
Passed             
NN(1) ATT 0.232 0.101 0.130 0.126 1.03    
NN(3) ATT 0.232 0.101 0.130 0.084 1.55    
NN(5) ATT 0.232 0.101 0.130 0.075 1.73*   
Radius ATT 0.232 0.103 0.127 0.083 1.55    
Kernel ATT 0.196 0.045 0.151 0.099 1.52    
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Table 10a. Cumulative abnormal returns and the heterogeneous effect of long-term institutional ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the heterogeneous effect of long-term institutional ownership on the cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A shows the results of 
indexer and non-indexer long-term institutional investors, and Panel B shows the results of long-term institutional investors with low and high portfolio turnover. Eight different event 
windows are used to calculate CAR. A market model based on a 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. The FTSE All Share index 
has been used for benchmarking. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for 
serial correlation through clustering by firms.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                    Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal returns 
  [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
                                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)    
  Panel A 
Long-term IO (non-indexer)        
      
20.352***       10.398**  
      
14.368***       17.778          15.237          27.325**        10.112    
      
44.016*** 
                                         [7.176]         [4.545]         [5.323]        [13.876]         [9.199]        [12.140]        [10.449]        [16.239]    
Long-term IO (indexer)                 35.236          -8.569          -2.107         109.361    
     
216.737**        86.250    
     
351.001***      218.627    
                                        [63.619]        [42.365]        [55.909]       [116.642]        [97.298]       [109.502]       [128.364]       [168.952]    
Institutional Ownership (non-indexer)             -11.149*         -4.505         -11.214**        -1.908         -10.070         -15.462          -6.093         -20.917    
                                         [6.346]         [2.765]         [4.716]        [12.951]         [9.080]        [11.532]         [9.910]        [13.344]    
Institutional Ownership (indexer)                -22.084          -3.089          10.628        -112.564    
    -
199.904**       -94.011        -328.170**      -252.119    
                                        [64.554]        [41.075]        [56.931]       [114.171]        [93.739]       [103.622]       [128.396]       [159.537]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                               0.41            0.43            0.24            0.39            0.48            0.48            0.46            0.40    















Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover)      
      
30.147*** 
      
14.580***       13.469**  
      
24.437**  
      
39.007*** 
      
39.275*** 
      
57.533*** 
      
65.854*** 
                                         [5.781]         [4.825]         [6.409]        [10.232]         [9.523]         [9.971]        [15.955]        [13.905]    
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)              0.559          -2.463           9.520           7.783          -3.926          -1.601         -26.707*         16.023    
                                        [12.617]         [7.171]        [10.501]        [27.878]        [14.891]        [19.159]        [15.394]        [26.684]    
Institutional Ownership (high portfolio         -12.198**        -5.730          -5.510          -2.970         -15.932*        -16.997*        -26.883*        -27.798**  
turnover)            [4.904]         [4.556]         [5.612]         [9.071]         [8.415]         [9.866]        [13.942]        [13.479]    
Institutional Ownership (low portfolio        -0.585           3.189         -11.085          -3.967           0.012          -0.928          22.051          -2.488    
turnover)            [11.750]         [6.521]         [9.774]        [25.896]        [14.762]        [18.378]        [16.708]        [23.236]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                               0.44            0.44            0.24            0.38            0.49            0.48            0.48            0.41    
N          296             296             296             296             296             296             296             296    
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Table 10b. Voting outcome and the heterogeneous effect of long-term institutional 
ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of logistic and OLS regressions examining the heterogeneous effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on the voting outcome of shareholder proposals. Panel A shows the results of indexer and non-
indexer long-term institutional investors, and Panel B shows the results of long-term institutional investors with low and 
high portfolio turnover. Columns (1) and (2) show the logistics estimations and Column (3) shows the OLS estimations. 
Defeated (Passed) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the shareholder proposal is put to vote and does not (does) exceed 
the majority voting requirement, zero otherwise. Dissent is the logistic transformation of the ratio of against and dissent 
votes to the total votes cast. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard 
errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable =     Defeated          Passed    Dissent   
                                         (1)        (2)    (3)    
  Panel A 
Long-term IO (non-indexer)              -7.554**        20.253***       -3.696*** 
                                         [3.570]         [4.588]         [1.089]    
Long-term IO (indexer)                 -14.577          -3.464          23.904**  
                                        [33.691]        [51.297]        [11.646]    
Institutional Ownership (non-indexer)               4.809         -17.681***        3.075*** 
                                         [2.958]         [4.471]         [1.135]    
Institutional Ownership (indexer)                 11.210         -11.381         -28.655**  
                                        [34.262]        [55.150]        [13.691]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (Pseudo)                   (0.39) (0.41) 0.48 
N 322 322 222 
  Panel B 
Long-term IO (high portfolio turnover)            -6.092          18.391**         1.057    
                                         [4.370]         [7.676]         [2.728]    
Long-term IO (low portfolio turnover)            -15.976***       19.058***       -5.851**  
                                         [5.602]         [6.446]         [2.788]    
Institutional Ownership (high portfolio        2.687         -19.781**  -1.498 
turnover)                                 [3.113]         [7.766]         [2.820]    
Institutional Ownership (low portfolio       12.477**       -14.185**         4.073*   
turnover)                                 [4.985]         [5.795]         [2.212]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (Pseudo)                   (0.41) (0.43) 0.48 
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Table 11a. Target analysis: pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the effect of investment horizon of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional investors on the probability of a firm 
being targeted by shareholder proposals. The dependent variable target firm is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firms are being targeted by at least one shareholder proposal at a given year, 0 
for matched (non-target) firms. Columns (1) – (8) show the results using different proxies for size in our matching procedure, Market-to-book (MTB), total assets, revenue, and market 
capitalization. Columns (9) and (10) replicate the estimation while pooling all matched firms with the four different size proxies in one regression. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables 
are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                    Dependent variable = Target Firm 
  MTB Total Assets Revenue Market Cap. All Matched 
                                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)             (9)            (10)    
Pressure-Sensitive IO                     -1.282                          -1.742                          -2.033                          -3.029                         -1.229                    
                                         [2.575]                         [2.865]                         [2.798]                        [3.037]                         [2.747]                    
Pressure-Resistant IO                     -3.141*                        -3.555*                        -3.343*                         -3.308*                       -2.980*                   
                                         [1.729]                         [1.860]                         [1.985]                        [1.830]                         [1.760]                    
Pressure-Sensitive IO 
(long-term)               
                       4.001                          -4.577                       -12.060*                        -9.583                        -5.166    
                     [6.028]                         [7.466]                        [7.287]                         [8.247]                         [5.605]    
Pressure-Resistant IO 
(long-term)              
                    -3.929**                       -3.238*                         -3.174                        -3.451*                       -2.951    
                     [1.901]                         [1.937]                        [2.146]                         [1.942]                         [1.912]    
Pressure-Sensitive IO 
(medium-term)              
                      -9.382                         -11.929                           0.968                         -8.219                        -7.161    
                     [6.440]                         [9.603]                        [6.136]                         [7.825]                         [6.865]    
Pressure-Resistant IO 
(medium-term)             
                      -3.404                        -7.890**                        -0.297                         -4.626                        -2.534    
                     [4.687]                         [3.527]                        [4.905]                         [4.377]                         [3.053]    
Pressure-Sensitive IO 
(short-term)              
                      -1.192                           6.508                         10.934                         -0.353                         3.098    
                     [2.834]                         [8.661]                        [13.893]                         [2.867]                         [2.582]    
Pressure-Resistant IO 
(short-term)               
                      -0.193                           2.477                          -1.805                          2.054                        -0.502    
                     [5.198]                         [3.987]                        [4.682]                         [5.568]                         [3.908]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2      0.22        0.23       0.22        0.24       0.25        0.27       0.24       0.25       0.19       0.20    
N                                    192        192        200        200         202        202       202      202       499         499    
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Table 11b. Cumulative abnormal returns: pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional ownership on the cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A presents 
the effect of total ownership by pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional investors, and Panel B presents the role of the investment horizon of pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant institutional ownership. Eight different event windows are used to calculate CAR. A market model based on a 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has 
been used to calculate CAR. The FTSE All Share index has been used for benchmarking. Detailed definitions of the remaining variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors 
are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firms. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                    Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal returns 
  [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
                                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)    
  Panel A 
Pressure-Sensitive IO                -12.519           4.761         -18.144          21.508          -3.720          -6.266         -10.085          -2.648    
                                        [25.631]         [8.455]        [20.159]        [37.273]        [34.694]        [40.192]        [37.500]        [42.297]    
Pressure-Resistant IO                 -0.343          -5.328           1.859          -1.635           4.232           0.837          -7.793          -8.416    
                                         [7.951]         [5.452]         [6.656]         [9.661]        [11.242]        [13.442]        [14.358]        [18.107]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                               0.39            0.52            0.20            0.43            0.42            0.42            0.40            0.31    























(long-term)               
    -128.505**       -20.361        -108.106**      -212.772***     -182.456***     -233.390***     -263.171***     -236.319**  
    [50.143]        [20.313]        [49.187]        [58.374]        [62.609]        [69.771]        [58.161]        [90.859]    
Pressure-Resistant IO 
(long-term)               
      50.977***        8.902          30.496**        77.054***       82.312***      116.767***      123.145***      146.579*** 
    [12.379]        [11.161]        [13.301]        [22.396]        [18.761]        [23.343]        [19.305]        [40.455]    
Pressure-Sensitive IO                  7.976           7.976          -0.407          55.736***       24.984*         29.993**        31.140**        32.935    
                                        [10.918]        [10.171]         [8.175]        [13.098]        [14.437]        [13.308]        [14.694]        [25.383]    
Pressure-Resistant IO                -29.148***      -10.503         -13.205         -43.889**       -44.018**       -69.375***      -80.657***     -100.486*** 
                                        [10.254]         [8.129]        [10.586]        [18.361]        [18.237]        [22.958]        [17.224]        [37.245]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2                               0.54            0.53            0.32            0.59            0.54            0.59            0.56            0.43    
N                                         296             296             296             296             296             296             296             296    
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Table 11c. Voting outcome: pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional 
ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of logistic and OLS regressions examining the effect of pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant institutional ownership on the voting outcome of shareholder proposals. Panel A presents the effect of total 
ownership by pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional investors, and Panel B presents the role of the 
investment horizon of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional ownership. Columns (1) and (2) show the 
logistics estimations and Column (3) shows the OLS estimations. Defeated (Passed) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the shareholder proposal is put to vote and does not (does) exceed the majority voting requirement, zero otherwise. Dissent 
is the logistic transformation of the ratio of against and dissent votes to the total votes cast. Detailed definitions of remaining 
variables are reported in Appendix C Table C1. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and allow for 
serial correlation through clustering by firms. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Dependent variable =     Defeated          Passed          Dissent    
                                    
 (1)    (2)     (3)    
  Panel A 
Pressure-Sensitive IO                     43.625**       -51.157***        2.333    
                                        [17.640]        [18.223]         [2.889]    
Pressure-Resistant IO                     -2.857           4.895          -1.171    
                                         [3.601]         [3.538]         [1.529]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (Pseudo)                  (0.46) (0.38)         0.46    
N                                322 322 222 
  Panel B 
Pressure-Sensitive IO (long-term)                     23.944         -23.465          -2.851    
                                        [22.613]        [43.462]         [5.847]    
Pressure-Resistant IO (long-term)                     -17.584**        21.227*         -6.630**  
                                         [7.211]        [12.742]         [3.173]    
Pressure-Sensitive IO                     30.717**       -28.682           3.515    
                                        [15.198]        [38.855]         [2.422]    
Pressure-Resistant IO                      9.633*         -9.665           4.458    
                                         [5.369]         [7.675]         [3.372]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (Pseudo)                  (0.49) (0.33) 0.46 
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Table 12a. Target analysis: foreign and domestic institutional ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions examining the effect of investment horizon of foreign and domestic institutional investors on the probability of firm being targeted by shareholder proposals. The 
dependent variable target firm is a dummy variable equals 1 if firms being targeted by at least one shareholder proposal at a given year, 0 for matched (non-target) firms. Detailed definitions of variables are reported 
in Table C1 in Appendix C. Columns (1) - (8) shows the results using different proxies for size in our matching procedure, Market-to-book (MTB), total assets, revenue, and market capitalization. Columns (9) and 
(10) replicate the estimation with pooling all matched firms with the four different size proxies in one regression. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust clustering by firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significant of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                    Dependent variable = Target Firm 
  MTB Total Assets Revenue Market Cap. All Matched 
                                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)             (9)            (10)    
Foreign IO                      1.021                           1.951                           0.466                          -0.884                           1.410                    
                                         [1.645]                         [1.896]                         [1.564]                         [1.689]                         [1.399]                    
Domestic IO                     -3.081***                       -2.776***                       -2.601**                        -2.995***                       -2.952***                 
                                         [1.048]                         [1.015]                         [1.182]                         [1.081]                         [1.105]                    
Foreign IO (long-term)                                         1.480                           2.302                          -1.331                          -1.455                           0.826    
                                                         [2.061]                         [3.035]                         [2.235]                         [2.234]                         [1.832]    
Domestic IO (long-term)                                     -2.749***                       -2.869**                        -2.733**                        -2.825**                        -2.858**  
                                                         [1.047]                         [1.140]                         [1.297]                         [1.165]                         [1.147]    
Foreign IO (medium-term)                                  -3.896                          -2.227                           2.358                           2.807                           1.420    
                                                         [4.271]                         [4.754]                         [5.036]                         [5.697]                         [3.546]    
Domestic IO (medium-term)                               -5.115                          -6.126**                        -1.545                          -6.616**                        -4.146*   
                                                         [3.309]                         [3.093]                         [3.572]                         [2.756]                         [2.513]    
Foreign IO (short-term)                                        5.769*                          9.600**                         5.536                           0.870                           5.597**  
                                                         [3.424]                         [4.392]                         [4.995]                         [3.801]                         [2.834]    
Domestic IO (short-term)                                    -7.765*                          0.165                          -3.976                          -2.496                          -4.740    
                                                         [4.595]                         [3.897]                         [3.283]                         [4.103]                         [4.639]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2                          0.25            0.27            0.25            0.27            0.26            0.28            0.27            0.27            0.22            0.23    
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Table 12b. Target analysis: foreign and domestic institutional ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the effect of foreign and domestic institutional ownership on the cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A presents the effect of total 
ownership by foreign and domestic institutional investors, and Panel B presents the role of investment horizon of foreign and domestic institutional ownership. Eight different event widows are used 
to calculate CAR. Market model based on 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. FTSE All share index has been used for benchmarking. 
Detailed definitions of variables are reported in Table C1 in Appendix C. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust clustering by firm level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant of t-test at 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
                                    Dependent variable = Cumulative abnormal returns 
  [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
                                             (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)    
  Panel A 
Foreign IO                     -1.187          -0.477          -5.244          -5.044          -4.980          -9.555          -1.288         -20.912    
                                         [7.177]         [4.430]         [5.936]         [8.398]         [7.468]        [11.400]        [10.505]        [18.663]    
Domestic IO                      4.252           3.164           1.104           9.544*          2.935           4.975           4.462          19.494*** 
                                         [4.354]         [2.772]         [3.612]         [5.133]         [5.896]         [5.432]         [8.554]         [7.236]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2         0.33            0.41            0.20            0.36            0.42            0.44            0.40            0.38    



















Foreign IO (long-term)                        19.064*         11.820          18.472**        -1.889          -4.963          14.253         -25.175          50.951*   
                                         [9.588]         [7.460]         [8.537]        [14.403]        [13.659]        [18.769]        [19.086]        [27.450]    
Domestic IO (long-term)                      16.894**         5.524           6.605          18.982          30.532**        23.189*         45.016***       33.112**  
                                         [8.179]         [4.661]         [5.633]        [15.562]        [12.758]        [13.159]        [15.839]        [14.315]    
Foreign IO                    -10.520*         -6.235         -14.232**        -4.238          -2.751         -16.594          10.651         -45.787**  
                                         [5.527]         [4.173]         [5.540]        [11.540]         [9.568]        [12.611]        [11.956]        [17.919]    
Domestic IO                     -8.690          -1.079          -3.977          -4.955         -20.383         -12.768         -29.883*         -5.900    
                                         [7.457]         [3.768]         [5.123]        [14.661]        [12.224]        [12.426]        [15.013]        [11.818]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2          0.40            0.43            0.24            0.38            0.47            0.47              0.47              0.44    
N                                         296             296             296             296             296             296               296               296    
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Table 12c. Voting outcome: foreign and domestic institutional ownership (robustness) 
This table presents the results of logistic and OLS regressions examining the effect of foreign and domestic 
institutional ownership on voting outcome of shareholder proposals. Panel A presents the effect of total 
ownership by foreign and domestic institutional investors, and Panel B presents the role of investment horizon 
of foreign and domestic institutional ownership. Columns (1) and (2) shows the logistics estimations and 
column (3) shows the OLS estimations. Defeated (passed) is a dummy variable equals 1 if the shareholder 
proposal is put to vote and does not (does) exceed the majority voting requirement, zero otherwise. Dissent is 
the logistic transformation of the ratio of against and dissent votes to the total vote cast. Detailed definitions 
of variables are reported in Table C1 in Appendix C. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust clustering by firm 
level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable =     Defeated          Passed          Dissent    
                                    
 (1)    (2)     (3)    
  Panel A 
Foreign IO                     -0.865          -1.235           0.380    
                                         [2.041]         [3.800]         [2.375]    
Domestic IO                      0.119          -2.059           1.625    
                                         [1.056]         [1.561]         [1.373]    
Firm-level controls    Yes  Yes     Yes 
Proposal-level controls   Yes  Yes     Yes 
R2 (Pseudo)                        (0.34)  (0.27)     0.46 
N                                 322  322     222 
  Panel B 
Foreign IO (long-term)                        -1.809          21.553**        -0.440    
                                         [4.523]         [8.759]         [3.068]    
Domestic IO (long-term)                       -10.752***       12.721***       -2.950*   
                                         [3.365]         [4.031]         [1.485]    
Foreign IO                     -0.103         -15.517           0.380    
                                         [3.828]         [9.493]         [2.375]    
Domestic IO                      8.117***      -11.986***        1.625    
                                         [2.874]         [3.902]         [1.373]    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Proposal-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (Pseudo)                      (0.39)     (0.41) 0.46 
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Table C2. Cumulative abnormal returns around general meetings with only one shareholder proposal 
This table shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns around dates of general meetings with only one shareholder proposal by voting outcome of proposals, related issue of shareholder proposals, 
and meeting type. Market model based on 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. FTSE All share index has been used for benchmarking. 
The cross-sectional t-test has been used to test the significance of mean differences.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  CAR 
Panel A 
One-proposal meetings 
[-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
Defeated proposal -1.457* -1.293* -1.170* 0.845 -0.00219 -0.348 -0.443 -1.962 
  (-1.92) (-2.02) (-1.75) (0.72) (-0.00) (-0.30) (-0.32) (-1.02) 
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Passed proposal -0.190 0.201 -2.565 -3.670 -0.966 -1.076 6.235 5.905 
  (-0.13) (0.15) (-0.83) (-1.14) (-0.21) (-0.25) (1.36) (1.53) 
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
CG proposal -2.119 -1.860 -1.142 0.368 0.953 0.203 0.460 -1.163 
  (-1.59) (-1.63) (-0.91) (0.19) (0.50) (0.10) (0.19) (-0.35) 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
CSR proposal -0.0875 -0.292 -0.594 0.409 0.369 0.351 0.196 1.084 
  (-0.16) (-0.65) (-1.20) (0.58) (0.45) (0.40) (0.16) (0.60) 
N 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
CG proposal (elect) -3.532** -2.518 -2.769* 0.0949 1.399 -0.648 4.956 2.046 
  (-2.63) (-1.78) (-2.01) (0.04) (0.51) (-0.24) (1.34) (0.48) 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
CG proposal (remove) -1.012 -1.932 -1.266 1.101 2.022 1.893 -2.960 -1.830 
  (-0.24) (-0.56) (-0.32) (0.18) (0.40) (0.35) (-0.45) (-0.21) 
N 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
EGM -2.012 -0.896 -5.936 1.612 -3.238 -3.896 10.98 0.587 
  (-1.01) (-0.56) (-1.16) (0.23) (-0.38) (-0.48) (1.41) (0.08) 
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Panel B 
Defeated proposal Not-Defeated proposal 
[-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
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CG proposal -3.239* 1.310 -0.743 -4.276 0.279 -1.651 3.039 5.506 
  (-2.09) (0.50) (-0.25) (-1.04) (0.11) (-0.67) (0.66) (1.02) 
N 15 15 15 15 7 7 7 7 
CSR proposal -0.130 0.504 -0.395 0.259 0.0268 0.156 1.773 3.285 
  (-0.28) (0.74) (-0.38) (0.20) (0.02) (0.08) (0.47) (0.55) 
N 16 16 16 16 6 6 6 6 
CG proposal (elect) -2.296 2.778 5.469 2.160 -8.477* -10.64*** 2.908 1.591 
  (-1.73) (1.35) (1.51) (0.47) (-8.01) (-67.05) (0.19) (0.10) 
N 8 8 8 8 2 2 2 2 
CG proposal (remove) -7.172 -1.424 -11.81 -15.88 5.149* 3.626* 5.893 12.22 
  (-1.05) (-0.10) (-1.32) (-1.46) (2.92) (3.04) (0.79) (1.40) 
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
EGM -4.279 10.06 2.612 -12.04 1.011 -9.657 22.13 17.43* 
  (-1.77) (2.01) (0.40) (-1.43) (0.36) (-0.70) (1.47) (3.06) 
N 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 
Panel C 
EGM  AGM 
[-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
CG proposal -1.638 8.085* 4.663 -1.701 -2.300 -2.526 -1.116 -0.962 
  (-0.71) (2.35) (0.87) (-0.19) (-1.39) (-1.33) (-0.41) (-0.28) 
N 6 6 6 6 16 16 16 16 
CSR proposal - - - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - - - 
N - - - - - - - - 
CG proposal (elect) -4.204 4.973 8.446 -8.023 -3.364* -1.125 4.084 4.563 
  (-1.36) (0.87) (0.66) (-0.80) (-2.11) (-0.42) (1.04) (0.98) 
N 2 2 2 2 8 8 8 8 
CG proposal (remove) 2.665 10.52 6.441 13.03 -4.688 -8.318 -12.36 -16.69 
  (1.99) (1.62) (0.88) (1.61) (-0.55) (-1.07) (-1.45) (-1.63) 
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
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Table C3. Cumulative abnormal returns around general meetings with multi shareholder proposals 
This table shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns around dates of general meetings with multi-shareholder proposals by voting outcome of proposals, related issue of shareholder proposals, 
and meeting type. Market model based on 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. FTSE All share index has been used for benchmarking. 
The cross-sectional t-test has been used to test the significance of mean differences.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant of t-test at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  CAR 
  Multi-proposal meetings 
  [-1,+1] [-1,0] [0,+1] [-2,+2] [-1,+5] [-1,+7] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
Defeated proposal -1.914* -1.142* -1.185 -2.948** -3.698** -4.344*** -3.318** -4.860** 
  (-1.81) (-1.71) (-1.23) (-2.09) (-2.49) (-2.87) (-2.01) (-2.62) 
N 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
No-Defeated proposal 0.800 0.677 0.180 1.607 2.194 1.048 5.462** 7.082* 
  (0.68) (0.67) (0.24) (0.96) (1.32) (0.59) (2.59) (1.91) 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
EGM -1.925 -0.429 -1.459 -3.490* -4.841** -5.045** -4.525* -3.605 
  (-1.20) (-0.47) (-0.95) (-1.94) (-2.30) (-2.40) (-1.82) (-1.20) 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
AGM -0.400 -0.554 -0.264 -0.0960 0.253 -0.933 2.275 1.031 
  (-0.46) (-0.76) (-0.44) (-0.07) (0.19) (-0.66) (1.49) (0.44) 
N 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Defeated & AGM -0.665 -0.884 -0.312 -1.519 -0.461 -1.506 0.596 -3.143 
  (-0.57) (-0.89) (-0.37) (-0.82) (-0.25) (-0.75) (0.28) (-1.31) 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Defeated & EGM -3.356* -1.440 -2.192 -4.597** -7.432*** -7.619*** -7.834*** -6.841** 
  (-1.85) (-1.60) (-1.19) (-2.15) (-3.33) (-3.52) (-3.42) (-2.38) 
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
No-Defeated & AGM -0.0689 -0.141 -0.205 1.682 1.145 -0.217 4.373* 6.248 
  (-0.05) (-0.13) (-0.23) (0.81) (0.60) (-0.11) (2.04) (1.49) 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
No-Defeated & EGM 4.275* 3.949 1.721 1.307 6.386* 6.108 9.816 10.42 
  (2.23) (1.73) (1.46) (0.96) (2.27) (1.62) (1.55) (1.22) 
N 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
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Defeated CG proposal (elect) & EGM -3.078* -1.677 -2.603* -3.731* -6.022 -4.271 -5.220 -1.900 
  (-2.36) (-1.94) (-2.37) (-2.42) (-1.04) (-1.17) (-0.83) (-0.48) 
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Defeated CG proposal (remove) & 
EGM -2.271 -3.055 -2.054 -0.676 -5.966 -5.575 -9.211 -9.390 
  (-0.84) (-1.93) (-0.63) (-0.25) (-1.03) (-1.14) (-1.88) (-1.39) 
N 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Not-Defeated CG proposal (elect) & 
EGM - - - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - - - 
N - - - - - - - - 
Not-Defeated CG proposal (remove) & 
EGM - - - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - - - 
N - - - - - - - - 
Defeated CG proposal (elect) & AGM -0.164 -2.819 0.0737 -0.690 -0.537 0.0264 -1.691 -5.525 
  (-0.13) (-1.71) (0.05) (-0.55) (-0.37) (0.02) (-0.84) (-1.82) 
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Defeated CG proposal (remove) & 
AGM - - - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - - - 
N - - - - - - - - 
Not-Defeated CG proposal (elect) & 
AGM 1.633 1.644*** 0.933 2.812 0.415 -0.793 0.982 3.839 
  (0.73) (3.78) (0.48) (1.15) (0.17) (-0.23) (0.28) (0.60) 
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Not-Defeated CG proposal (remove) & 
AGM -2.823 -2.493 -1.846 -0.153 -0.738 -3.587 4.968 6.192 
  (-1.36) (-2.08) (-0.74) (-0.02) (-0.19) (-0.99) (1.10) (0.79) 
N 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
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Table C4. Cumulative abnormal returns around general meetings: a comparison between first and subsequent meetings 
This table shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns around dates of shareholder proposal general meetings by voting outcome of proposals, related issue of shareholder proposals, and meeting 
type with differentiating between first and subsequent meetings. Market model based on 200-day period ending 21 days prior to the general meeting date has been used to calculate CAR. FTSE All 
share index has been used for benchmarking. The cross-sectional t-test has been used to test the significance of mean differences.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significant of t-test at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  CAR 
Panel A 
First targeted meeting Not-First targeted meeting 
[-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
Defeated proposal -2.627** -2.989** -4.057** -4.807** -0.530 0.502 0.265 -2.339 
  (-2.40) (-2.06) (-2.32) (-2.31) (-0.70) (0.41) (0.21) (-1.53) 
N 52 52 52 52 38 38 38 38 
Passed proposal -1.432 -2.406 0.913 4.376 2.410 2.520 5.258 1.357 
  (-0.96) (-1.10) (0.31) (1.18) (1.73) (1.27) (1.60) (0.57) 
N 31 31 31 31 13 13 13 13 
CG proposal -1.266 -1.224 -0.956 -0.235 -1.341 -1.067 1.348 -1.872 
  (-1.35) (-0.98) (-0.57) (-0.10) (-1.26) (-0.63) (0.88) (-0.87) 
N 71 71 71 71 32 32 32 32 
CSR proposal -0.306 0.473 0.260 -0.0890 0.182 0.722 0.524 1.000 
  (-0.25) (0.41) (0.15) (-0.03) (0.39) (1.08) (0.50) (0.72) 
N 11 11 11 11 19 19 19 19 
CG proposal (elect) -1.607 -1.527 -1.184 -0.732 -2.086 -3.457* 1.131 -3.018 
  (-1.37) (-0.94) (-0.59) (-0.26) (-1.49) (-1.86) (0.93) (-1.52) 
N 49 49 49 49 18 18 18 18 
CG proposal (remove) -1.580 -2.142 -1.912 -1.245 -1.256 -1.838 5.273 0.147 
  (-1.17) (-1.16) (-0.80) (-0.38) (-0.46) (-0.41) (1.43) (0.03) 
N 44 44 44 44 12 12 12 12 
EGM -2.661 -4.466* -2.301 -2.275 0.149 2.910 -0.121 -4.527 
  (-1.54) (-1.90) (-0.67) (-0.65) (0.10) (1.13) (-0.06) (-1.07) 
N 29 29 29 29 10 10 10 10 
Panel B 
Defeated proposal 
First targeted meeting Not-First targeted meeting 
  [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
CG proposal -3.268** -3.963** -5.334** -5.702** -0.793 0.551 0.848 -3.582 
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  (-2.55) (-2.34) (-2.65) (-2.31) (-0.65) (0.27) (0.42) (-1.52) 
N 43 43 43 43 23 23 23 23 
CSR proposal 0.342 1.327 0.991 -0.668 -0.210 0.402 -0.449 0.288 
  (0.27) (1.15) (0.59) (-0.36) (-0.49) (0.65) (-0.73) (0.20) 
N 9 9 9 9 15 15 15 15 
CG proposal (elect) -3.248* -4.119* -4.651* -5.002 -2.317 -3.512 -0.0374 -4.511 
  (-2.04) (-1.84) (-1.74) (-1.58) (-1.46) (-1.49) (-0.03) (-1.76) 
N 30 30 30 30 12 12 12 12 
CG proposal (remove) -4.430** -6.605** -8.625*** -8.198** 1.893 5.209 8.113 -6.098 
  (-2.39) (-2.73) (-3.28) (-2.36) (0.36) (0.56) (0.93) (-0.78) 
N 27 27 27 27 5 5 5 5 
EGM -4.268** -4.594* -7.840*** -7.557** -0.884 3.771 -1.847 -7.462 
  (-2.14) (-1.86) (-2.83) (-2.38) (-0.46) (1.02) (-0.77) (-1.39) 
N 23 23 23 23 7 7 7 7 
Panel C 
No-Defeated proposal 
First targeted meeting Not-First targeted meeting 
  [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
CG proposal 1.808 2.982* 5.768** 8.162** -2.742 -5.203 2.624 2.497 
  (1.58) (1.99) (2.36) (2.10) (-1.28) (-1.79) (1.52) (0.53) 
N 28 28 28 28 9 9 9 9 
CSR proposal -3.222 -3.371 -3.030 2.517 1.651 1.919 4.174 3.669 
  (-0.81) (-1.31) (-0.39) (0.12) (1.17) (0.82) (0.95) (0.92) 
N 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 
CG proposal (elect) 0.985 2.566 4.290 6.010 -1.623 -3.346 3.467 -0.0311 
  (0.64) (1.29) (1.59) (1.19) (-0.55) (-1.01) (1.35) (-0.01) 
N 19 19 19 19 6 6 6 6 
CG proposal (remove) 2.948** 4.948** 8.750** 9.799* -3.506 -6.872* 3.245 4.608 
  (2.22) (2.72) (2.67) (1.76) (-1.29) (-1.95) (1.48) (0.79) 
N 17 17 17 17 7 7 7 7 
EGM 3.500 -3.972 18.93* 17.97* 2.560 0.900 3.906 2.322 
  (1.63) (-0.58) (2.13) (2.32) (1.02) (0.74) (1.22) (0.42) 
N 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 
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Panel D 
EGM 
First targeted meeting Not-First targeted meeting 
  [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
CG proposal -2.604 -3.296 -4.129 -2.868 0.149 2.910 -0.121 -4.527 
  (-1.45) (-1.56) (-1.36) (-0.80) (0.10) (1.13) (-0.06) (-1.07) 
N 28 28 28 28 10 10 10 10 
CSR proposal - - - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - - - 
N - - - - - - - - 
CG proposal (elect) -3.587 -4.441 -6.662** -6.803* 0.758 -0.503 2.538 1.040 
  (-1.63) (-1.65) (-2.25) (-2.07) (0.49) (-0.35) (1.67) (0.40) 
N 21 21 21 21 7 7 7 7 
CG proposal (remove) -2.362 -3.897 -4.350 -2.116 2.958* 5.371 0.694 -2.631 
  (-1.18) (-1.70) (-1.39) (-0.53) (2.31) (1.47) (0.23) (-0.59) 
N 25 25 25 25 6 6 6 6 
Panel E 
AGM 
First targeted meeting Not-First targeted meeting 
  [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] [-1,+1] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] [-10,+10] 
CG proposal -0.395 0.125 1.111 1.480 -2.019 -2.875 2.015 -0.666 
  (-0.39) (0.08) (0.58) (0.50) (-1.47) (-1.37) (0.99) (-0.26) 
N 43 43 43 43 22 22 22 22 
CSR proposal - - - - - - - - 
  - - - - - - - - 
N - - - - - - - - 
CG proposal (elect) -0.122 0.659 2.925 3.821 -3.895* -5.336* 0.235 -5.600* 
  (-0.10) (0.34) (1.16) (0.93) (-2.04) (-1.89) (0.14) (-2.15) 
N 28 28 28 28 11 11 11 11 
CG proposal (remove) -0.551 0.169 1.296 -0.0989 -5.470 -9.048 9.853 2.926 
  (-0.32) (0.06) (0.35) (-0.02) (-1.13) (-1.23) (1.52) (0.33) 
N 19 19 19 19 6 6 6 6 
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